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Recent reforms to digital copyright enforcement have given platform 
intermediaries and large copyright holders the power to sanction billions of 
underrepresented users worldwide. The automated monitoring, filtering, and removal of 
user-generated content has mirrored other forms of machine-based decision making, as it 
provides legal authority to algorithms and privatizes control over legal expression. While 
there is much debate on the effectiveness of current enforcement methods, there is still 
much to understand about the politics that influence these changes and the legal and 
policy frameworks that lead to machine-based decision making.  
To fill this gap, this study explores the recent policymaking discourses that have 
influenced public narratives of automated filtering and the legal outcomes of related 
regulatory debates. I present three case studies of international and national reforms in 
one specific area of internet policy: intermediary liability law. These case studies include 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the United States (2016), The Canadian Copyright 
 v 
Modernization Act (2012), and Article 17 of the new Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market in the European Union (2018). I have analyzed hundreds of pages 
of government documents, including hearing transcripts, stakeholder submissions, and 
government reports to ascertain how reforms to digital copyright enforcement have 
developed and what this documentary evidence discloses about the politics and the 
geopolitics that have influenced these changes. Additionally, I analyze the legal and 
policy frameworks that lead to machine-based decision making, and the implications of 
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CHAPTER I:  
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation focuses on one core area of internet policymaking, digital 
copyright enforcement, and the national and international regulations that govern the 
automated filtering of copyright material. Drawing from previous scholarship in political 
economy of the media, international communications, and media law, I present three case 
studies of digital copyright policy making: Canada’s national copyright law (notice-and-
notice), the intellectual property provisions contained within the stalled Trans-Pacific 
Partnership free trade agreement, and Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market in the European Union.  
Recent reforms to digital copyright enforcement have given platform 
intermediaries and large copyright holders the power to sanction billions of 
underrepresented users worldwide.1 The automated monitoring, filtering, and removal of 
user-generated content has mirrored other forms of machine-based decision making, as it 
provides legal authority to algorithms and privatizes control over legal rights.2 While 
there is much debate on the effectiveness of current enforcement methods, the shift to 
privatized automated enforcement is said to make the internet safer for commerce and 
more protective of creative work.3 Yet evidence from a number of areas, including 
internet governance, law, and development studies suggest that these claims may be 
 
1 IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD GOVERNANCE AND BETTER 
REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2013). Id. at 87.; LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 513 (2011). 
2 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process (2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1012360 (last 
visited Aug 27, 2018). 
3 Karyn Hollis, A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Intellectual Property Chapter of the TPP:  Confirming 
What the Critics Fear, 6 COMMUN. 1 (2017), https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cpo/vol6/iss1/5. 
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inflated.4 Recent scholarship in the area of algorithms and artificial intelligence has also 
established that engineering and design processes are not neutral and, in many cases, are 
exacerbating social inequities.5 There is still much to understand about the politics that 
influence these changes, the legal and policy frameworks that lead to machine-based 
decision making, and the implications of automated content controls on social welfare 
and human rights.    
Three laws – Article 17 in the E.U., the intermediary liability provisions in the 
TPP, and Canada’s notice-and-notice – were all developed during or after the widespread 
use of automated software for enforcement. Therefore, I have selected them as exemplars 
because they provide three distinct standards of intermediary liability that govern 
automated filtering and where automated filtering was the technical backdrop of 
negotiations. Internet platforms and large entertainment companies in the U.S. began the 
widespread automation of notice sending and notice processing between 2011 and 2012.6 
As discussed later, these automated processes have led to exponential rises in daily 
takedowns and have been under increased scrutiny in recent years for high levels of false 
positives.7 The debates surrounding them, therefore, shed light on the politics of this new 
era of automation. 
 
4 Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, 
AVAILABLE SSRN 2755628 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628 (last 
visited Oct 12, 2016). 
5 VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH 
THE POOR (2018); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES 
REINFORCE RACISM (2018). 
6 Google’s data shows that it removed an average of 10,000 URL’s per day in response to copyright 
takedown requests in January of 2012. That number rose to 100,000 per day by January of 2013. See 
Transparency Report: Content Delisting Due to Copyright, GOOGLE, 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/copyright/overview 
7 See Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield, supra note 4. 
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I have also chosen to study these three laws because the decisions that are made in 
these jurisdictions will likely influence other countries’ decisions. The policy choices 
made in the U.S. and the E.U. could lead to new international norms. As Freedman 
argues, the media policymaking of the European Commission (EC) and the U.S. 
Congress have international implications, as different countries seek to establish their 
own policy programs for digital economies.8 The three laws under study here can also be 
seen as blueprints for other international agreements, such as within the WIPO or WTO 
forums. International media policy scholars have also looked at cases in the global north 
because they are resisted. Reform efforts also aim to counteract and create alternatives to 
the standards in the U.S. and E.U. My intent, therefore, is to look at these exemplars 
critically, not to say that these laws are somehow more desirable than those in other 
countries. These choices acknowledge the geopolitical power of the U.S. and E.U. in 
particular and the Canadian standard as an outlier to those two influential policy models. 
And, as I analyze the policy debates surrounding them, I hope to shed light on how global 
norms for platform regulation have developed.  
Like other areas of internet policymaking, such as privacy and net neutrality,9 
digital copyright is a site of struggle between property rights and free expression rights. 
The discourses, arguments, and policy rationales that emerge from policymaking can 
reveal how internet policies are created in different national contexts. In addition, 
copyright is unique in the way that the law connects to many different financial sectors 
 
8 Des Freedman, The Politics of Media Policy 18 (2013). 
9 Michael Geist, The Policy Battle over Information and Digital Policy Regulation: A Canadian 
Perspective The Constitution of Information: From Gutenberg to Snowden, 17 THEOR. INQ. LAW 415–450 
(2016). 
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and political constituencies and impacting nearly everyone who uses a computer for 
entertainment and information. In turn, the actors involved in the creation of digital 
copyright law – entertainment companies, telecommunication companies, digital rights 
advocates, copyright lawyers, academics, and artists – have shaped the public 
understandings of digital capitalism as they act within the policy field to justify various 
policy positions and coalitions.  
Copyright takedowns are a form of filtering that are designed to deny access or to 
obscure content by deleting it from a host’s index – such as a Google’s search results or 
YouTube’s library. Different jurisdictions have determined how much power hosting 
platforms have to remove content from their networks, how quickly they must remove it, 
and the amount of oversight they are subject to from government institutions. The 
international picture is constantly in flux and the balance of rights is an ongoing political 
contest in many countries.10 Takedowns and the mechanisms that the law provides for 
content removal can be seen as a type of state-facilitated censorship – one that presents 
inherent conflicts with institutions of free expression.  
While the future of this global spread of intermediary liability law certainly 
matters to expression rights of users, platform regulation and the laws that dictate 
automated filtering effects more than individual rights. In addition, these legal 
frameworks favor the platforms that have the human resources and computing power to 
respond to millions of takedown notices per day. Estimates have claimed that YouTube 
 
10 STEFAN KULK, INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES AND COPYRIGHT LAW. TOWARDS A FUTURE-PROOF EU LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK (2018). See also, Daniel Seng, Comparative Analysis of the National Approaches to the 
Liability of Internet Intermediaries, WIPO STUDY AVAILABLE WWW WIPO 
INTCOPYRIGHTENINTERNETINTERMEDIARIES (2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf (last visited Mar 15, 2017). 
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developed its ContentID system, which filters out copyrighted material on upload, for 
$60 to $100 million.11 In addition, they favor large corporations that have the legal 
resources to withstand litigation. Small startups, especially those in smaller economies, 
that could be the next YouTube or Facebook, simply do not have the material resources 
to purchase the software and hardware needed to maintain compliance with legal 
mechanisms that require immediate takedowns and impose immediate liability for 
infringing posts. The global diffusion of U.S.-based notice-and-takedown laws, therefore, 
further concentrates capital accumulation in the North, while also threatening norms of 
freedom of expression and information access. 
This dissertation contributes to the contemporary conversations about internet 
policy to examine the globalization of U.S. copyright law as a site of struggle between 
the rights of users and the enforcement of copyright online. Broadly, I am interested in 
examining multilateral and national policymaking fora and their relationship to human 
rights, most specifically speech rights, including the right to freedom of expression in 
relation to techno-regulation. In terms of governance, I am concerned with questions of 
political transparency, corporate power and the inherent dynamics of a policy process 
that, in some cases, are occurring in secret or with limited public accountability.  
Maintaining a human rights and a users’ rights framework, this study focused on 
the legal infrastructures of content control, including how those structures have 
developed, how they have evolved over time, the public policy discourses that support 
these legal changes, and the modes of resistance and alternative models that exist.    
 
11 See Benjamin Boroughf, The Next Great Youtube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, 
Cooperation, and Fair Compensation, 25 ALBANY LAW J. SCI. TECHNOL. 95–128 (2015). 
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In this chapter, I outline the broad topic of intermediary liability law and describe 
its significance to the internet and democracy. I describe the specific form of law in the 
United States, § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and introduce the 
three cases under investigation: the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Article 17 of E.U. 
Copyright Directive, and Canada’s Copyright Act. I discuss how public opinion of 
copyright in the U.S. has shifted since the 1970s and the major lobbying efforts behind 
that shift. I briefly address some of the legal challenges to § 512 of the DMCA and the 
lobbying efforts to strengthen it. I outline how notice-and-takedown, as codified in the 
DMCA, functions as an extra-judicial semi-privatized mechanism for copyright 
enforcement. I also address the recent self-regulatory efforts to automate the 
implementation of the law. I address the international perspective in two sections – the 
first pertains to U.S.-led free trade agreements and the second highlights other standards 
of digital copyright enforcement, including those in Chile and Canada. This introduction 
provides the background to understand the big picture(s) and the significance of the 
detailed discussions of policymaking that follow.    
What is Intermediary Liability? 
What will we tolerate as a society to protect the broadly received benefits of 
internet freedom? That question is the essence of intermediary liability law. For more 
than two decades, lawmakers have deliberated this issue and have historically reached 
vastly different conclusions.12 However, more recent reform efforts in the United States 
and the European Union suggest that immunity from liability is continuing to narrow. 
The stakes for democracy, economic development and the future of the digital age are not 
 
12 JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 150 (2019). 
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insignificant. Many policy questions remain unresolved: Will liberal democratic 
governments allow platforms to profit from the advertisements of child sex traffickers? 
How much irreparable defamation will the public tolerate before platforms are held 
responsible? Can search platforms continue to index copyright pirate sites without being 
required to automatically filter? When will the threats of misinformation and 
disinformation become so large that governments statutorily mandate platforms to self-
regulate? In terms of copyright, the political economy of platform immunity is a complex 
multi-sided policy field dominated by competing corporate interests, with many big 
entertainment companies and industry associations arguing for state-mandated automated 
filtering and big technology companies, on the other hand, arguing for a continuation of 
light-touch regulation. But there are also actors who take more nuanced views that 
advocate for various compromise solutions, as well as coalitions of advocacy groups 
attempting to speak for the legal rights of users. In terms of other genres of illegal and 
harmful content, the coalitions of actors, their interests, and the discourses they are using 
vary by the type of content in question, the interests of political coalitions, existing case 
law, and the regional and domestic contexts. But, across content areas, intermediary 
liability laws are often cited by industry as the legal foundation of the internet economy.13 
  From this point, I will focus specifically on copyright as one distinct area of 
intermediary liability. In the U.S. and the E.U., two laws that have been in practice for 
over twenty years – the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) (1998) in the U.S. 
and the E.U.’s e-Commerce directive (ECD) (2000) created the revolutionary legal 
 
13 Amir Hassanabadi, Viacom v. Youtube: All Eyes Blind – The Limits of the DMCA in a Web 2.0 World 
(2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1809194 (last visited Sep 7, 2017). 
 8 
mechanism of notice-and-takedown and set global standards for policing illegal and 
harmful content online. These once-obscure internet rules define what remedies are 
available to copyright owners when their works are pirated and what intermediaries must 
do to protect intellectual property on-line.14  
While notice-and-takedown can be seen as yet another turning point in the 
historical progression of media markets, its effects extend far beyond the 
commodification of culture and the limiting of innovation. The resulting policies are also 
seen to violate the “positive duties” under European Convention on Human Rights and 
the speech rights afforded in the 1st Amendment in the United States. However, the First 
Amendment has limited impact on private action in a privatized system.15 Therefore, 
intermediary liability is seen as outside the scope of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  
In practice, notice-and-takedown has been shown to have far-reaching 
implications for the rights of users and for the business models of large technology (and 
media) companies. Critics from across different sectors of law have also criticized safe 
harbor laws for blocking innovative business ideas,16 overburdening end-users in cases of 
fraud and abuse17, lacking in the basic due-process protections afforded in traditional 
 
14 Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield, supra note 4. 
15 PETER YU, The Graduated Response (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1579782 (last visited Dec 
5, 2017). 
16 WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (1 edition ed. 2009). 
17 Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield, supra note 4. 
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mediums18, and favoring the needs of large corporations over the expression rights and 
educational needs of citizens. 
Human rights groups and researchers have also documented cases where powerful 
actors such as governments and corporations have used the notice and takedown regime 
found in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to silence critics. One of the most widely 
covered cases has occurred in Ecuador where the Spanish copyright watch firm Ares 
Rights was allegedly hired by the Ecuadoran government to submit takedown notices to 
social media companies in the United States to remove political content that originated in 
Ecuador. Over the course of 2014, Ares Rights was responsible for the removal of links 
on Facebook of videos of protests critical of the Correa administration, the suspension of 
a Twitter account that contained political cartoons, and the removal of a documentary that 
profiled indigenous resistance to mining operations. In all these cases, Ares Rights, 
working on behalf of Ecuadorian state actors, claimed the content in question violated 
U.S. copyright law. And, while most of this content was restored due to successful 
counter-notices, the put-back process took weeks and placed an unfair burden on the user 
to prove fair use. By the time the content was restored, the political moment during which 
the content was most relevant had long passed. 19 
 
18 Margot Kaminski, Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online Intermediaries, 28 AM. UNIV. INT. LAW 
REV. WASH. 203–222, 215 (2013). 
19 see Adam Steinbaugh, State Censorship by Copyright? Spanish Firm Abuses DMCA to Silence Critics of 
Ecuador’s Government, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/state-censorship-copyright-spanish-firm-abuses-DMCA (last visited 
Jun 28, 2016); Maira Sutton, Copyright Law as a Tool for State Censorship of the Internet, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/copyright-law-tool-state-internet-
censorship (last visited Jun 28, 2016); Jose M. Vicanco & Eduardo Bertoni, La censura en Ecuador llegó a 
Internet, EL PAIS, December 15, 2014, 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/12/12/opinion/1418385250_354771.html (last visited Jun 29, 2016). 
 10 
How Does Notice-and-Takedown Work? 
The design of notice-and-takedown is deceptively simple: a copyright holder 
submits a short notice to an intermediary saying it is aware that a user has posted 
copyrighted content and the intermediary is obligated to promptly take the content down. 
§ 512 of the DMCA provides this safe harbor to internet intermediaries, who can escape 
liability if they follow a notice and takedown process by responding to and removing the 
infringing material that was identified by the rights-holder. In the U.S., there are some 
user protections, including a counter notice procedure.20  
As an example of how notice-and-takedown functions, we can look at the case of 
Stephanie Lenz v. Universal Music. In 2007, Lenz took a short video of her baby pushing 
a walker around her kitchen floor while Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy” played in the 
background. She posted the grainy video on YouTube to share with family and friends. 
Shortly thereafter an employee in Universal Music Group’s legal department found the 
video and submitted a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube, claiming it violated the 
Universal exhibition right. YouTube’s staff read the notice and took the video down. For 
most users, this is where the interaction would end. But Stephanie Lenz sued Universal 
under the clause in § 512 of the DMCA that allows users to take legal against the 
copyright holder for an erroneous takedown. Her lawyers claimed that Universal knew or 
should have known that the inclusion of Prince’s song in her video was fair use. The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that copyright holders must take into account fair 
use before they send a notice, granting a partial victory to Lenz.21  
 
20 Jennifer M. Urban et. al., Supra Note 4. 
21 Marc J. Randazza, Lenz v. Universal: a call to reform section 512 (f) of the DMCA and to strengthen fair 
use, 18 VAND J ENT TECH L 743, 745 (2015). 
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 The notice-and-takedown process requires involvement from four parties to 
function: the user, the copyright holder, the intermediary, and the state. In the Lenz case, 
the user (Stephanie Lenz) posted content containing copyrighted material to a publicly 
available platform. (In this case, it was a video with copyrighted audio in the background, 
but it could be any form of copyrighted work – video, images, audio, or even links in 
search results to an unauthorized copy of a work.) The copyright holder, Universal Music 
Group, on behalf of Prince, then recognized the unauthorized post and sent a notice to the 
hosting platform – YouTube in this case. § 512 outlines very specific requirements for 
the content of this notice that are discussed later in this chapter. When YouTube, the third 
actor in the process, received a notice, they (in theory) read the notice to check for 
validity and took the content down. This is where the path usually ends. But if the user 
believes that the takedown was unlawful, they can submit a counter notice to have the 
content put back up. Upon the receipt of a counter-notice, the intermediary waits ten days 
to see if the rightsholder wants to take legal action against the user. If they don’t, the post 
is put back up and remains online. If the intermediary does not follow this procedure, it 
can be held liable to the user or the rightsholder, depending on the action (or lack of 
action) by the ISP.  This is the key user protection found in § 512. If the rightsholder 
sends a notice of legal action against the user, however, the content remains down.22 The 
state (actor number four) has two key responsibilities. One, the U.S. Copyright Office 
maintains a database of individuals who work at intermediaries, whose job it is to receive 
takedown notices. Intermediaries are required to assign these “designated agents” and to 
 
22 Lenz went in a totally different direction, and as the user, she sued the copyright holder for 
misrepresenting and abuse of the system. This happens very rarely, as most users do not have the resources 
to sue.     
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keep this information current; otherwise, they can lose their immunity. Second, disputes – 
however rare – are adjudicated in federal courts.     
Through the DMCA, the Safe Harbors provision put the burden of policing the 
internet for copyright infringement on the shoulders of the copyright holders, the artists 
themselves in some cases, but in most cases, large U.S. based entertainment and media 
companies. To escape liability, the intermediary must “not have actual knowledge of the 
material or activity” and “upon notification of the infringement…acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material.”23 The intermediary must have what is called 
“red flag” knowledge in a two-part test that is designed to ensure that the host is not 
burdened with the duty to monitor.  
§ 512, Paragraph C of the DMCA outlines the current notification requirements 
for copyrighted content residing on servers in the U.S. In addition to basic information 
regarding the identity of the notifying party and the location of the content in question, 
the law requires that notifications include: “A statement that the complaining party has a 
good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by 
the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”24 This is a key user protection and was the 
basis for the Ninth Decision in the Lenz case.25 Counter-notices are required to have 
many similar details, including the identification and contact information for the user and 
a description and location of the content in question. There is a similar good faith clause 
which states that a counter-notice requires: “A statement under penalty of perjury that the 
subscriber has a good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of 
 
23 See 17 (U.S.C. 512(c)(1) 
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) 
25 See Lenz v. Universal 
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mistake or misidentification of the material to be removed or disabled.”26  
Critics of the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown procedure refer to the lack of due 
process in such cases when the user who posted the content in question is afforded 
limited capacity to protest and have their speech restored. Typically, the process does not 
include judicial oversight until one party takes legal action. As a result, the system has 
seen widespread fraudulent use that results in the extra-judicial removal of lawful speech. 
This fraud and abuse have been well established.27 The friend-of-the-court briefs and 
relevant legal commentary seem to indicate that none of the stakeholders involved are 
happy with the way notice-and-takedown is working in practice. However, there is little 
agreement on what direction the U.S. statute should evolve and the preferred 
alternative.28 
After the DMCA and Legal Challenges 
There is an ever-growing body of case law in the United States that it is defining 
the limits of rightsholders and clarifying legal definitions. In Viacom v. YouTube, 
Viacom sought over U.S.$1 billion in damages from YouTube for knowingly facilitating 
the illegal distribution of copyrighted works. Viacom claimed that YouTube’s executives 
had full knowledge that users were posting and sharing copyrighted works. Prior to the 
case, YouTube and Viacom attempted to reach a business agreement in which Viacom 
would share YouTube’s revenue from the posting of its works.29 This deal failed when 
 
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) 
27 See Annemarie Bridy & Daphne Keller, US Copyright Office Section 512 Study: Comments in Response 
to Second Notice of Inquiry (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920871 (last 
visited Oct 11, 2017). 
28 Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield, supra note 4. 
29 HASSANABADI, supra note 13. 
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YouTube refused to pay. In response, Viacom sent a takedown notice demanding the 
removal of over 100,000 clips. So, Viacom sued. Their case rested on the idea that 
YouTube was not free from liability because its executives had actual and real knowledge 
of specific instances of infringement and continued to leave the content online.30 
Estimates at the time claimed that 70-90% of the clips on YouTube were posted without 
the owner’s permission. In response to Viacom’s conflict with YouTube, the latter did 
not include the former in its fingerprinting technology that filtered copyrighted works that 
it instituted in 2007. Viacom claimed, “it was a deliberate business decision to not 
broadly deploy these techniques and instead…hold content owners hostage to the 
defendant’s efforts to commercialize the site.”31 YouTube argued to the courts that it 
provided an open platform that supported democratic debate and had immeasurable 
impact on culture, politics, and society writ large. It was in compliance with the DMCA 
and was actually able to operate because of it. They framed Viacom as a self-interested 
corporate adversary that sought to bring down all that YouTube had accomplished. The 
court concluded that the DMCA was working efficiently in that YouTube was able to 
takedown all the material that Viacom requested through notices and affirmed prior 
courts’ (and the Congress’ intent of the DMCA) in regard to actual knowledge of 
infringement. Intermediaries continued to be held by the red flag knowledge standard, 
i.e., a notice is required for a takedown to take place.32 
In addition to Viacom v. YouTube, a number of other cases helped to define “red 




32 Hassanabadi, supra note 13. 
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Amazon, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, 
Grokster, Hotfile and Lenz vs. Universal, among others. These cases also confirmed that 
general knowledge was not enough; a giant crimson banner (or a takedown notice) was 
necessary under the DMCA. After the DMCA, the music sharing site Napster was 
founded to provide a platform for peer-to-peer downloading of copyrighted music. It was 
estimated that Napster “distributed more music than the entire record industry from its 
inception a century earlier.”33  
Copyright Law and Public Opinion 
According to lawyer and copyright scholar Jessica Litman, public perception in 
the U.S. (and most western nations) has traditionally understood copyright as a bargain 
that compensates creators for their work, while providing the broadly received benefits of 
access. It is these general principles that undergird copyright statutes that matter most to 
people. The general public tends to believe that the details of copyright law only matter to 
a narrow collection of interest groups.34 As such, public opinion has been generally 
favorable of laws that promote scientific and technological innovation and the protection 
of arts and culture. Political rhetoric then has coincided with these normative 
understandings and this pro-copyright sentiment has influenced policy making in the 
west. Litman argues, however, that these ways of thinking about copyright policy also 
can limit public interest reforms. As a result of this narrow understanding of copyright, 
 
33 Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet 
Age, 59 J Copyr. Soc USA 1 (2011). 
34 Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (2001). 
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the recent timeline of copyright reform is characterized by the expansion of protection, 
the removal of limitations, and a push for conformity in the digital environment.35 
As Litman explains, until the 1970s, copyright in the U.S. existed as an agreed 
upon quid pro quo between creators and the public.36 This balance gave creators and 
publishers limited commercial control and gave the public the right to control access for 
personal use. For example, people could freely hold private performances, resell one 
legitimate copy, and critique and teach with the work in a public venue.37 Owners, on the 
other hand, had control over publishing, public performance, and duplication. Neither the 
author nor the public received all the surplus generated from the sale and production of a 
new work. The benefits from the creation of new works were shared between society and 
the author.38 
In policy discussions, the stakeholders and lawmakers framed copyright in moral 
terms – as a bargain between the public and authors and a balance between competing 
rights. This rhetoric of bargains and balance lasted until the 1970s until the discourse of 
copyright gradually began to shift to broad economic and nationalistic justifications. 
Beginning in the 1970s, large rightsholders and some lawmakers framed copyright law as 
a necessary protection of American interests, a vital prerequisite for U.S.-led 
globalization and vibrant economic growth in the U.S.    Lobbyists made causal links 
between the amount of copyright protection and the amount of creative, technological, 
and cultural production. They argued that more copyright law and stricter enforcement 
 
35 Id. at 78. 
36 Id. at 78. 
37 Id. at 79. 
38 Id. at 79. 
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would lead to more products and would strengthen the U.S. economy. In this view, the 
geographic fragmentation of enforcement and protection was tantamount to the global 
mass piracy of American creativity.39  
According to Blayne Haggart, this shift in discourse led to a shift in political 
power and the corporate capture of policymaking in the U.S. As a result, digital copyright 
law in the 1990s and 2000s has been largely been created via industry-to-industry 
negotiations, mediated by Congress and government agencies. Sometimes this has 
resulted in legislation, while at other times, the process has resulted in non-statutory 
agreements to abide by certain corporate policies. The copyright lobby has been led by 
the major Hollywood studios, who have been represented by the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA) and the International Intellectual Property Alliance 
(IIPA). These groups have tended to maintain the highest level of influence in Congress.40  
According to McDonald, the MPAA has consistently used nationalistic discourse 
to connect copyright laws to jobs, framing copyright in terms of national well-being and 
the maintenance of a creative labor force.41 Traditionally, MPAA lobbying for 
international policy diffusion has been backed up by the reported impact of piracy in 
targeted countries. Due to technological changes in distribution, more streaming and 
more broadband access, the IIPA and the MPAA are left with little credible evidence to 
judge the impact of piracy, except for takedown data from DMCA requests and data 
related to the rise in legal purchases made by former users of shuttered cyber lockers or 
 
39 Id. at 81. 
40 BLAYNE HAGGART, COPYFIGHT: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 64 (2014). 
41 Paul McDonald, Hollywood, the MPAA, and the formation of anti-piracy policy, 22 INT. J. CULT. POLICY 
686–705 (2016). 
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pirate streaming sites. Their self-published research reports that blocking of pirate sites 
generated more legal sales than other methods.42 Overall, the new tech environment has 
forced the MPAA to expand the number and types of targets, and to employ the 
cooperation of external industrial sectors – advertisers, payment processors, search 
engines, and social platforms.43 Hollywood (and the MPAA) is now more dependent than 
ever on other sectors of the economy to enforce its copyright in the digital environment. 
But it appears that these dynamics have not changed their nationalistic rhetoric regarding 
piracy and jobs.   
According to Haggart, through the 1990s, copyright policy continued to be a high 
stakes and technocratic arena. Public opinion had barely registered as an influence on 
U.S. or internal copyright policy making. But the combination of the U.S. institutional 
structures (its diffuse, pluralist, and porous political process) and the 
“dissemination/protection” conflict inherent in this debate had left open the possibility 
that public interest voices could be a countervailing force to the interests of the dominant 
entertainment and copyright industries.44 It wasn’t until 2012, during the debates over 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the U.S., that public opinion became powerful enough 
to influence copyright policymaking.45 
Safe Harbors and Free Trade 
Since the passage of the DMCA, all of the multilateral and bilateral free trade 
agreements that were led by the U.S. have included some form of notice-and-takedown in 
 
42 Paul McDonald, Hollywood, the MPAA, and the formation of anti-piracy policy, 22 INT. J. CULT. POLICY 
686–705, 698 (2016). 
43 NATASHA TUSIKOV, CHOKEPOINTS: GLOBAL PRIVATE REGULATION ON THE INTERNET (2016). 
44 HAGGART, supra note 41 at 64. 
45 Id. at 97. 
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their intellectual property chapters. However, only one, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) in 2012, has explicitly been about internet governance issues. The 
rest of the agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Korea-U.S. FTA, the Chile-U.S. FTA, and 
the Australia-U.S. FTA have been framed in terms of economic barriers to trade, 
however, all have sought to establish some form of ISP liability, including notice-and-
takedown.  
At the time of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) (1995), prevailing modes of broadcast and exhibition lent themselves to the 
application of screen quotas and the geography of broadcasting allowed for a logical 
application of subsidies. However, by the mid-2000s the growing prevalence of the 
internet as the preferred mode of ancillary market delivery suggested that we had entered 
what Siva Vaidhyanathan has called the “digital moment.”46 The U.S. cultural industries 
began to shift their policy priorities, essentially ignoring screen quotas and local 
subsidies, and sought the reclassification of ancillary market delivery as electronic 
commerce, thereby opening up unrestricted markets for cultural products on-line 
(Bernier, 2004; Given 2003).47 However, pay-per-download and streaming business 
models are built around an infinitely reproducible product that produces inherent 
challenges to electronic commerce. To address these conditions, the cultural industries 
 
46 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
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47 See Ivan Bernier, The recent free trade agreements of the United States as illustration of their new 
strategy regarding the audiovisual sector, MEDIA TRADE MONIT. (2004), http://www.diversite-
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have engaged with global governance bodies to develop an ever-evolving set of statutory 
frameworks that are positioned at the intersection of internet governance and cultural 
policies. Anti-circumvention, enforcement, protection rights for digital copies, and 
internet service provider (ISP) liability are being written into comprehensive treaties and 
backed up with legal reforms. And, as cultural protections are legislated away by the 
digital moment, new negotiating priorities have emerged in the governance of e-
commerce. In this context, the free trade negotiations over intellectual property rules and 
internet policies have become sites of struggle between the internet and copyright.48  
Through this period, large rights-holders, including representatives of the film and 
music industries, have tried to transform the open and neutral design of the internet and 
the democratic potential of the personal computer itself. 49 Since the development of the 
world wide web and the explosive growth of social platforms and search engines, the 
goal of the copyright industries has been to create scarcity, enforce control of copies, and 
limit access. However, these goals have yet to be achieved.50  
In this context, recent trade agreements have built upon the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA), but with some significant differences. In the DMCA, 
intermediaries must takedown copyrighted material immediately after receiving a notice 
from the copyright holder or they are held liable for each copyright infringement. 
However, recent agreements, such as the TPP, do not require member states to enact user 
safeguards such as a “counter notice and put-back” protocol (as discussed above) that 
 
48 see TRISHA MEYER, THE POLITICS OF ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU: ACCESS AND 
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allow users to contest a takedown and have their content restored in a timely fashion. 
This is a key user protection under the DMCA. In addition, rights holders are often not 
required to state that they have made a good faith effort to determine whether the content 
in question is posted legally under the fair-use doctrine (for the purposes of news 
commentary or research) before sending a takedown notice.51 This and other provisions 
make the TPP’s framework for copyright protection less protective of users than the 
DMCA, more limiting of users’ ability to legally oppose takedowns, and even more 
favorable to actors who wish to use copyright law to censor political speech online.  
Internet policies that seek to control and restrict speech online have made trade 
agreements the subject of ongoing public controversy in recent years. In 2012, a coalition 
of civil society groups in Europe waged a successful public relations campaign to stop the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). ACTA was supported by the U.S. 
cultural industries, as it provided broader intellectual property protections and 
enforcement regimes than national laws or WTO rules. Anti-ACTA protesters framed the 
agreement’s copyright regulations as bad for privacy rights, freedom of expression, and 
unfairly punitive to internet service providers. After two years of street protests, petitions 
and lobbying, the E.U. parliament rejected ACTA by a 92% margin. Research has 
revealed the agenda building power of civil society groups and their impact on public 
opinion in regard to intellectual property.52 Similarly, in the U.S., a protest movement of 
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grassroots groups halted the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). In early 2012, Google, 
Wikimedia, Mozilla and other prominent internet companies joined the citizen movement 
to lobby against SOPA, framing its enforcement regimes as stifling to innovation and free 
speech.53 
 The past twenty years of copyright case law, national digital policy making, and 
multilateral negotiations have resulted in a global fragmentation of legal frameworks for 
digital copyright enforcement.54 Models continue to be tested and a number of national 
laws are challenging the global hegemony of the United States in intellectual property 
law that was established during the General Agreements in Trade in Services (GATS), 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) processes. 
Fragmented Standards for Limiting Internet Service Provider Liability 
Outside the E.U. and the United States, the various notice-and-takedown laws that 
have been implemented have created a fragmented and heterogeneous patchwork of 
practices. Given the previous established success of the United States in its push for 
intellectual property policy diffusion through bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, 
this is a notable discontinuity in the hegemony of the U.S. cultural industries.  
In 2010, the Chilean National Congress rejected this notice/counter-notice 
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procedure between private parties and created a mechanism with judicial oversight to 
ensure compliance with Chile’s fair use law (that was updated in the same statute). The 
constitutional rights of users were of central concern to policymakers. Rather than a 
notice to the ISPs, the law provides rightsholders with a process to petition the courts for 
an order that would compel an ISP to remove or block the material in question. The 
Chilean version of ISP liability law was enacted as an update to existing copyright law, to 
bring Chile into compliance with the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement of 2004 and the 
requirements imposed by the courts for such notices are provided in the updated statute. 
The heart of Chile’s notice-and-takedown mechanism is located here in § 85Q of law 
20,430 (emphasis added): 
When the injunctions are requested before the lawsuit is served (preliminary 
injunctions), and provided there are serious motives for it, such injunctions may 
be ordered by the court without hearing the content provider, but in this case the 
petitioner must post a bond at the court's satisfaction. … 
Once the foregoing has been complied with, the court shall order without further 
delay to remove or disable access to the infringing contents. The resolution shall 
be notified to the respective service provider by official notice, and to the 
petitioner through the publication board at the court. … 
The affected content provider may, notwithstanding other rights, request the court 
issuing the order to disregard the measure of disabling access or removing the 
material. For this purpose, it shall file a petition…and shall furnish any additional 
information supporting such petition…55 
 
55  Chilean Law 20,430 – Modifying Law 17,336 on Intellectual Property, 2010, Eng. Translation, 27 
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This process requires the explanation of the serious motives and clear 
descriptions of the infringement until it meets the court’s satisfaction before any 
takedown action can be taken. The burden of proof is on the rightsholder to prove the 
details of infringement in a case-by-case process overseen by a judge. In comparison, this 
slow and deliberate process is laid out in a statute that clearly favors the users’ rights to 
fair use for education and commentary.56  
While the Chilean law favors the addition of judicial oversight and greater due 
process protections, the Canadian system, formally adopted in 2012, retains the privatized 
nature of the DMCA, but goes further to protect the identity of the end user. ISPs are 
required to act as legal intermediaries and to forward takedown notices to the user 
immediately or they can face stiff fines and lose their liability protections. Once the ISP 
forwards the notice, they have met their obligations. This key distinguishing feature of 
the Canadian mechanism is presented in § 41.26 that stipulates the requirements for 
notice-forwarding:   
41.26 (1) A person described in paragraph 41.25(1)(a) or (b) who receives a 
notice of claimed infringement that complies with subsection 41.25(2) shall, on 
being paid any fee that the person has lawfully charged for doing so, 
(a) as soon as feasible forward the notice electronically to the person to whom the 
electronic location identified by the location data specified in the notice belongs 
and inform the claimant of its forwarding or, if applicable, of the reason why it 
was not possible to forward it…57 
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Furthermore, ISPs are not allowed to supply the rightsholder with the identity of 
the infringing user without a court order. The users then are required to takedown the 
content themselves after receiving the first notice or face fines of no more than $5000 for 
non-commercial infringement.58 The Canadian statute, the subject of chapter six in this 
dissertation, was formally adopted by the Canadian Parliament in 2012 and has been 
comparatively untested by the courts.  
In practice, the user could contest a takedown simply by leaving the content 
online. If the rightsholder is unsatisfied with the user’s lack of action, the rightsholder can 
ask a court to compel the ISP to release the identity of the user. The system is more 
burdensome on both the ISP and the copyright owners, as ISPs must create infrastructure 
to support the forwarding of notices and the copyright owners must decide to sue (or not) 
on a case-by-case basis. The requirements for notices do not include a good faith clause, 
but require the claimant to explain their interest: 
(2) A notice of claimed infringement shall be in writing in the form, if any, 
prescribed by regulation and shall 
(a) state the claimant’s name and address and any other particulars 
prescribed by regulation that enable communication with the claimant; 
(b) identify the work or other subject-matter to which the claimed 
infringement relates; 
(c) state the claimant’s interest or right with respect to the copyright in the 
work or other subject-matter; 
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(d) specify the location data for the electronic location to which the 
claimed infringement relates; 
  (e) specify the infringement that is claimed; 
(f) specify the date and time of the commission of the claimed 
infringement; and 
  (g) contain any other information that may be prescribed by regulation.59 
 It is not trivial that the Canadian Parliament left the door open to further changes 
to the notice requirements by including § (g) to require “any other information prescribed 
by regulation.” This could possibly be an area for further inquiry and clarification. 
 During the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, Chile and Canada 
retained these statues despite the appearance of U.S. pressure to adopt stricter standards. 
While the governance process of the TPP was closed to the public and the media, the 
final text of the TPP includes single carve-out for these two distinct ISP liability 
frameworks and locks out the possibility that other member governments could adopt 
their own standards for ISP liability. While the TPP, in its current form, appears to have 
faltered due to political change in the U.S., the push for global intellectual property 
harmonization is ongoing.  
The Move Towards Automation 
Longstanding copyright law, no matter the medium, holds that it is the job and 
responsibility of the rightsholder to identify the potentially infringing material and to 
document the problem. Recent litigation of notice-and-takedown has sought to define and 
re-define the meaning of red-flag knowledge, the standard of the DMCA. As discussed 
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previously, intermediaries must have red flag knowledge of specific instances of 
infringing activity on its networks, not just general awareness. Litigation is pushing 
intermediaries to move towards self-monitoring and notice and stay-down policies, 
against the intent and text of the DMCA. However, the courts are still determining what 
platforms know and when do they know it and setting the terms and extent of self-
monitoring. As it stands, § 512 includes no self-monitoring obligation in defining the role 
of the platform in enforcement.60  
A number of firms have adopted and enacted internal policy changes in regard to 
notice and takedown that can be seen as examples of DCMA+ self-regulation – some in 
partnership with government agencies and some completely voluntary. While it is hard to 
determine their precise motivations for these self-regulation practices, there is evidence 
that, at least during the Obama era, there were regulatory pressures for reform towards 
more obligations on the platform side. In 2013 there was a brokered agreement between 
Google, advertisers and credit card companies. And, in 2013 Google added code to their 
algorithm that served to push repeat offenders down in search results. And, in turn 
Google began publishing transparency reports on infringement. 
Within this semi-privatized regulatory system of notice-and-takedown, automated 
monitoring and takedown software such as YouTube’s Content ID have also been 
developed and implemented privately.61 These proactive tools pre-screen uploads for 
copyrighted content, removing the need for notices entirely – a stricter form of 
compliance that is implemented on a voluntary basis by platforms seeking greater 
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protection.62 The new automation-focused policies represent advancements beyond the 
rules included in the DMCA and a geographical advancement of corporate self-
regulation. Throughout the history of post-DMCA case law in the United States, the 
courts have repeatedly sided with internet intermediaries in interpreting the 
implementation of the notice-and-takedown mechanism. Like in the Viacom case and 
Lenz v Universal, these court opinions in combination with requirements of § 512 have 
created the conditions for the overuse of the takedown mechanism and the submission of 
notices on a massive scale.63 
As many large rightsholders see the situation, “the court simply provided no 
example of how one could possibly become ‘aware of facts or circumstances’ that a 
specific item is infringing other than a notice from the true owner.”64 For this reason, 
rightsholders have maximized the number of notices they can send and adopted 
automated tools that send tens of millions of notices per day. As some legal analysts have 
argued, copyright owners are left with no other choice.65 While the true scale of the 
changes is unknown, it can be said that automated systems of enforcement have led to 
billions of takedowns.  
Referred to as automated content recognition (ACR), proactive filtering systems 
work by filtering uploads as they are posted by matching them to a database of 
copyrighted music, for example. If the software detects a match, then the post is filtered 
before it goes live. Currently, ACR is voluntary, but the European Union has adopted 
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Article 17 of the controversial Digital Single Market Copyright Directive (discussed in 
chapter eight), which would mandate this form of self-monitoring on many platforms. 
However, studies have shown that ACR systems lack the complexity to make nuanced 
determinations between fair use and infringement nor are they likely to curb piracy.66     
According to Urban et. al., during the timespan of 2009 to 2012, the automation 
of takedown notices in the United States in particular led to an exponential growth of 
takedowns.67 For example, Google received 4,275 requests in 2009 and then 441,370 
requests in 2012. Any one notice can, in fact, include thousands of URLs. Their study of 
the integrity of the notice and takedown system in 2014 showed that in 4.2% of their 
sample, the notice did not match the intended target i.e., they discovered two to seven 
million erroneous takedowns, out of 108 million takedowns over the six-month period. 
The rapid increase of takedowns in this period (2010 to 2012) can be attributed to the 
development of sophisticated algorithmic tools for searching vast databases of content for 
infringing content and automatically generating takedown requests. The requests are 
rarely checked for validity and platforms favor the approach of removal first, to avoid 
liability.  
The size and scale of infringement has risen with the success of the major 
platforms, along with the scale and sophistication of enforcement through artificial 
intelligence. Large firms have made enormous structural investments to develop and 
 
66 EVAN ENGSTROM & NICK FEAMSTER, The Limits of Filtering: A Look at the Functionality & 
Shortcomings of Content Detection Tools 27 (2017), https://www.engine.is/the-limits-of-filtering (last 
visited Jun 17, 2019). 
67 Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield, supra note 4. 
 30 
implement these new tools.68 These pro-active measures can also include giving rights 
holders access to a platform’s servers to remove content themselves and other agreements 
outside the law to supplement enforcement.69 
According to Urban et. al., during the timespan of 2009 to 2012 three significant 
changes occurred to the notice and takedown landscape. First, the automation of notices 
and takedowns led to an exponential growth of takedowns. Second, this has led to the rise 
of the professionalization of enforcement and the widespread use of REO’s (Rights 
Enforcement Organizations). And third, the increasing sophistication of pirates has led to 
the decreasing relevance of unique links or any one URL that leads to pirated content.70  
Chapter Summary: Introduction 
The intent of this chapter was to introduce intermediary liability and its 
significance to the internet and democracy, describe the basic functioning of notice-and-
takedown, and explore recent political and technical changes that may affect future 
reform efforts. Through the lens of the semi-privatization of regulation, I explained the 
significance of automation to both human rights and the global political economy of the 
internet. And I addressed the domestic legal context and the international dimensions of 
the notice-and-takedown system. I explained a number of the reasons for the focus on the 
three cases presented in the dissertation and why the politics of the policymaking around 
these three laws can help us understand more about the political economy of internet law.    
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Mapping This Dissertation 
In the following chapter, I review related literature from critical political economy 
of the media, internet governance, and international communications. In these areas, I 
focus on influential studies of discourse, as well as studies in international internet policy, 
content filtering and digital copyright. In chapter three, I describe my methodological 
approach that is modeled from European scholars of policy discourse analysis. I describe 
the types of documents I have gathered, how I have coded them, and reasons for the 
chosen timelines. Chapter four outlines the theoretical approach – critical political 
economy of the media, international communication, and the theory of monopoly 
capitalism. Chapter five covers the history of copyright safe harbors in the international 
and national arenas. Chapter six is a case study of the actors, arguments, and discourses 
of copyright safe harbors policymaking in the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the U.S. 
Congress from 2010 to 2016. Chapter seven is a case study of the policy debates in the 
Canadian Parliament prior to the adoption of the Copyright Modernization Act (2010 to 
2012) and the arguments and discourses therein that pertain to safe harbors. Chapter eight 
is a case study of one period of public comment in 2015, prior to the passage of Article 
17 of the new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market in 2018 in the 
European Union. Finally, chapter nine explores the larger significance of these public 
debates, the findings and limitations of this study, and opportunities for further research.  
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CHAPTER II:  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the various strands of literature that relate to the study of the 
international political economy of internet intermediary law. The chapter begins with the 
central inspirations for this dissertation – the key texts in the critical study of 
multilateralism and copyright. My orientation began with an interest in free trade and 
media policy and a survey of the authors that provide a foundation in that area is 
provided. I also include a walk-through of the internet governance approach and touch on 
important related strands of scholarship in areas such as self-governance, algorithms, 
copyright law and agency, and the global digital divide. The chapter concludes with a 
review of the studies that I have drawn upon from a methodological perspective – 
specifically, studies of internet policy and discourse. My hope is that this dissertation will 
make a modest contribution to those studies that blend structural approaches with 
discursive analysis. 
Media policy studies has produced a broad range of investigations that address 
copyright in the digital age. Much of this literature addresses the power of large 
entertainment and information companies under neoliberalism to impose statutory 
regimes that enclose knowledge and culture as private property.71 The effects of this 
historical process and its continuities and discontinuities have been explored in terms of 
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social welfare, innovation, and creativity. With some notable exceptions,72 the majority 
of this literature was written before the establishment of the platform economy. Today, a 
small group of internet intermediaries, including Google, Facebook, and Amazon, control 
the distribution of and access to information and culture for billions of users across the 
globe.73 For users everywhere, Google searches, Facebook posting, and mobile 
technology have become synonymous with internet use. And, at the policy-making level, 
these platforms hold significant structural power over governments that need the internet 
to be both open and secure. In addition, internet infrastructures are now vital components 
of growth in all sectors of the economy, which requires digital platforms to be safe and 
ubiquitous. As a result of their ability to control both hardware and content on such a 
massive scale, this small group of technology companies are defining what is possible 
online and have a disproportionate influence over the limits of human agency and the 
conditions for social progress. Recent investigations by scholars of internet governance, 
political economy, science and technology studies, and law have attempted to analyze 
and explain these technological and political dynamics. Much of this discourse has been 
organized around themes of global pluralism, social justice, human rights, human 
flourishing,74 and freedom of expression.  
The transnationalized and liberalized marketplace of digital media has also led to 
a shift in the way that that media policy scholars have approached research. In 2011, 
Mansell and Raboy outlined a new sub-field that they call global media communications 
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policy (GCMP)75 To Mansell and Raboy,76 the politics of media diversity, equality, and 
inclusion in the information society became located in a new site of struggle, the fora of 
global internet governance. Their analysis embraces multilateral institutional structures 
and the power dynamics and competing interests therein. GMCP examines the “highly 
politicized” system of media governance at many levels, including the governmental, 
local, and supranational, while foregrounding a global notion of the underserved and 
disempowered majority who fight for “inclusiveness,” “diverse content,” and 
“universality”.77 Culture and information are key to the global transformations that 
amount to a paradigm shift, to the dominance of transnational capitalism and of 
governance through the logic of global trade.  
Mansell and Raboy write,  
Analysis of global media and communications policy also needs to depart...from 
the study of global policy problems that focus principally on state–state 
relations…[to] research [that] focusses on the distribution of power among 
institutions and the interactions among agents and institutions which are 
understood to co-determine outcomes within a political system.78    
Copyright and Multilateralism   
In the 2000s, media policy scholars began to do just this – and widened their 
focus to the global stage. Some of this research has focused on multilateral agreements 
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and analyzed the political economy of copyright policymaking at free trade 
negotiations.79 Key developments have included the World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WCT), among others.80  
Deere, in her study of multilateral policymaking in this area concluded that the 
U.S. has used its economic power to leverage its trading-partner status to enforce 
conformity in the area of intellectual property.81 Deere’s study of the implementation of 
the WTO agreement on TRIPS examines the period (1995-2005) when countries were 
creating policies to place their nations in compliance with the agreement.82 As noted in 
chapter eight, TRIPS was a historic step in the global harmonization of intellectual 
property law as it brought together 123 nations in a new framework of regulation and 
enforcement. As an outcome of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS), it was a 
political process led by the United States and E.U. nations. In her study, Deere found that 
in some countries, domestic compliance led to the adoption of stricter standards than 
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TRIPS, resulting in a patchwork of laws that were actually more beneficial to northern 
states than the standard set by the agreement. Deere concludes that many countries 
implemented stricter standards than TRIPS stipulated because of three factors: the 
coercive power enacted by the U.S., the presence of weak internal national institutions, 
and the lack of intellectual property infrastructure and agencies within targeted states. 
She presents a number of case studies of francophone African countries where weak 
institutions led to exposure and vulnerability to epistemic communities of policy 
entrepreneurs.83  
In another study of the TRIPS process, Drahos and Braithwhite ask why states 
would give up sovereignty to intellectual property laws. They outline the negative effects 
of national reforms that favor the U.S. interests as reducing access medicines, threating 
the free expression and cultural exchange, and the limiting the human right to 
information.84 In contrast to Deere, Drahos and Braithwhite examine what led up the 
inclusion of intellectual property in the Uruguay Round in the first place. They conclude 
that it was a combination of coercive and ideational pressure enacted through the political 
alliance of the U.S. and the E.U. Their study includes profiles of key policy leaders and 
entrepreneurs, such as Jack Valenti of the MPAA and Edmund Pratt of the Pfizer 
corporation, as well as political economic profiles of some of the key corporations 
involved in the TRIPS negotiations.85 
Along these lines, Hesmondalph argues the most useful way to think about 
imperialism in relation to media and culture in the “present conjuncture is via the notion 
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of copyright.”86 In his historical analysis of neoliberalism, his central concern are the 
legal structures of marketization rooted in a western epistemology versus the social needs 
of public domain and creativity. To Hesmondalph, scholarship must interrogate 
differences in the characteristics of imperialism od copyright across epochs. For example, 
in the early twenty-first century, imperialism has been characterized by neoliberal 
capitalism that both requires the marketization of information and culture and is 
manifested through media and culture. In neoliberal theory, human well-being in this 
period is best advanced through entrepreneurship within an international framework of 
copyright and property rights. Free markets are regulated by free trade agreements and 
entrepreneurial freedom is assured through a marketplace governed by law and order. In 
this ecosystem of copyright, the law ensures prosperity.  
To Hesmondalph, the multilateral policies of copyright, the WTO (TRIPS) and 
other free trade agreements are evidence of neoliberalism’s “cultural turn.” In other 
words, culture, information and knowledge are more central to capitalism than ever 
before and supranational policies are evidence of this. The worldwide compliance with 
these regimes is a form of imperialism in relation to culture. In this way, the global 
cultural marketplace is managed by regulations that limit the public domain and expand 
private ownership.87 The political economic order of neoliberalism is then structurally 
bound to the governance of “symbol production and consumption” because copyright is 
the legal infrastructure that underpins it.  
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Meanwhile, Breen focuses on the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement as a case 
study in what he calls digital determinism. He argues that in the digital age, technology 
carries inherent inequalities because of the unequal distribution of resources and 
awareness that define institutions of power. As Breen outlines, Australia – like many 
countries with well-developed cultural sectors – has a long history of cultural protections 
that support cultural labor and nation building. The U.S.-Australia FTA marks a break in 
these policies. Due to labor union pressures, the agreement maintains cultural 
exemptions, such as screen quotas and cinema subsidies, but only in analog formats and 
old technologies – not on the internet. The agreement was marked as a victory for cultural 
workers, but also for U.S. negotiators who sought market access for digital trade.  
To Breen, digital determinism operates as a hegemonic force because both parties 
agree that it will be mutually beneficial. Key to the power of digital determinism are the 
economic and cultural changes that are considered to be the consequences of free trade 
agreements that loosen most national cultural industry protections in the digital 
environment. As Breen argues, technology, culture, policies, and values are exported 
from core countries as a continuation of unequal trading relationships that create 
inequalities. In Breen’s account, Australian negotiators lacked the specialized knowledge 
of digital policy and its effects in other regions. This specialized knowledge, stemming 
apparently from more state-sponsored research agendas, could serve as a counterweight 
to U.S. negotiators and their discourses of development and optimism regarding digital 
trade policy.88 
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In addition, Tusikov has examined the phenomenon of non-binding agreements as 
a form of self-governance that routes around free trade negotiation entirely. As Tusicov 
has shown, government agencies are brokering agreements between corporate 
stakeholders – to meet competing economic interests. These dynamics have been evident 
in the area of trademark law, where U.S. officials have brokered deals with online retail 
sites, credit card companies, and platforms to defund and filter out vendors that traffic in 
counterfeited goods.89 Contracts are debated in secret with little to no public record 
keeping, accountability to courts, or independent review. As Tusicov has shown, the 
policymaking of non-binding agreements is more efficient, but the resulting policies have 
rapidly changed the legal landscape. Her research has mapped the privatization of 
trademark policing and the globalization of informal agreements.90 
Algorithms  
How states choose to regulate – or not regulate – platforms is reflective of 
dominant attitudes towards the person who is on the receiving end of algorithmically 
generated output. In this way, artificial intelligence can be seen as a tool for the 
expression of different forms of power91 that corporate and state interests exercise over 
underrepresented groups. Contrary to the celebratory nature of recent technologists and 
their promises for what algorithms can do for us,92 socially destructive values may be 
getting encoded into decision-making processes to such a degree that re-coding 
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alternative values may be improbable, if not impossible.93 For example, the provision of 
social services in the United States is currently being managed and facilitated by systems 
that track and surveille recipients – often the poorest and neediest citizens. Decisions 
regarding who gets what services – housing, food stamps, health care benefits – are 
determined computationally, in ways that both remove responsibility from state 
employees, but requires constant surveillance of the poor.94 Automation reinforces old 
inequalities, and thereby perpetuates the problems of poverty and discrimination that they 
are said to solve. As Eubanks argues,  
Marginalized groups face higher levels of data collection when they access public 
benefits, walk through highly policed neighborhoods, enter the health-care 
system, or cross-national borders. That data acts to reinforce their marginality 
when it is used to target them for suspicion and extra scrutiny.95  
Critics of big data have examined the social implications of algorithmic decision 
making in areas such as predictive sentencing, immigration, and surveillance of 
marginalized populations. Crawford addresses the use of predictive and surveillance 
infrastructure to target Muslim immigrants, as the use of computational tools to facilitate 
the state’s targeting of social justice activists. She suggests that artificial intelligence (AI) 
tools are ideal for policing, given their lack of transparency, lack of accountability, 
tendency to encode bias and claims of neutrality. In turn, the lack of due process that 
 




characterizes automated decision-making allows governments to attack enemies without 
oversight, while hiding behind the supposed neutrality of the code within.96 
Despite the common perception that Google results are neutral, studies have 
described stark differences between the ranking and output for racially opposite searches 
such as “black girls” vs. “white girls”.97 Search results in these studies reveal the biases 
of Google’s engineers towards providing information that appeals to racist attitudes, 
rather than information that is most useful or relevant.  
Eubanks proposes regulatory solutions that seek to impose transparency and the 
involvement of more publicly minded custodians of information, such as librarians. The 
underlying regulatory approach she advocates is one where the decisions regarding how 
information is indexed, filtered, and accessed should be driven by public policy, not 
privatized corporate practices. In this vision, we can begin to approach the de-
privatization of algorithmic tools and the coupling of regulation with artificial 
intelligence for alternative ends. In the neoliberal model, the benefits that Google 
provides are a byproduct of an ad-driven for-profit platform, while in the public-good 
model that Eubank’s proposes, the public’s need to access, distribute, and receive 
valuable information are the central benefits. From the bottom, the system is designed to 
serve the users’ rights without subjecting the public to the negative externalities of tools 
whose primary purpose is to serve advertisers.98  
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Democracy and the Internet 
Amongst democratic societies, the relationship between state institutions and the 
internet has unique characteristics that set it apart from other political-economic 
dynamics and other modes of communication. On balance, most policy makers and 
leaders of state agencies need networked technologies to meet certain policy and 
administrative goals that intersect with and affect nearly all aspects of governing. As 
such, the net needs to be relatively open, secure and functional99 for the sake of 
governmental and economic goals. Faster production of goods and services, lower 
transaction costs, greater growth and prosperity from electronic commerce, and the 
possibility of efficient control of transactions are all economic goals that can be met with 
networked communications.100 Cybersecurity, surveillance, and law enforcement are also 
vital concerns of many state agencies.101 In addition, internet corporations lobby 
governments and international institutions for favorable policies that allow for open data 
flows and for legal structures that secure online marketplaces, such as intellectual 
property protections.  
As Denardis explains, while issues of internet governance are rising in the public 
consciousness, the outcomes, in terms of freedom of expression, privacy and openness, 
are all the result of complex legal, infrastructural, and technical decisions, understood 
only by a small set of elite experts.102 While these experts are not always the decision 
makers, the full knowledge of the implications often rests with them. It is not enough, 
 
99 MONICA HORTEN, THE CLOSING OF THE NET (1 edition ed. 2016). 
100 Id. 
101 LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014). 
102 Id. 
 43 
then, to describe the implications of internet policies, but research must also point to how 
decision-making is evolving in both national and international fora in order to better map 
the conditions that lead to international policy coordination. Furthermore, more research 
is needed to make sense of how internet policies, once adopted by states, become 
implemented and challenged.103 
In one leading study of international internet policy, Horten argues that the 
governance of the internet is a contested space defined by two opposing perspectives: a 
market-led perspective that sees the internet as a site of commerce, and a user-
empowerment perspective that holds freedom of expression as its guiding principle. 
According to Horten, citizen-led movements, corporate lobbying, and the needs of 
military and law enforcement have brought a number of ongoing policy debates into the 
public eye, including privacy, net-neutrality, copyright enforcement, and blocking and 
filtering. At the same time, policymakers in liberal democracies are regulating the web to 
meet policy goals such as faster production of goods and lower transportation costs, 
greater growth and prosperity, and the possibility of control over transactions.  On the 
other hand, internet corporations that deal in information, entertainment and social 
connection need the state to create a favorable policy environment for them to control 
data flows and to meet commercial goals. In the end, as Horten explains, the future of the 
internet will be determined by the outcome of these two competing visions, one that is 
market-led and one that is public-led.104 
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 In the area of internet governance, Denardis argues that the technical standards 
that define the arcane management of online spaces have very tangible political 
dimensions. While the hidden technical aspects of the web, such as protocols and internet 
addresses are complicated, they need to be understood beyond a small group of elite 
experts. Moreover, the outcomes of governance decisions affect civil liberties such as 
privacy and freedom of expression. Interests in national security and commerce all play a 
part. Denardis sees a growing understanding in the public about the politics of the 
internet, while also calling on researchers to contribute research that supports that 
growing consciousness.105 
To Denardis, internet intermediaries have risen in power as the internet has 
matured. States and traditional institutions have decreased in power. The narrative of the 
internet’s democratic potential does not match with the reality of the censorship and 
control. In many cases, technology and democracy have diverged. However, internet 
governance is a set of continually negotiated contested spaces, and as such, will 
determine the future of innovation policy, national security, and freedom of expression. 
Denardis argues that the technical protocols – that define how traffic on the internet is 
managed – bake in a set of values to the design of the network. These standards are sites 
of conflict. On a very basic level, the internet works because of these universal 
technological arrangements, but the process of setting these standards is political.  
In another related study, Mackinnon argues that the commons is the primary 
techno-political platform for a global netizen movement. In other words, sharing is the 
key to a pluralistic internet. Mackinnon's argument rests on a few central points. First, 
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internet companies would not be so successful if the net was designed with proprietary 
technology – code that was built for free by the web’s original engineers. Second, the 
digital commons played a key role in the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, allowing 
activists to access to global publishing and real-time information sharing platforms. 
Third, software code and technical standards are themselves forms of law and policy 
because they constrain what we can and cannot do online. As McKinnon argues, the 
modes and limits of expression are being shaped, not by governments alone, but by 
software developers, hardware engineers and network operators. Thus, Mckinnon finds 
that the citizen commons is the key counterweight to corporate and government power, 
allowing for “dissent, whistleblowing and non-mainstream conversations.”106  
Of particular importance is Mckinnon's treatment of the contested terrain of 
copyright enforcement. She recounts a U.S. government hearing on internet security 
when representatives from New York and California districts pressured Google’s senior 
counsel to block, filter and pre-screen for copyrighted content. The Google representative 
fought back by focusing on free speech and freedom of expression. To MacKinnon, this 
hearing reflects the larger trend at the time – when it comes to copyright, politicians push 
for censorship and surveillance over free expression. During this period, lawmakers in the 
U.S. pressured internet companies to stop piracy because of aggressive lobbying by the 
entertainment industries. Protecting intellectual property (IP) became more important 
than due process. Mckinnon cites a number of examples: The PROTECT IP Act of 2011, 
the ICE shutdowns of 2011, ACTA, as well as § 512 of the DMCA. 
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In a related study, Mueller provides an historical account of the internet 
governance taking place in two forums, the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). As 
Mueller argues, the internet has pressured states in five ways: through international 
communications that crosses jurisdictions, changes in the polity that result from online 
networks, decentralized control and distributed participation, new institutions that govern 
network design and policy, and unlimited storage of data and information. He concludes 
that new forms of governance are needed that recognize these dynamics. He argues 
ultimately against state power and for a form of decentralized multi-stakeholder 
governance.107 
In contrast, Castells argues that the democratic nation-state is the key to 
addressing inequality of access and to establishing an internet run on liberal democratic 
norms. Castells argues that there are profound contradictions between in the celebratory 
discourses of technology and the evolutionary direction of the knowledge economy, that 
itself is profoundly exclusionary. As Castells writes, the global economy of the 
networked society could close itself off from the billions of people who are information-
resource poor. For Castells, a massive program of international public policy is required 
to address inequalities of infrastructure, education, and information resources to prevent 
the moral, political, and economic crises of exclusion.108 
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Along those lines, Drezner also argues that there is little benefit to technological 
change, without liberal democratic governance and democratic institutions. Drezner 
surveyed the literature in political science and international relations in regard to the 
relationships between the internet and state-society relations and focused specifically on 
regime type. As Drezner argues, the internet can serve civil society through access to 
information and horizontal communication, but it can also serve the interests of autocratic 
governments who wish to surveil and control.109 
In addition, Milner performed a cross-national comparison of 190 countries to 
better understand the relationship between institutional characteristics and the digital 
divide. Milner argues that states will block and filter if they see the internet as a threat. 
Milner concludes that the most significant factor in predicting the digital inclusion is 
regime-type. Autocratic regimes see little benefit from the internet if they don’t connect it 
to economic development, whereas democratic regimes are more likely to promote 
openness and are assumed to recognize the benefits for economic growth (and desire 
those benefits).110 
The Global Digital Divide  
 Within the field of international communications, scholars have also addressed 
the global nature of internet policymaking and the inequities of governance that is 
market-led. In her studies of neoliberalism and internet policy, Charkravarrty argues that 
critical communication scholars need to attend to the historical backdrop of the current 
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neoliberal attempts to solve the digital divide. She argues that discourses of media 
development have led to an “anti-politics” of tech-driven development and negates class 
conflict and colonial histories. Implicit in her critique is the argument that western 
international communication scholars need to be self-reflexive in their agreement (or 
neutrality) in regard to corporate-led solutions to the digital divide.111 
 Al-Ghazzi cautions against applying western liberal narratives to studies of 
democratic communications and social movements in the global south. Specifically, Al-
Ghazzi cites the discourse of the “citizen journalist” in regard to the use of social media 
during the Arab spring uprisings of 2011. In many cases, media practices are varied and 
not always tied to notions of citizenship in any particular state. To solve this problem, Al-
Ghazzi recommends that scholars take the time to learn from local and inter-cultural 
histories.112 
  In a related study, Charkravartty and Aouragh argue for the study of 
infrastructures of empire, while making the case that recent literature on infrastructure is 
missing references to the cold-war histories of the internet. In addition, they point out that 
internal conflicts within post-colonial states, rooted in race and class, that characterize the 
policy field of media development today have not been well understood. To Chakravartty 
and Aouragh, infrastructures are not just technologies, but the result of the combination 
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of technologies and policies. As such, scholars need to attend to the use, history, and 
design of infrastructures in the global south.113 
 At the same time, Yeo has studied the political economy of search engines to 
analyze the competition between Google and Baidu for Chinese audiences and the 
relationship of each company to state power and geopolitical contests. Yeo reveals the 
connections between competing ideologies of internet development on global scale, with 
the resulting controls on corporate advancement impacting the material lives of millions 
of internet users, as well as the profits of multinational internet intermediaries.114 
Intellectual Property (IP) Law and Agency 
Not all authors take a negative view of intellectual property laws in terms of the 
advancement of human rights. Chander and Sunder argue that in practice, IP laws can in 
fact serve social ends and economic development in the global south. For example, 
Chander and Sunder address how indigenous communities are using IP law to protect 
traditional knowledge and how the state could intertwine human rights and IP. Chander 
and Sunder assert that IP should include a broader set of values (as opposed to narrow 
libertarian theories) that would promote the use of IP to support human rights, public 
health, and economic development. As Chander and Sunder argue, human advancement 
is predicated on IP law that serves both human needs as well as profit. In fact, they point 
to the civil society groups that are insisting on this and advocated for it in different ways. 
Examples include efforts such as Creative Commons, lobbying for reforms within WIPO, 
new WTO declarations, as well as instances of trademark being employed to support 
 
113 Miriyam Aouragh & Paula Chakravartty, Infrastructures of empire: towards a critical geopolitics of 
media and information studies, 38 MEDIA CULT. SOC. 559–575 (2016). 
114 ShinJoung Yeo, Geopolitics of search: Google versus China?, 38 MEDIA CULT. SOC. 591–605 (2016). 
 50 
agricultural and health related developments in poor communities. According to Chander 
and Sunder, these efforts towards using IP for social ends are having tangible and 
positive effects. But the inclusion of social justice concerns is now urgent because of the 
rise of the internet and the global adoption of the TRIPS agreement.115  
In terms of the internet, Chandler and Sunder see hope in new technologies that 
allow for IP to be shared cheaply and easily, fostering the widespread use of human 
knowledge. However, at the same time, the ease of distribution has led to laws that 
criminalize the circumvention of copyright protections, laws that could be exploited to 
limit the spread of knowledge and lock out competition in the marketplace. Key to a new 
democracy of IP is not that copyright should be eliminated, rather, the lawmaking process 
should be opened further to include marginalized voices. According to Chandler and 
Sunder, the teleology of IP should not be determined by legal scholars, but by the 
democratic process, historical development and political struggle.116  
 The arguments presented by these legal scholars illuminate how the historical 
development of IP law impacts public health, communication rights, freedom of 
expression, and an open internet. Along with healthcare and food, access to knowledge 
and freedom of expression are also basic human needs in an egalitarian society. These 
rights are predicated on a global open internet and global governance of the internet that 
accounts for a plurality of viewpoints. Chander and Sunder’s, arguments highlight new 
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opportunities for change – examples of agency within an increasingly enclosed and 
privatized internet.117  
Discourse and Internet Policy 
Much has been written about the power of the Internet and social media vis-á-vis 
popular uprisings in dictatorships throughout the world. Memes such as ‘net-neutrality’, 
‘Arab-spring’, and ‘meta-data’ have emerged as important frames that are supporting 
normative positions such as, an open internet is good for democracy and access to social 
tools are good for democratic movements, etc. Furthermore, a certain cluster of American 
corporate interests that rely on an expanded base of users to support their business models 
have benefitted greatly from these discourses. In parallel, a dichotomy has emerged 
between global centers of informational and technological power. In one popular 
narrative, China favors information control to maintain national order and state 
sovereignty, while the U.S. favors open access, legal and technical controls to protect 
commerce and surveillance to prevent terrorism. As a basis for policy decisions and 
foreign policy, American ideals of human rights, security and freedom are juxtaposed 
with authoritarianism and state control. 
A number of scholars have examined these geopolitical dynamics by studying 
discourse – the words of that public officials and powerful people use to influence 
policymaking and public opinion. For example, when Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg 
testified in the U.S. Congress that his company should not face antitrust regulation 




Facebook and Congress have shared interests.118 The words “free expression,” in this 
context, mean liberal democracy, the U.S. Constitution, and the origin story of the United 
States. They signify to the audience a story that is much more significant than the details 
of Facebook’s alleged anti-competitive behavior – and how to regulate it or not. 
Discourse scholars argue that these words (and the ideas they signify) matter to how 
policy change happens – and how power operates in the various arenas of policymaking. 
Wilson maintains that some approaches to discourse analysis are more heavily influenced 
by linguistic theory, while others are more rooted in institutional approaches.119  
Regardless of the theoretical vantage point, discourse scholars claim that words used in 
policy making can be studied and analyzed using the tools of textual analysis – not unlike 
the way that a cinema studies scholar may study film “texts.” Key to an institutional 
approach is the question of who is producing the text in question and what their interests 
are. In this way, the emphasis for an institutional political discourse analysis is on the 
politics of the issue under study.     
In the area of internet policy, leading scholars have used discourse analysis to 
argue that U.S. policymakers use the discourses of “free flow” and “internet freedom” to 
maintain control over the world’s internet resources for benefit and dominance of 
American companies.120 For example, Powers and Jablonski situate their account of 
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information policy in the critical political economy of the media and map a diverse set of 
examples to tell a century-long story of U.S. power and intentions in the on-going 
development of global governance. Powers and Jablonski argue that the U.S. political 
agenda in regard to the internet is directly tied to American tech companies, western 
norms, and serves to promote western products. Powers and Jablonski provide an account 
of how U.S. corporate interests have dominated the policy positions and geopolitical 
moves by the U.S. government in regard to information resources and the internet. In 
detailed case studies, Powers and Jablonski effectively hold up new understandings to 
consider in light of the dominant discourses of “free flow” and “information freedom.”121 
Powers and Jablonski demonstrate how U.S. media companies maintain local control in 
infrastructure and are able to extract fees from global south countries – and how this lack 
of investment and profit extraction has been facilitated by the uneven process of global 
governance. In the end, they make the case for state controls that support state 
sovereignty and global rules that protect user privacy and personal data from government 
and corporate uses. 
McCarthy uses the tools of critical discourse analysis to present one of the first 
studies that connects international relations to internet governance. Applying both an 
historical materialist and science and technology studies approaches, McCarthy accounts 
for the role of the U.S. government in the control of internet resources. And, using a 
constructivist analysis, he examines the discourse of U.S. officials to connect the norm of 
internet freedom to the spread of American control of the internet. McCarthy’s key focus 
is on the design of the technology as policy – technological design that has both political 
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roots and political implications. He aims to rethink international relations theory itself by 
asserting that the internet is a form of power.122 
  In one short essay published in 2016, Pohle, Hosl, and Kniep propose a wholly 
new analytical approach to the study of the politics of internet policy. Pohle and her 
colleagues draw together sociological field theory (Bourdieu and Wacquant) and science 
and technology studies (Latour) to call for the study of the core conflicts of the internet 
policy field. They argue that the core conflicts are those that define what is truly at stake 
in the policy debate itself. The core conflicts are defined by actors in the field and 
through policymaking fora, and they become institutionalized into policies and structures. 
In the case of internet policy, this means debates over three central concerns: 1) what is 
the purpose of regulation (i.e., cybersecurity, innovation, or open communication); 2) 
whose expertise is recognized in the policy debates; and 3) how will the problem at hand 
be regulated. In short, actors in policy field are in a constant contest of meaning-making 
over these three questions and the outcomes define the character of our future internet. 
Therefore, given that the nature of the internet is defined by political struggle, the 
discourses used in that struggle are worthy of methodical examination and comparative 
analysis. According to Pohle et. al., discourses have a “performative effect” in that they 
become inscribed into technologies, laws, and even policymaking routines through the 
process of discourse institutionalization.123 By combining a macro-level structural 
approach – identifying stakeholders and how policies are getting made – with a 
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discursive approach that examines policy documents and government documents in 
granular detail, we can see how meanings are embedded in structures. In the end, 
mapping the conflicts of internet policy (and the discourses used therein) will lead to 
more informed stakeholders and a better policy field.124  
Meyer, in her study of digital copyright policymaking in the E.U. presents a 
comprehensive study of discourse institutionalization in the area of internet policy. She 
covers over a decade of copyright policymaking in multiple countries in the E.U. through 
textual analysis of hundreds of government documents. Her central question is “how and 
why have selected policies in the European Union dealing with the online enforcement of 
copyright developed?”125 She engages with this question through a series of case studies 
that provide thick descriptions of debates between stakeholders in a way that provides a 
nuanced account of central interests, arguments, and discourses in each case. Meyer 
argues that the many discourses and arguments that comprise the digital copyright policy 
field fall under the meta-debate between access and control i.e., between the internet and 
copyright. Powerful interests – entertainment industries and internet platforms – sit on 
both sides of the debate and the struggle between them is ongoing. Meyer sees little 
change in the fundamental nature of this debate and the political economy that drives it. 
She argues for more transparency and accountability on the part of government and a 
regulatory approach that addresses monopolistic practices on either side.126 Meyer 
concludes that the theoretical approach of the study of political economy of the media 
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should include discourse analysis, in addition to studies of market share and market 
power, to chart changes in power and control. She writes,  
…the lack of agreement on problem definitions, policy solutions and goals is 
in part driven by differences in stakeholder rationales for copyright and the 
internet. Analyzing ideas and discourses offers additional insight into the results 
and stalemates we observe in online copyright enforcement policies. Stakeholders 
compete to structure and frame the policy problem at hand.127  
Conclusion 
In all of these areas of scholarship, there appears to be little attention to 
multilateral policymaking that regulates algorithmic and automated filtering. In other 
words, copyright and internet policy have historically had profound geopolitical 
importance – which is well documented in political economy and internet governance – 
but the regulation of the automation of regulation appears to be understudied. Some, legal 
scholars have turned their analysis to the development of algorithms and automatic 
content controls to compare different regimes and assess the outcomes for free expression 
and privacy.128 But, given the implications of algorithmic controls in terms of free 
expression and information access, there is room for further inquiry related to automated 
filtering in internet governance, international communications, and political economy.  
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This literature review has brought together the various strands of scholarship 
informing this study of the political economy of intermediary liability. Keys areas have 
included critical political economy of the media, internet governance, critical data 
studies, and international communications. Scholars in these areas have been concerned 
with central questions of policy change and political economy – how do policy programs 
develop, who do they benefit, and to what effect? Within these various areas, some 
authors have analyzed the discourse of policymaking as a way to account for changes in 
power and control. The granular detail and the thick description of discourse analysis 
helps to understand important political debates and connect those debates to policy 
change. Thus, the chapter reviewed influential studies of discourse, as well as other areas 















I begin with a focus on the critical political economy of the media approach, 
describing its key characteristics, and specifically its emphasis on power and praxis. I 
draw also from international communication theory and theories of monopoly capital. I 
include a broad survey of international communications that covers its three central 
paradigms – modernization, dependency, and post-modernist. All three paradigms are 
included to help ground this chapter in the trajectory of international communications in 
the twentieth century. I conclude with an explanation of the theory of monopoly capital 
and apply this framework to the study of corporate oligopolies and their power vis-á-vis 
the capitalist state. 
In the area of media and globalization, scholars in international communications 
and critical political economy of the media (PEM) often have centered on theories of 
cultural imperialism and center/periphery as they relate to the dominance of the United 
States – in both telecommunications and entertainment.129 And, recently, some notable 
critical investigations of the internet130 have questioned liberal constructions of the 
networked technologies and mapped the global terrain of digital imperialism and 
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monopoly capitalism in relation to the digital economy. In addition, media policy, as a 
subset of neoliberalism, has been the subject of theoretical inquiry in both political 
economy and international communications. Throughout the 20th century, scholars of 
international communications modeled the geopolitical dimension of cultural, 
informational, and technological flows–flows that included policy changes. This inquiry 
has focused on state-to-state relations and various models of geopolitical power.131 This 
project draws on these theorists, but also addresses internet laws and regulations that have 
been developed since the rise of U.S.-based internet platforms. Therefore, I have chosen a 
theoretical approach that takes into account the persistence of colonial relationships – as 
well as the structural power of Silicon Valley companies – that shape our politics, our 
social world, and the conditions in which we live.  
Critical Political Economy of the Media 
Scholars within the critical political economy of the media approach (PEM) have 
found a nexus of corporate and geopolitical power under the neoliberal capitalist system 
that drives the movement of policy regimes. Evidence often supports a model of state 
power that sets programmatic agendas to further strengthen geopolitical positions and 
corporate profits. Critical analysis is typically intertwined with prescriptive proposals for 
more egalitarian programs and framings that often serve prosocial media reforms. In the 
study of transnational conditions and policy flows, the theoretical frameworks of critical 
political economy tend to mirror coercion theorists in international relations,132 although 
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analysis tends to be on the structural level and unified agendas are assumed to be present 
among actors in the capitalist class and in transnational institutions. Analysis includes 
detailed descriptions of how policy change has occurred and indemnifies the 
consequences and implications of policy outcomes, rather than strict empirical 
comparisons of change mechanisms.  
PEM scholars often critique capitalism from a grounding in moral philosophy and 
also aid social movements for justice, equality and the public good. In opposition to 
mainstream and administrative approaches, critical PEM scholars provide a vision 
towards capitalism’s eventual demise, and sometime aid the reform of media policies. 
The vision of such a line of research includes liberation from capitalist domination, a 
redistribution of resources, and a cultural sphere defined by people, not profit. Key to 
critical political economy is the use of historical and documentary methods to investigate 
questions of the role of the media in cultural and ideological struggle. While some 
scholars have sought to explicitly extend a Marxist critique of society and others have 
sought to directly aid social change with social critique, nearly all address the location of 
authority and the distribution of power in society. One of the significant differences that 
is evident throughout these texts is their treatment of the globalization of capitalism. 
There are varying levels of emphasis on this process and how it relates to the power of 
the United States, the dissemination of commercial culture and theoretical development.  
Building from Marx and Engels, critical PEM disregards any notion that the 
empirical study of the economic relations could be an objective science.  In the Political 
Economy of Communication, Mosco offers a broad definition that is useful to 
differentiate PEM from other schools of economics and their relationship to Marx.  He 
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writes that any ideological strand (including Adam Smith and other classical political 
economists) of PEM typically share four aspects: a focus on the social totality, history, 
moral philosophy and praxis. This definition is echoed by Wasko, Murdock and Sousa in 
their introduction to The Handbook of Political Economy of Communication, but they 
emphasize the leftist context of the approach and distinguish critical PEM from media 
economics because it is holistic, historical, involves a moral philosophy, and embraces 
praxis, i.e., for work to have tangible impacts.  
This obligation to apply one’s research to public discussions is important to 
consider. When one examines the ways in which research and scholarship are valued both 
in our dominant financial institutions and in political movements on the right in the 
United States (and globally), we can see that knowledge generation is vital to social 
movements and political fights. In the study of the mass media, PEM makes that 
connection, understands the interrelated nature of research and policy, and provides a 
growing body of work that is relevant and increasingly impactful.  
Towards a Political Economy of Culture 
In calling for a political economy of culture, Nicolas Garnham addresses the 
significance of documenting and analyzing historical processes. To Garnham, capitalism 
requires that the market economy dominates society and industrial powers use the media 
to maintain the status quo. It is the role of the researcher to document the relationships 
between the economic base and the spheres of culture and information. Garnham applies 
a Marxist analysis to draw the boundaries of the field. In calling for a political economy 
of culture, he highlights the inherent need of capitalism to invest and expand, and the key 
role that surplus gained from labor play in the processes of capitalism. To Garnham, 
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political economy raises questions about how these surpluses have been allocated over 
time and how the relationships between industrial forces and cultural production have 
shifted and evolved. The political economy of culture examines the continuous historical 
process of attempts to surmount the barriers to this process.  Garnham writes, 
Historically the sphere of mental production or non-material production presented 
and continues to present important barriers to [increased productivity and 
widening markets] and the forms and dynamics of the mass media can in part be 
understood as resulting from a continuous attempt to surmount those barriers and 
from the concretely various successes and failures of that attempt.133 
 The commodification of audiences is one piece of that story, but so are the 
processes of global governance, media privatization, runaway production, copyright 
agreements, and intellectual property enforcement agreements that serve the growth of 
the culture industries as businesses that seek to sell (and profit from) actual cultural 
commodities.  
Murdock and Golding also stress the media’s role in maintaining social relations 
and the importance of examining how that has evolved historically. To Murdock and 
Golding, the mass media have been absent from critical analysis of the reproduction and 
legitimation of class relations in advanced capitalism.134 While other scholarship has 
examined education and other social and economic sectors, the ideological role of the 
mass media in maintaining capitalism has not been fully explored. Historical examination 
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starts with the theoretical position that the mass media cement consensus among the 
working classes. The job of the researcher is to document how and why that happens.135 
Mosco writes that PEM scholars are typically rooted in Marxian theory and 
examine how wealth is related to power and how economic power influences information 
and culture. A moral vision, rooted in democratic and communitarian ideals, guides both 
research and the political platform for change. Understanding is not distinct from social 
action, and the two work together to support political transformation. To Mosco, 
globalization is not the integrative part of PEM as a whole, but a sub-area, as labor, social 
class, technology, globalization are examples of sub-areas with critical political economy. 
According to Mosco, the social processes of commodification, specialization and 
structuration are central starting points for political economic research. He argues that the 
study of political economy differs from cultural studies in that it supports the perspective 
that consumption and commodification serve to “reproduce class power.”136 
  Wasko emphasizes how PEM has been influential for a wide array of research 
within media studies and, as a discrete approach, has expanded internationally. She 
demonstrates how globalization and the study global capitalism is woven throughout all 
of the sub-areas of PEM. In her account, an international perspective and a consideration 
of global dynamics is essential to any critical analysis, whether the focus is media history, 
media as a business, labor, media and the state, or the public sphere. Global PEM 
scholarship has emerged in different variations that have focused broadly on the cultural 
industries, social movements, globalization, and the information-based media. Wasko 
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writes that as the field has grown in scope and impact, it has influenced more integrated 
studies involving cultural studies and media economics. PEM continues to be relevant 
and vital to our understanding of media and society within the evolution of market 
capitalism globally.137  
 One controversial figure amongst the authors of these selected readings (and the 
body of work referenced by Wasko and Mosco) is Dallas Smythe. While he is considered 
a founding member of PEM in the U.S. and Canada, his conception of the audience 
commodity has generated a number of critical responses and lengthy conversations about 
its impact on the evolution of Marxist theory, as it relates to communications. To Smythe, 
the distinction between base and superstructure has been complicated by an advanced 
form of capitalism that relies on the labor of audiences to perpetuate itself. He argues that 
audiences, not content, are the primary products of media. To Smythe, the study of 
content perpetuates subjective examinations of superficial concepts that are divorced 
from real life. Smythe claims that mainstream media economists and Marxists alike have 
not properly examined the market for audiences or the role that the media plays in 
making market capitalism function. Audience power is a form of labor that is bought and 
sold by the media. Demographics describe the different collectives of audiences to 
advertisers and determine their value in the market. Nielsen ratings and research are 
combined to statistically “grade” audiences and increase the probability that the 
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advertiser is hitting their target. Audiences actually pay for the privilege of working for 
advertisers, much more than broadcasters pay to operate, or advertisers pay for time.138  
Smythe describes his central argument: “…what is the principle product of the 
commercial mass media in monopoly capitalism was simple: audience power. This is the 
concrete product which is used to accomplish the economic and political tasks which are 
the reason for the existence of the commercial mass media.”139 Smythe made his 
contribution decades before the growth of internet platforms and that are predicated on 
sophisticated audience segmentation.   
International Communications Theory 
International communications developed as an approach? in the 20th century and 
its key approaches and concerns were directly tied to geopolitical and technological 
factors. Historically, research has been most concerned with relationships between 
structural and institutional changes and peoples’ real material lives and conditions. 
Thussu divides the field into three approaches: modernization, dependency, and post-
colonial (or post-modernist).140 
 The dominant theory within international communications has been 
modernization. In connection with the free flow of communications discourse, 
modernization theorists see media as tools for hastening economic growth and 
development towards liberal democracy and capitalist economic structures. For example, 
Lerner studied audience exposure to western broadcasting in the Middle East, concluding 
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that media were a key component of moving a population from a traditional to a modern 
way of life. He believed that media were a mobility multiplier, in that programming that 
exposed people to films and programs from overseas made them question their way of 
life and aspire for societal change.141 
 Another widely recognized proponent of modernization was Schramm, who 
published Mass Media and National Development in conjunction with UNESCO. 
Schramm believed that media were vehicles for transforming information from north to 
south and from urban to rural settings. He agreed with Lerner that media motivated 
people to aspire to a better life, but also believed that media could transfer norms and 
values, such as the American Dream (if you work hard, you will have a better life).142 
 Rogers was also highly influential in international communications and across the 
social sciences. Rogers, a leading researcher of modernization theory, presented the 
diffusion of innovations model in the 1960s.143 His main interest was the process of 
adoption and he worked to better understand the characteristics of subsets of a 
population, and how those characteristics effected their capacity and willingness to adopt 
a new technologies or media products. However, he has been widely critiqued for 
ignoring place-based differences, disregarding the power dynamics inherent in 
technological change, and for not addressed the inequality of media development in 
general. 
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Dependency   
 Given the geopolitical changes in the twentieth century and the politicization of 
telecommunications on world scale, the dependency paradigm arose as a theoretical 
orientation in the 1960s. Its chief assumption was that power dynamics are inherent in 
capitalist structures and that liberation and social change comes from exposing the 
connection between economic relationships and peoples’ material realities, especially in 
regard to media and culture. The dependency theory’s essential model of world power is 
that there is a center, or core, of elite nations, and these nations spread, diffuse, or impose 
media, information and culture on peripheral or poorer nations who are dependent on the 
informational and infrastructural power of the core nations. Loss of sovereignty, local 
culture, and economic independence are among the negative results.144 
During this same time period, Norwegian sociologist Galtung published his 
theory of structural imperialism. Rather than a unipolar flow of economic and media 
domination, Galtung posited a symbiotic relationship between the center of elites within 
the center nations and the center, or core, of elites in peripheral nations. These alliances, 
of center of the center to the center of the periphery represent the dynamics of structural 
power for the world media system. His theory has often been applied in studying news 
flows, as news agendas and flows at the time were found to be driven by a global network 
of elites.145 
 Meanwhile, Wallerstein presented a theory of the world system to explain 
globalization from a neo-Marxian perspective. Building on the theoretical ground laid by 
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Marx and Weber, Wallerstein posited a world economic order that can be studied like an 
organism, with cycles and phases that can be observed over time. He believed that the 
global division of labor was responsible for the center – periphery dynamic and that 
world history and structural power is driven by economic relations, not politics.146 
One of the most well-known scholars in the dependency school is Herbert 
Schiller, who modeled a world communications order where the United States 
undermined the sovereignty and independence of other nations. In Mass Communication 
and American the Empire, he traced the role of the U.S. government in cultural 
domination and saw the spread of consumerism as dominating over pluralism, national 
culture, and public service. In reflecting on four decades of critical scholarship on 
cultural imperialism, Schiller writes that after World War II, the geopolitical dynamics 
made Europe and third world countries vulnerable to the technological and economic 
power of the U.S. At that time, American power was established not only through 
military might, but through the intentional dissemination of American entertainment and 
news around the globe. Ideological and cultural hegemony were the result.147 
However, many scholars dismissed Schiller’s Marxist position, and saw the rise 
of global capitalism as a movement away from domination and towards global diversity 
and equanimity that allows resistance to hegemony. Despite these critiques, in 1991, he 
asserted that “imperialism’s vital signs are unimpaired.”148 In his view, transnational 
dynamics continued to be ruled by global capitalism and that any universalism was based 
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on business interests, not social justice or human rights. In the context of recent global 
positioning, Schiller’s treatment of the state is important to emphasize. He admits that 
transnational companies don’t necessarily work in the service of a particular nation-state, 
but in the service of companies’ profits. However, he writes that in the media 
communications industries, American companies still dominate. Even where new centers 
of production exist in the global south, the content produced merely mimics the styles 
and formats popularized in America. The corporate takeover of culture for marketing 
purposes is not uniquely American, but the highest form of media capitalism is found in 
the U.S.149 
Schiller’s emphasis oscillated back and forth between a focus on corporate power, 
commercialism and U.S. geopolitical power, but in the end, he asserted that these are 
actually one and the same. In distinguishing a critical approach, he wrote that 
globalization theorists claim that autonomy defines the current world order, and that state 
interests and political power are cancelled out by new forms of international institutions 
and the broad-based access to instant global communications. In actuality, he argues that 
globalization is built on the infrastructure built to serve business interests. These business 
interests often operate in harmony, and collectively work to open markets and reach 
consumers. In this process they take command over the technological, economic, political 
and cultural practices to achieve their goals of growth and increased value.150 
A number of theories of imperialism have updated Schiller’s theories to the digital 
age and address the structural power of U.S.-based platform corporations. Jin has 
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introduced a theory of platform imperialism which places the U.S. and U.S.-based 
platforms in a dominant position over other countries in the area of internet governance. 
Jin argues that the structural power of U.S.-based internet corporations results in a loss of 
privacy and a lack of transparency in many countries. He uses four case studies, including 
intellectual property law, the digital divide, the labor power of internet users, and the 
dominance of U.S.-style entrepreneurship as evidence. Unlike previous eras of 
imperialism, users have the ability to organize and resist platform owners to transform 
this nexus of corporate and state power. But colonial relationships are on-going as a 
result of the collaborative relationship between big technology companies and the U.S. 
government.151 
Post-Modernism, Post-Colonialism, and Post-Structuralism  
Critics within the dependency approach have claimed that globalization 
represented domination of the west and its attendant commercial culture, while celebrants 
of modernization have emphasized positive trends such as democracy, development, and 
diversity. As theoretical examination developed, scholars addressed a number of the 
assumptions and perspectives that underlie both of these positions. One important area of 
concern has been the idea that culture, economic forms and political ideologies flow in a 
unidirectional fashion from the countries of the global north to the global south, i.e., the 
capitalist mass media of the global north produces messages that are received by 
audiences in the global south and these messages have certain effects. Recent theorists 
have transformed this linear correlation into models that take into account multiple levels 
of analysis and the multidimensionality of globalization processes. In this discourse, the 
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power dynamics of global capitalism are not erased, but its effects are found in examples 
of hybridization, not monoculture, and its source is not just the West, but from various 
geographic levels and locales. Local resistance, appropriation of technologies, cultural 
identity and the role of the nation-state are also points of analysis in these more 
postmodern conceptualizations of global culture.  
 In the 1990s scholars from across media studies began to develop new theories to 
explain globalization that argued against linear models of domination. One of the most 
well recognized theorists in this area is Appadurai, who asserts that cultural flows are 
complex and that, rather than cultural imperialism, there is a global heterogeneous dialog 
of cultural flows. In turn, social and political struggles create disjunctures or ironies and 
resistances that are a form of cultural power. Rather than a structural analysis, he argues 
that the power and context of cultural flows can be studied on five levels, or scapes: 
techno-scapes (technologies), ideo-scapes (ideas, norms, ideology), media-scapes 
(images), finance-scapes (capital), and Ethno-scapes (people). He argues that influence is 
created through ironies and contradictions, not hegemony.152 
 
 Sreberny argues that media corporations are truly global and linear models of 
flows of media and culture are outdated. She points to a number of ethnographic studies 
as evidence of the slippery boundaries of the global and the local. To her, there is a 
triangle of forces that shape culture, encompassing the local, the national, and the global. 
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In addition, she cites the success of Bollywood and TV Globo of Brazil as evidence of 
these varied flows and influences.153 
 Martin-Barbero focuses specifically on the question of national culture as the 
result of combined influences of media development, local culture, and foreign 
investment. He uses four case studies in radio, the press, music, and film to develop his 
model of national culture. While the development of national cultural identity is a process 
whereby local indigenous culture is essentially stolen and diversity is absorbed into the 
idea of a nation, he believes that technologies and media can be reclaimed to meet the 
needs of people.154 
Monopoly Capital, The State, and Imperialism 
Under monopoly capitalism, Baran and Sweezy posit a state that is characterized 
by big government coordinated in service to a small oligarchy of large corporations. 
Rather than manifesting a libertarian ideal of limited government, the capitalist state 
responds to rising surplus by creating the policies and infrastructures that guarantee its 
absorption. And, given that monopoly capitalism cannot possibly create enough demand 
to absorb massive surpluses that are a defining feature of monopoly capitalism, the state 
creates the necessary demand, and, in turn, further surplus is created. While the 
government can be, of course, a valued customer through vast and differentiated types of 
procurement across government agencies, it also distributes the surplus through “transfer 
payments” in the form of tax incentives, subsidies, and entitlements such as social 
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security. Baran and Sweezy go on to define the state’s role in the actual generation of 
surplus itself, by defining a political economic model where the state’s role is not 
parasitic, as the surplus it creates would not otherwise be generated were it not for the 
government. In the end, any advocacy on the part of elites for small government and less 
taxes is useful only for appeals to the voting public, as it is well understood how the state 
benefits all actors in the monopoly system.   
How, then, do various interest groups effect policy change, government spending 
and transfer payments? What is the nature of the internal conflicts in the government and 
the influential dynamics of state agencies, lobbyists, and social movements? This is the 
key defining relationship of Baran and Sweezy’s definition of the state – the private 
interests of capital control government programs in nearly every area of public spending, 
from military and non-military budgets, such as housing, highways, and education. 
Bourgeois democracy is preferred by elites where voters rule in theory, but the oligarchy 
rules in practice. In turn, spending that primarily benefits masses of citizens are limited 
only to essential basics, while programs that enhance the profits of a critical mass of 
corporations and industrial sectors are lavishly supported. Spending and transfer payment 
programs can be pro-active, such as the absurd amounts spent on the federal interstate 
highway system. And policy decisions can be also preventative to avoid threats to the 
class structure and private enterprise.155 Decisions on investment amounts, or whether to 
invest at all, are based on the need to absorb and generate further surplus. As such, the 
range of debate is limited to conflicts between elite and moneyed interests. Furthermore, 
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any resistance from organized workers or other coalitions of non-property owners is 
typically limited to seeking small concessions that stay within the boundaries of 
monopoly capitalism. The power of the oligarchy is so great that trade unions are better 
off playing within the system, rather than suffering the consequences of defiance.156 
According to Baran and Sweezy, three key processes define the American post-
war political economy: the overwhelming reliance on military spending to avoid 
recession, the capture of bourgeois representative democracy by powerful corporate 
actors, and the limitation of government spending on social needs (despite clear needs in 
this area).157 Legislative agendas and government agencies are trained to narrow the 
bounds and possibilities of government to an illogical set of priorities defined by class 
structure and private profits, “Real competition with private enterprise cannot be 
tolerated, no matter how incompetent and inadequate its performance may be; 
undermining of class privileges or of the stability of class structure must be resisted at 
any cost.”158 In many cases, including the construction of interstate highways, the 
management of national waterways, the provision of public education, the funding of the 
military, and the development of public housing, public spending (or lack thereof) is 
ruled and determined by the powers of the oligarchy. In fact, the structure of bourgeois 
democracy itself is carefully designed to serve oligarchy needs, even more so than an 
authoritarian regime.159 
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 While corporate elites rule U.S. economic policy internally, foreign policy after 
the second world war has likewise been crafted in all instances to strengthen the 
centralized power of U.S. corporate interests and to dominate the world militarily. 
According to Baran and Sweezy, this has been a success in all regions of the world with 
few exceptions. The U.S. has created a “vast world-wide American empire”160 that 
requires enormous military investment and government resources to maintain. As Baran 
and Sweezy define 20th century U.S. imperialism, the intertwined agendas of market 
expansion and military expansion have secured U.S. domination of markets as well as the 
policy programs within foreign governments. Policies then don’t diffuse from nation to 
nation as such; they are written by corporations as preconditions for access to the benefits 
of the global economy. In monopoly capitalism, radical adjustments in domestic policies 
and laws facilitate corporate profits across geography and across time. Policies are 
written to ensure total control and to prevent any threats to profits. The root of this 
hegemonic power then, is the desire for monopoly power and corporate entitlement to all 
surpluses.161 
 The case of Cuba presents a clear example of the guiding motivations for U.S. 
foreign policy – an anti-socialist program of the highest degree. U.S. imperialism is 
managed by the need for what Baran and Sweezy define as “monopolistic control”162 or 
the freedom of capital to move quickly and freely to respond to market conditions 
without restrictions, and on privileged terms that protect property and profits. Coercion is 
the primary modality of power for stopping the spread of sovereign and independent 
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socialist states from emerging. And, militarism, the constant and near-total presence of 
the U.S. military and domestic military acting on behalf of monopoly interests is the 
central tool of power. The construction of bases, the provisions of weaponry, tanks, and 
aircraft through military aid, the public nature of military training missions – all of these 
concrete aspects of militarism work to draw foreign governments and foreign militaries 
closer to the U.S. and to, above all, maintain political stability by creating a conservative 
culture.  
In all instances then, policy diffusion under Baran and Sweezy’s model starts with 
the security state. The imagination of the citizenry and the understanding of what is 
possible is regulated by the constant display of military might and on-going expansion of 
military infrastructure overseas. Various forms of dissent and defiance are then re-
framed. They are no longer progressive and welcome parts of democratic debate, but 
unpatriotic and irrational, “militarization fosters all the reactionary and irrational forces in 
society…Blind respect is engendered for authority; attitudes of docility and conformity 
are taught and enforced.”163 In this way, imperialistic domination is developed through 
military coercion as well as the provision of military aid, that in turn leads to 
disempowering socialist forces. Militarism mediates civil liberties164 because any policy 
reform, from civil liberties to all out revolution, is then connected to communism and is 
an assault to the nation. Constant wartime, living under threat of the enemy, frames all 
politics as one of a nation under an external threat. The us v. them narrative allows capital 
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to connect social reforms to the enemy to win the agreement of the population and win 
support for imperialistic foreign policy. 
Oligopolies and Neoliberalism in Crisis 
In the Implosion of Contemporary Capitalism, Amin places the relationship 
between labor and imperialism at the center of his theory of global power relations. In his 
view, it is the intertwining of capitalism and imperialism that has led to the global 
domination of neoliberalism, or the globalization of generalized and financialized 
monopoly capitalism. To Amin, it is the measure of living conditions, effects on the poor, 
and wages that must guide any assessment of the state. The function of the capitalist 
state, particularly when spending GDP or creating policies that lead to the investment of 
GDP, is to “allow the accumulation to continue”165 no matter what the conditions are for 
the populace or for individual workers. The privatization of entitlements is one area 
where we can see the capitalist state serve this function. In health care, as an example, the 
government's role is to increase the volume of surplus through privatization and public-
private partnerships. Government’s role in fact is to create policies that facilitate the 
increase in this volume over a broad swath of related industries.166 
Key to Amin’s analysis of the present phase of imperialism is his theory of 
generalized monopoly capitalism. In imperialism’s most recent phase, oligopolies have 
become geographically centralized and integrated – so interconnected that any new firm 
must comply with the rules of the oligopoly to survive.167 Power rests definitively in what 
Amin calls the Triad – Japan, Europe, and the United States. In this way, he maintains a 
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center/periphery model, but sees the centralization as further intensifying in a small set of 
firms. At the center of this entire model are the living conditions of all workers.168 In the 
form of wages, vast surpluses are extracted from the periphery to the center through 
favorable laws and policies in the home country. Lack of wage growth - zero wage 
growth in the periphery – is the evidence and driver of the imperialist model, as all 
benefits of global economic growth are seen in the transfer of rents to richer countries.169 
In the global north, wages grow for the average workers and vast surpluses accrue for the 
ruling classes. As a result, any analysis of change can only be based on comparing 
processes of surplus absorption and the extraction of imperialist rents – any other 
measures, such as growth rates, are not appropriate measures of current conditions.170 
Amin argues that the center-periphery polarization is a permanent state of global 
capitalism. Indeed, there is no catching up and state-socialism is the only way forward.171 
In this context, he presents his concept of the emergent state as a tool for analysis. For a 
state to be emergent, it need not have a coherent socialist or capitalist plan, but its 
program must be inwardly focused on national economic sovereignty and be determined 
by social movement pressures - class based and political.172 There is no set of rules for 
emergence to emerge, according to Amin, but it must be state based, not globally 
focused. If it is a global program, in any respect, it is aimed at reducing the power and 
hegemony of “countries in the dominant capitalist center.”173 Leaving the door open 
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(apparently) for models of emergence that include capitalism (at least as an intermediary 
stage), he sees the primary factor in emergence as a coherent plan for state sovereign 
power. In discussing the case of China, he notes the key difference between most of the 
world’s emerging markets (as defined by the World Bank) and the emergent Chinese 
state - the controlled exposure of China’s economy to the control of global generalized 
monopolies. This internal focus and sovereign control have resulted in “the retention of 
the majority of the surplus-value produced there” and a comparably lower level of 
inequality than is evident in capitalist states ruled by generalized monopoly capital.174  
Amin also recognizes that imperialism in the early 21st century continues to be 
built on other structures of power - access to natural resources, the patents and copyrights 
for technological innovations, and the centralization of financial services companies in 
the global North.175 Furthermore, as the title of this thesis implies, the system of 
generalized monopoly capitalism is currently in a deep state of crisis. Since 2008, a new 
phase of capitalism has begun that is characterized by waves of wars, revolutions and 
resistance from peripheral nations.176 Due to its own successes, and it is now magnified 
internal contradictions, neoliberalism is proving to be widely unstable. The global 
economic crisis is inherently connected to the decline of bourgeois democracy in the 
West and the development of some emergent states.177 While all this is leading to the 
autumn of capitalism, the hegemony of generalized monopoly capital has by no means 
been erased and, as in continuity with other crises, is being maintained through 
 
174 Id. at 65. 
175 Id. at 7. 
176 Id. at 97. 
177 Id. at 28. 
 80 
militarism. In addition, political-economic power continues to control the internal 
policies of client states.178  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlined the theoretical approach that I apply to the study of internet 
policy. I began by introducing the central tenants of the critical political economy of the 
media approach and have included its leading voices. I also survey the three approaches 
within the study of international communication and highlighted one leading scholar of 
international communications (Jin) and his theory of platform imperialism. Jin draws 
upon the dependency framework but updates it to the age of platforms. The chapter 
concludes with an explanation of the theory of monopoly capitalism as one critical model 
for the study of oligopolies and the capitalist state.   
Research Questions 
Given this evolving legal terrain and the open divergence of models across 
jurisdictions, I propose an examination of relationship between state-based governance of 
the internet, trans-national agendas, and local/regional norms in regard to digital 
development and digital rights. A series of questions will guide this research: 
1. How have recent national and multilateral digital copyright policies that regulate 
copyright automation been negotiated? How has this new era of semi-
privatization of the law developed in the E.U., U.S., and Canada in regard to 
intermediary liability? 
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2. What are the leading arguments for and against reform in the policy field and how 
are those arguments tied to institutional interests? What coalitions of stakeholders 
have formed around these arguments? 
3. How have the conflicts in the debate over semi-privatization and the automation 
of the law been expressed in discourses and what discourses have been used by 
stakeholders to maintain the status quo and to support reform?  
4. How do these discourses incorporate geopolitical aims – that is, how do actors in 
the internet policy field use geopolitical narratives, as well as regulatory 
arguments, to influence the public and lawmakers’ conceptions of the automation 














This chapter describes the particular approach to discourse analysis I take in this 
dissertation. I explain how I coded government documents for actors, arguments, and 
discourses. I explain the choices I have made regarding corpus selection, including the 
timelines for analysis. I conclude with a discussion of discourse as a unit of analysis. In 
this section I describe how I define discourse, how I coded for discourses, and how other 
authors have engaged with discourses in policy studies. Here, I review what other authors 
have written about the idea that discourses have causal weight.  
Previous studies of media policymaking have relied heavily on government 
documents. Government documents have provided evidence of changes in structural 
power,179 changes dominant discourses, and new understandings of relationship between 
the internet and statecraft.180 In the area of copyright, Meyer has relied on hearing 
transcripts and legislative reports published by the European Commission – and 
individual member states – to complete a series of case studies of  different policymaking 
processes across the E.U..181 Her approach combines document research with discourse 
analysis in order to identify the processes of discourse structuration and discourse 
institutionalization–whereby a discourse becomes “embedded into legal and supporting 
policy documents at the end of the policymaking process.”182 Based on a framework 
 
179 NATASHA TUSIKOV, CHOKEPOINTS: GLOBAL PRIVATE REGULATION ON THE INTERNET (2016). 
180 POWERS AND JABLONSKI, supra note 121. 
181 Trisha Meyer, The Politics of Online Copyright Enforcement in the EU: Access and Control (2018). 
182 MEYER, supra note 49 at 53. 
 83 
developed by Hajer,183 this approach links the text of the policy document to the author’s 
coding of the actors involved, the arguments they make, and the discourses they deploy. 
The goal of the researcher is to connect discourses to power in the policy field – to better 
understand how frames and themes are used to justify positions and build power. These 
policy documents – statutes, submitted briefs, and transcripts of debates – support both 
linguistic analysis and political economic investigation. This allows us to answer both 
how and who questions that are at the core of political economic research. As Meyer 
writes, we are interested in both “how stakeholders advocate their problem definitions, 
policy solutions and goals and who is successful in this endeavor.” In this way, the two 
modes of inquiry can combine to support the active and engaged orientation of the 
researcher, whereby research is a form of praxis that aids in both improving 
policymaking processes and the public good.184  
Hajer describes discourse analysis as the study of “meaning of politics and 
political actions.” He argues that discourses create meaning and studying that meaning is 
necessary to fully understand policy decisions. As Hajer outlines, discourses have the 
power to establish what is a policy problem and what is not, and to signal when a solution 
is possible or impractical. To study discourses, according to Hajer, discourses must be 
“tracked and traced.”185  Once they are described, they can be linked to discursive 
coalitions – to groups of stakeholders that use a certain discourse – and to a process he 
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calls discourse institutionalization.186 In the study of discourse institutionalization, the 
researcher can make methodologically sound links between discourses used in 
deliberations and the development of related institutions of government and regulatory 
practices. Hajer argues that is it plausible then to measure the influence of a certain 
discourse by examining whether that discourse has “solidified”187 into an institution. In 
other words, the researcher should not just describe discourse, but should connect it to 
norms and government action, then a fuller picture of policy change can emerge. In this 
way, there are real and measurable links between meaning making and policy choices, 
but discourse is not the sole cause of those choices. The three studies I present here are 
designed to explore the meaning making practices surrounding recent examples of 
internet policymaking. They aid in understanding processes of discursive coalition 
building and discursive institutionalization, but further study would be necessary to 
determine why policymakers have chosen to regulate automated filtering in these cases.  
Document Gathering and Coding  
In these three case studies, I have gathered four types of documents: stakeholder 
submissions, legislative hearing transcripts, government speeches, and government 
reports. I have used news reports and press releases as background research, but my 
analysis is weighted entirely on these government documents. For my analysis in all case 
studies, I have coded for three primary variables: actors, arguments, and discourses. The 
actors are identified by names and affiliation within the transcripts and submitted briefs. 
Using qualitative analysis software, Atlas TI, I have grouped them by their stated 
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position, in both their submitted briefs and testimony–pro, anti, and middle ground. I 
have coded for arguments as the presentation of factual grounds for a particular policy 
position or the stated opinion regarding the efficacy or fairness of the policy. I take these 
arguments as face value i.e. I assume that the author of those words is being truthful 
about their position. Discourses, rather, do not speak directly to reason or reasonableness 
of policymakers, but are made up of representations and narrative elements that attribute 
a broader meaning to the policy choice in question. In contrast to reasoned argument, 
discourses in the policymaking context can be defined as linguistic constructions that 
define the social payoff for the greater good. In this way they connect with the receiver’s 
preconceived notions of what is good and what is right for the nation or society as a 
whole.188 For example, I would consider the choice of the term modernization, in the 
Copyright Modernization Act, is a discursive construction. And I would code any 
statement regarding the level of responsibility that intermediaries should have in policing 
illegal content, as an argument.  
Canada: The Copyright Modernization Act Hearings 
In the timeline of the copyright modernization act in Canada, I have selected two 
key incidents in the legislative timeline. There are legislative hearings associated with the 
two final rounds of the Copyright Modernization Act, bills C-11 and C-32. These 
hearings, combined with the stakeholder submissions, provide the richest account of the 
opposing positions and the responses and questions from MPs, prior to the bill’s passage 
in 2012. The selection narrows my corpus to an essential set of documents that are most 
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revealing of the debates between cultural producers and intermediaries in the Canadian 
context. These hearings are referred to as studies in the Canadian parliamentary parlance. 
The prepared testimony and provided answers to MP’s questions are the evidence of 
these hearings. Each hearing is available as separate PDF files and there are 30 hearings 
in total, between the two bills. This amounts to approximately 500,000 words of 
transcribed testimony.    
The public record of these hearings includes testimony from a wide array of 
external stakeholders including industry associations, broadcasters, songwriters, artists, 
university educators, librarians, internet service providers, software companies, film 
industry representatives, production unions, copyright lawyers, the Chamber of 
Commerce, as well as representatives from other state agencies such as Canadian 
Heritage and the Department of Industry. The calendar, just for the C-32 committee, 
included 124 witnesses that were heard across 20 meetings. The amount and diversity of 
these stakeholders reflects the vast number of interconnections that radiate out from 
copyright law to touch nearly every economic sector and many areas of public interest. 
The amount of testimony and high level of public involvement also reflects the 
encyclopedic nature of the bills in question–covering nearly many aspects of copyright 
law. These included longstanding issues such as copyright terms and moral rights and a 
series of new rules of address digital distribution, such as exemptions for distance 
learning, the circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs), exemptions for 
providers of cloud services, and intermediary liability. It is not possible, within the scope 
of this chapter, to discuss the politics of all the provisions within the Copyright 
Modernization Act, but we must recognize that they are all important to explore in regard 
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to structural power and the public interest. Here I narrow the focus to intermediary 
liability, given its geopolitical importance, its significance for users’ rights, and what it 
can tell us about the structural power of platform intermediaries in the Canadian context.    
Article-17: The Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
As part of the European Commission’s Digital Single Market Strategy, the 
Commission held a Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, 
Online Intermediaries, and the Collaborative Economy in late 2015.189 The questionnaire 
was open to the public for thirteen weeks, from September 2015 to January 2016 and was 
a part of the Commission’s broader multilateral initiative on the digital economy – the 
Digital Single Market Strategy. The raw submissions to the consultation – from those 
stakeholders that agreed to publicize them – provide a sample of the institutional actors, 
the arguments tied to those actors, and the policymaking discourses that used to justify 
their positions on platform regulation. These stakeholders and the arguments and 
discourses they present, influenced the broad initiative of the Digital Single Market 
Strategy and the new Directive on Copyright. Section two of the questionnaire requested 
stakeholder comments on key questions of intermediary liability reforms – is the E-
Commerce Directive (ECD) (2000) – that requires intermediaries to promptly remove 
illegal content upon receipt of valid notice – “fit for purpose”? Is the definition of 
intermediaries provided in the ECD – as passive and technical information society service 
providers – still relevant in the age of large content sharing platforms? Should national 
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laws implement a “duty of care” principle and require platforms to automatically monitor 
and filter copyrighted content?190 Answers to the third question provide of sample of pre-
decision arguments and a mapping of political alignments between conflicting groups – 
deploying conflicting discursive constructions to justify opposing positions on liability 
reforms.   
The consultation received 1034 replies in multiple languages. Each response was 
approximately 10 pages and 5000 words. Respondents self-identified the type of their 
organization and respondents represented a broad cross section of economic and social 
sectors. My sample of responses were limited to those where the respondent indicated 
that they would make their answers publicly available – a total of 118 responses. Given 
my focus on intermediary liability reform, I further limited the sample to the responses 
that responded to those sections of the questionnaire (some only responded to those 
sections on data and cloud computing). As a result, I selected those documents that 
included comments related directly to questions regarding automated filtering, notice-
and-takedown and counter notices. And given my practical constraints of English-
language researcher, I selected only those responses submitted in English. The remaining 
sample of 48 responses included approximately 700 pages and 200,000 words of written 
comments, position papers, and testimony. With the exception of one response, all 
submissions were sent by organizations – businesses, industrial associations, and non-
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governmental organizations – not individuals. Limiting the sample to those submissions 
publicly available allowed me to account for the intention of the actors and performative 
aspects of their choice to insert their comments in the public record.  
The TPP: U.S. Congressional Hearings 2010-2016 
The formal negotiations of the TPP took five years – from 2010 to 2015. All 
negotiating rounds were done in secret and no transcript of debates exists in the public 
record at this time. The information access group Wikileaks published leaked drafts of 
certain chapters over this time period, including multiple rounds of the draft chapters on 
intellectual property rights. These drafts allow us to assess the alliances of countries for 
differing positions, but not the details of the arguments presented nor the substance of the 
debate. Some commentary and letters exist from international civil society groups and 
non-governmental organizations, as well as statements and press materials released by 
offices within different member states. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) also 
published press releases after each round of negotiations that included their summary of 
the debates and outcomes. Given the lack of transcripts of debates, I focus on these sets 
of documents: the U.S. congressional record during the negotiation timeline – 2010 to 
2015, U.S. government reports and research from the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), press releases published by the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
presidential speeches, as well as press accounts from major U.S. daily papers.  
The U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives held 13 committee and 
sub-committee hearings that included testimony relating to the intellectual property 
provisions of the TPP. These hearings, while few in number, provide the most detailed 
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account of the actors, alliances, interests, arguments, and discourses within the U.S. 
policy field in regard to copyright and free trade during that period. 
The terrain of U.S. free trade policymaking is secretive by design. While this 
creates obvious challenges for social research, these constraints also create an opportunity 
to embrace the lack of transparency as the defining characteristic of the investigatory 
landscape. A closed process can be seen, not as impossibility, but as an invitation to trace 
all that lies outside the wall as the shadows of the truth, and to construct form from what 
exists. This investigation then, is an attempt to understand power from the absence of it, 
to examine secrecy as a discourse itself.   
In addition to the congressional record, recent U.S.-negotiated trade deals have 
left behind a broad collection of documents that can be used to sketch a historical 
wireframe of actors, agendas, influence, and resistance. These documents include news 
coverage, trade press articles, government reports, private sector research, presidential 
speeches, public comments, and statements from industry as well as a small collection of 
leaked documents, including working drafts, policy proposals, and email 
communications.  
In my investigation of the TPP, I conducted multiple full text searches in 
ProQuest Congressional that all used the term “trans-pacific partnership”. I added 
additional searches with qualifiers such as: “copyright,” “intellectual property,” “internet 
service provider liability,” and “ISP liability.” These added terms limited the results to 
hearings that addressed copyright and internet policies as well as the TPP. Together, 
these searches yielded over a hundred documents, many of which were reports compiled 
by the congressional research service (CRS). Given their quantity, these reports may be a 
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productive corpus for an examination in another study. Here, I selected only the complete 
hearings within the search results. This yielded 13 hearings that directly addressed 
internet policy and the TPP. Given the implications of the TPP for the future of internet 
policy and the future of U.S.-led neoliberal globalization in general, there is surprisingly 
little in the congressional record on the TPP, copyright enforcement and its internet 
related statutes. However, the total number of combined pages is over 500, including 
appendices. In addition, the hearings spanned a broad cross section of committees and 
subcommittees in both the house and the senate. The timeline covered four years, from 
2011 to 2015. 
Document Research in Media Policy Studies  
According to Scott (1990), documents must be assessed for their authenticity 
(soundness and authorship), credibility (sincerity and accuracy), representativeness 
(survival and availability) and meaning. Authenticity of a document can be understood in 
terms of ‘soundness.’ A copy is sound when it is close to the original and uncorrupted. In 
addition, the credibility of the author must be justified with evidence that is internal to the 
document and external to the document. Credibility is determined by examining how 
distorted the content has become. In turn, the motives of the author and whether the 
author was acting in good faith when they created the document are also assessed. An 
awareness of prejudices is very important here. The researcher must also know whether 
the documentary data is representative of the totality of the genre or type of evidence. 
Documents survive by being copied and published, and by being archived in suitable 
storage. In sum, the purpose of all of this is to locate interpretation and find meaning and 
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significance in the documentary evidence. This meaning can be both literal and 
interpretative.     
 Following Scott’s explanation, documents can be used as resources or topics. 
Documents used as resources are valued for what they denote about the world. 
Documents as topics are treated as social products and the context of their production is 
most important. These two foci of interest are interdependent. In the end, the quality of 
the explanation deduced from research is determined by the quality of the documents. In 
this context, Scott defines the public government document as a very specific type of 
record that is born of specific social contexts of production. Their content must be 
interpreted in light of their context and the interests of the state that produces them. In 
this way, government documents are never neutral and are imbued with cultural and 
ideological significance.191 
Discourse Analysis and Media Policy 
 In Critical Discourse Analysis, the analyst recognizes their political position in the 
dynamics of knowledge institutions. As a result, they bring forward their intentions to 
bridge knowledge and action. Scholars in this area propose that no mode of scientific 
inquiry is neutral. As a form of textual analysis, critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
according to Van Dijk, begins with defining discourse as the set of debates and 
conversations that occur between actors in a given field of social practice. The job of the 
analyst is to uncover the role of discourse in the exercise of power through the thick 
description of talk and text. In many cases, the researcher works in solidarity with social 
causes and is self-reflexive and aware of their political goals.  
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In choosing their texts to examine, in locating and exposing specific 
representations, and in contextualizing their results, they maintain the rigor of their 
inquiry through clear self-reflexive practices that situates themselves and the social 
mission of their research. CDA further distinguishes itself by foregrounding social causes 
over fads and producing contextualized explanations, rather than mere description.192   
 Key to Critical Discourse Analysis is intensive focus on the texts. Rather than 
merely coding the frames, words, or schemas, the analyst examines specific samples of 
the text deeply and completely. The goal is typically not to quantify relationships over 
time or to correlate the between frames in two sets (or more) sets of text, rather the 
practice of CDA explores and describes relationships to address how certain actors in the 
cultural field express themselves and their ideologies through symbols, images and 
language. As a gaze with a clear theoretical position, CDA penetrates into the texts and 
reveals structures of power, political constraints, rhetorical strategy and processes of 
movement building. It suggests who is forming alliances and sharing discourses and what 
purposes the discourse may serve in sites of struggle. As such, CDA is best suited to 
using case studies to answer how certain actors use language and symbols to express 
agendas, not why the discourse works or does not work to accomplish political ends.193  
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter described the methods used in these three studies of internet 
policymaking. I gathered three extensive corpuses of government documents for each 
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case study. Each group of documents is primarily comprised of transcripts of legislative 
hearings that are publicly available. I described which chosen timelines, how the 
documents were obtained and coded for actors, arguments, and discourses. The chapter 


















THE HISTORY OF INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the historical progression of international information 
policymaking that has led to the inclusion of intermediary liability in free trade 
agreements.  Highlighted are key examples of agreements and treaties that have been 
most influential to digital copyright law and have been recognized for their geopolitical 
significance. Particular attention is given to the copyright policies developed through 
U.S.-led free trade processes and other international institutions that govern intellectual 
property. This review of historical developments will provide the context for later 
chapters that address automation of takedown during the platform era.   
Since the development of the telegraph in the 19th century, information policymaking 
has been consistently multinational.194 The International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) formed in 1865 (as the International Telegraph Union) to establish international 
technical standards for telegraph development. And the Berne and Paris conventions 
began in the 1880s to facilitate international cooperation for copyright and patent law. In 
these fora, international pressures influenced national decisions and national conditions 
also influenced a country’s positions vis-á-vis dominant powers. Since the late 1980s, the 
internationalization of copyright law, as one area of national information policy 
decisions, has been driven by U.S.-led free trade institutions. In 1994, 133 nations signed 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services that established a global regime that tied 
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market access to neoliberal media and telecommunication reforms. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was established from these negotiations as a multilateral institution 
to adjudicate disputes and manage implementation. Intellectual property laws, including 
laws protecting media and cultural products on the world market, were also established 
under the WTO in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement in 
1994. Free trade agreements, such as TRIPS, did not require the consensus required in 
other international bodies, such as the ITU or the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.195 
The Historical Roots of Notice-and-Takedown 
Thussu discusses the development of international communications policy in 
parallel with geopolitical, technological, and social changes occurring after World War II. 
In the post-war world order, the two powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, 
engaged in an ideological war of propaganda. The clash of ideologies between capitalism 
and communism relied heavily on the use of the mass media and broadcast technologies, 
including film, radio, newspapers, and television. Each power used media to achieve its 
goal of convincing developing nations to align with them, both politically and 
economically. At first, Radio Moscow and the Voice of America were the primary 
channels used in these state-based campaigns, with the U.S. justifying its political 
operations under the discourse of the “free flow” of information. This ideological 
struggle lasted through the Vietnam War and the Cuban Missile Crisis.196 
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 In the 1960’s many countries did not align with the Soviet Union, given the 
economic strength of the United States. However, a number of more powerful countries 
choose not to align with either power. Led by leaders from Egypt, Indonesia, and India, a 
group of nations formed an east-west alliance, or the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
Leaders from the non-aligned nations advocated for political and economic partnerships 
and coalitions between developing nations, rather than with the U.S. or the UK. They tied 
national goals of economic liberation and political independence directly to the need for 
equality in communication flows and media infrastructures.197   
 In the 1970s, working through UNESCO, the leaders with the NAM argued that 
inequality of access to technology and the unequal flows of culture and communications 
were tied directly to inequality of development. There was, in fact, a dependency on the 
countries of the north for news, entertainment, information, and the hardware and 
software needed to develop independent state-based media systems. As a result of this 
inequality in communications, the NAM leaders called for policy reform on a multilateral 
level, calling this dependency and lack of media development, a form of 
neocolonialism.198  
 In 1978, the NAM leaders achieved an historic political victory with the 
establishment of the MacBride Commission by UNESCO. The Commission’s mission 
was to examine and analyze the state of information and cultural inequality among UN 
states. The political backdrop of this work involved the concerns of NAM countries and 





MacBride Commission combined hundreds of studies from across the world and released 
its report, Many Voices, One World, in 1980 to establish what it called the New World 
Information and Communications Order (NWICO). NWICO had four central categories 
of demands: communication rights, freedom of the press, respect for national culture, and 
national sovereignty.199 
 Hamelink credits the MacBride Commission and NWICO with bringing 
recognition on a global stage to two political and social realities of the time. First, the 
technological developments in the global south to date had, in large part, been designed 
to serve the needs of transnational media corporations (TNCs) rather than the needs of 
civil society and developing nations. Second, an information famine in the global south 
and the uneven flows of cultural products had led to the politicization of 
telecommunications on a global scale.200  
 In the 1980s, citing political differences, newly elected U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher left UNESCO and worked to 
delegitimize and remove its director general. As a result, UNESCO lost 30% of its 
funding, which threatened the implementation of the Many Voices, One World report and 
other UNESCO political projects.201 
 President Reagan argued that NWICO represented a form of reverse hegemony, 
whereby control of media and telecommunication technologies would be handed over to 
communist states. In order maintain TNC growth, Reagan’s administration stepped 
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outside of the UN system and used market pressures to secure market access. Many elites 
around the world began to align under a U.S.-led neoliberal order, which was highly 
influenced by the economist Milton Freidman. In this way, the free flow doctrine of the 
cold war was replaced with the discourse of the free market.202  
 In 1991, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the world was left with one 
superpower, and led the Bush and Clinton administrations to globally push for a 
neoliberal economic and political order. Many nations began to privatize national 
telecommunication systems and open their markets to foreign investment. Loan 
conditionality and the promise of market access to the United States were key economic 
tools for alliance building and achieving the dominance of neoliberalism. By the late 
1990s, the public service promise and the national development goals of NWICO had 
been overtaken by the logic of the free market and the neoliberal order.203 
 The global governance of these neoliberal reforms was managed through 
multilateral free trade agreements led by the U.S. and UK. The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) held the Uruguay Round of negotiations from 1986 to 1994. 
During this process 123 nations signed on to what became known as the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). GATS liberalized a global market for services, 
including communications, by linking trade rules in other areas, such as manufactured 
goods, agricultural products, and raw materials, to trade rules governing media products 
and telecommunication services. The WTO was established from these negotiations as a 
multilateral institution to adjudicate disputes and manage implementation. Intellectual 
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property laws, including laws protecting media and cultural products on the world 
market, were also established under the WTO in the TRIPS agreement.204 
 The 2000s saw the reemergence of the ITU as an important site of struggle over 
communication rights and access. First established to manage the technical standards of 
the telegraph, the ITU became politicized in the 1950s over the allocation of 
electromagnetic spectrum and then again in the 1980s over the allocation of satellite orbit 
positions. In the early 2000s there was another significant wave of political conflict and 
advocacy over the digital divide, or inequality of access to the internet. In 2003, in a joint 
project with UNESCO, the ITU established the World Summit on Information Society 
(WSIS). The chief concerns of these conferences were related to the work of NWICO in 
that WSIS addressed the inequality of internet access both between nations as well as on 
individual level. In addition, there were concerns that internet service providers in the 
global south were not given equal access to the backbone of the network. In addition, the 
U.S. had a dominant influence over the control of routing and switching, as well as 
assigning domain names.205 
The WIPO Copyright Treaties 
Despite the rapid growth of digital networks, the WTO had not addressed digital 
copyright enforcement in TRIPS, the most far-reaching international agreement on 
intellectual property to date. The birth of the world wide web in the mid 1990s led to the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)206 passing the internet treaties – the 
 
204 Id. 
205 Victor Pickard, Neoliberal Visions and Revisions in Global Communications Policy From NWICO to 
WSIS, 31 J. COMMUN. INQ. 118–139 (2007). 
206 The World Intellectual Property Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations.  
 101 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) and the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT) in 1997. These treaties created a global set of requirements for member states to 
enforce digital copyright and required each member state to pass domestic legislation to 
place these new policies into force. To comply, the U.S. Congress developed and passed 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). However, the two central provisions of 
the DMCA went beyond the requirements provided in the WCT and WPPT: the 
protection of digital locks (technological protection measures) by outlawing anti-
circumvention hardware and software and the safe harbor provision that allows internet 
intermediaries to escape liability when users post copyrighted content.207  
The WIPO internet treaties and the resulting agreements are key examples of 
industry-to- industry pressure for stricter copyright reforms. U.S. negotiators with support 
from domestic copyright industries, including music and film, lobbied for a ban on all 
electronic devices that could circumvent digital locks, or technological protection 
mechanisms (TPMs) on MP3s, eBooks, and movies.208 The U.S. consumer electronics 
industries (along with negotiators from developing countries) objected because 
electronics company were in the business of providing access to copyrighted works. This 
debate resulted in a more open-ended and flexible agreement than was initially desired by 
U.S. negotiators, which left room for domestic variation by member countries.209 
The U.S.’s agenda at WIPO emerged during the Clinton administration when the 
Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) was formed. Led by Ambassador Bruce 
 
207 David Kravets David Kravets Security, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA is the Law That Saved 
the Web, WIRED , https://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later/ (last visited Dec 5, 2017). 
208 HAGGART, supra note 41 at 45. 
209 HAGGART, supra note 41. 
 102 
Lehman, the task force sought a maximalist copyright approach in the digital 
environment. But due to opposition within Congress, the IITF decided to use the WIPO 
forum to reach a multilateral agreement first. They then used that multilateral agreement 
as leverage to get Congress to act. This policy making process in the U.S. led to possible 
standards for Technological Protection Methods (TPMs) and intermediary liability laws. 
With these standards in place, U.S. negotiators could then move to other nations through 
free trade agreements.210  
Lehman, a former copyright lobbyist who had become Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks,211 was a key figure in the pre-WIPO internet treaties policy making in 
the U.S. As chair of the IITF taskforce, he was highly influential in moving policy in 
favor of the copyright industries. In September 1995 he and a number of industry 
lobbyists produced a white paper entitled “Intellectual Property and National Information 
Infrastructure, the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights.”212 This 
paper laid out the Clinton administration’s vision for digital copyright and was the 
foundation of the U.S. position at WIPO. The white paper was crafted entirely by 
Lehman and even his senior staff and other members of the IITF were shut out. As a 
blueprint for policy, the document carried a near total bias towards the content and 
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The resulting domestic bill, “NII Copyright Protection Act,” appeared a year 
before the discussion at WIPO in 1995. The bill quickly stalled because of wide cross-
industry opposition led in part by Professor Peter Jazi of American University and the 
Digital Future Coalition that united pro-internet opposition groups. To date, inter-industry 
compromise and conflict had determined the character of copyright law and policy in the 
U.S. Lehman’s white paper was seen as a one-sided departure from that precedent and 
failed to build consensus in the U.S. He then went to WIPO with his plan, got a version 
of it passed and returned to Congress with the leverage of WIPO. This process 
represented policy diffusion in reverse – the use of a treaty as leverage for Congress.213  
The limitations on ISP liability began in the Lehman white paper and were 
transferred to the WCT and WPPT proposals. Originally, these proposals addressed the 
protections of temporary copies of digital content stored briefly in a computer’s random-
access memory (RAM). The copyright industries and author’s groups argued that even 
these temporary copies could be reproduced and distributed. Despite tremendous debate 
and time spent on this issue, there was little evidence of the debate in the final text. 
Leaving wide flexibility to member states, the final text says only that Article 9 of the 
Berne Convention applies in the digital environment.214 Article 9 reads, 
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have 
the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner 
or form. 
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(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 
(3) Any sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction for the 
purposes of this Convention.215 
The meaning of this passage in regard to digital copies is highly contested. In 
addition, a statement attached to Article 8 also addresses ISP liability: “It is understood 
that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication 
does not in itself amount to communication with the meaning of this treaty or the Berne 
Convention.”216 This was inserted because telecom companies anticipated that they 
would be held liable merely for holding the temporary copies in their computers and 
servers – a necessary step for digital transmission. In order to avoid infringement claims, 
their legal identity and role in economic transactions needed to be re-defined. A coalition 
of developing countries led by the African delegation and the ISP lobby achieved this 
agreement and the E.U. and U.S. were forced into a compromise.217 
The side note on the Berne convention and Article 8 can be seen as the first 
international agreements that defined the limitations of ISP liability and laid the 
foundation for the DMCA § 512 and the Canadian Copyright Modernization Act. The 
logical result of this agreement for U.S. lawmakers was notice and takedown, because 
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automatic secondary liability was removed by Article 8 and the agreement that the Berne 
Convention applies in the digital environment.218  
The outcome at WIPO was due to the conflicting national interests of member 
states indicating the limited power of copyright interests in national fora. Also, the reason 
that WIPO was successful in creating the internet treaties was because the WTO did not 
address the internet in TRIPS, the most far-reaching international agreement on 
copyright to date. So, WIPO was the natural forum for the debate on digital copyright and 
was the preferred forum for the dominant and wealthiest countries. However, the U.S. 
was left with a much more flexible agreement than initially desired as more autonomy 
was given to member states to enact their own versions.219  
This final version of the internet treaties was a result of compromise that allowed 
permanent member states to create varied levels of protection. Some, like the U.S., were 
permitted to take a maximalist approach that would give the copyright holder the ability 
to control digital access, with only moderate protections for fair use or freedom of 
expression. However, other member states could take a more minimalist approach that 
favored the expressive and fair use rights over the economic rights to protect property.220 
WIPO worked as a forum that allowed developing countries and smaller powers 
to have some influence. The entertainment industry position was forced into a 
compromise and majority voting and consensus worked. However, the WIPO process and 
forum did not facilitate any radical reimagining of copyright in the digital age. The 
romantic notions of the singular author were not seriously questioned. Also, the public at 
 
218 Id. at 123. 
219 See HAGGART, supra note 41. 
220 Id. 
 106 
large was not involved in the domestic debate in the U.S. that led to the draft treaties. To 
a small group of NGOs and progressive lobbyists in the U.S., fair use and access to 
scientific data were issues in the WIPO debate at the U.N. and the early debate over 
intermediary liability in the U.S.221 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The DMCA was the U.S. implementation of the copyright treaties and is the first 
major piece of U.S. legislation to regulate copyright enforcement for the 
internet.222  Congress’ intent was to define “remedies available to rightsholders and 
responsibilities of online service providers.”223 One of the main contested issues related 
to how internet intermediaries were legally defined. Are internet platforms and ISPs 
considered publishers and therefore liable for user generated content? Or are they neutral 
distributers? Copyright industry lobbyists argued that internet intermediaries are 
publishers and are therefore liable for user generated content. Intermediaries argued first 
that they could not edit like traditional publishers. They were not in the business of doing 
so and given the volume of posts, they could not possibly edit everything. Secondly, they 
argued that internet expression would disappear without safe harbors because they would 
have to restrict the options for users out of fear of liability. 224 This expression, they 
argued, was the key benefit that served the greater public interest. § 512 of the DMCA 
was thus designed to be a compromise between internet providers and the entertainment 
industry – to provide safe harbor for platforms to escape liability if they followed a notice 
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and takedown process. Congress’ intent was to create cooperation between owners and 
service providers, to incentivize self-regulation, and to promote growth in the digital 
economy.225  
The DMCA was also, in part, the result of consistent litigation between content 
providers, mostly the largest players in the motion picture and music industries, and 
internet intermediaries. MGM v. Grokster and Columbia v. Fung were also important 
cases involving peer-to-peer sites that came about before the DMCA. ISPs were 
attracting attention due to the infringement operations of large pirate sites and because 
they were large wealthy companies and thus easily identifiable targets.226 Entertainment 
companies and internet providers came together and urged Congress to find a solution 
that would support both industries. 
This debate can be also seen in the context of the historical tensions between 
technology and the enforcement of copyright. New innovations in replication and 
distribution technology have consistently challenged the exclusive rights of copyright 
owners to reproduce and distribute their work. Each successive era of technological 
change, from the printing press, to the television, to the VCR, to the DVD has required 
the revision of copyright laws.227  
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter covered the history of copyright safe harbors in the international and 
national arenas. I began with a review of the major milestones in the post-World War II 
multilateral policymaking – from the Cold War to the World Trade Organization and the 
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TRIPS agreement. These major periods led to fundamental political shifts and to a 
neoliberal ordering in the 1990s. The chapter included a review the U.S. copyright policy 
agenda in the context of neoliberalism and internet policy on the world stage, and a 
summary of the two leading accounts of the genesis of copyright safe harbors at WIPO 
and the WIPO internet treaties, the WPT and WPPT. The chapter concluded with a 


















NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
Introduction 
Given the significance of the TPP as an international model for internet policy, this 
chapter describes the version of copyright safe harbors that was included in the TPP text 
in 2015, as well as providing comparisons to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the 
U.S. Despite the inherent secrecy of free trade talks, the discussion will include an outline 
of the actors, arguments, and discourses that characterized the final stages of the 
policymaking process from 2014 to 2016 in the United States Congress. The chapter 
reviews how the notice-and-takedown provision within the TPP was negotiated within 
the U.S. Congress, what political coalitions were represented in these negotiations, and 
what arguments were made to support their positions.  
The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a U.S.-led free trade agreement that 
included 12 Pacific Rim nations, provides a version of the U.S. law that erodes due-
process protections. In the TPP text, there is only an optional requirement of counter-
notices, which means that users are likely left with the no protection from fraudulent 
notices and abusive takedowns. In this scenario, the ISP has almost no concern of legal 
liability to the user for a wrongful takedown and no incentive to check the validity of 
infringement claims.228 Furthermore, the ten-day lag between the receipt of the counter 
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notice and the restoring of the content is rewritten as a “reasonable period of time.”229 
Hypothetically, the copyright owner could take as long as they want to craft a lawsuit 
while the content in question remains offline.  
 In February 2006, representatives of the 12 nations that were party to the TPP 
held a signing ceremony in Auckland, NZ. The prime minister of Australia and New 
Zealand rubbed noses to express their good will. President Obama, who did not attend, 
called the agreement a “forward looking” trade deal that “sets new, high ideals for trade 
and investment” and “supports a free and open internet.”230 This event marked the end of 
international negotiations, but the beginning of the two-year national ratification process. 
If fully ratified, or approved by the governments of all 12 countries, the treaty would 
have created a trade pact that encompassed 40% of global economy.231 The U.S. 
Congress passed a reauthorization of fast-Track trade promotion authority in 2015, which 
meant that Congress could only agree or disagree to ratify with a up or down vote–the 
final could not be amended. But, less than one year after the signing ceremony, newly 
elected President Trump abruptly pulled the U.S. out of the TPP and left the remaining 11 
nations to negotiate a new version of the pact, based on the original text that was largely 
built on U.S. framework developed under Presidents George W. Bush and Obama.  
To many observers, few issues highlighted the differences between Presidents 
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Obama and Trump more than the TPP.232 In fact, few issues had been more important to 
President Obama in his second term than the TPP. President Obama led a persistent effort 
to persuade the nation and Congress to support the deal despite powerful opposition from 
both parties and from labor and consumer groups.233 The Obama administration’s public 
communications (press briefings, press conferences, speeches, and blog posts) revealed a 
concerted and calculated effort to control the global narrative of the TPP. Despite bi-
partisan resistance, President Obama was nearly successful in his administration’s push 
for U.S. ratification. Even a shallow reading of press coverage on this issue would reveal 
that his public communication efforts were highly influential over reporting of trade, 
geopolitical concerns and global economics. Throughout 2014 and 2015, the president, 
members of his administration, and close supporters chose to frame the TPP in terms of 
benefits to American jobs, the geopolitical contest with China, the spreading of American 
values, and levelling the playing field for American businesses. 
Despite President Trump’s executive order, the involvement of the United States 
in the TPP is far from settled policy. President Trump has faced mounting pressure from 
agricultural districts that are being economically harmed by the president’s trade war with 
China.234 And, in 2018 he assigned two members of his cabinet to study the potential of 
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re-entering the pact as another lever to apply trade pressure to China.235 But, the 11 
remaining nations have signed a new treaty, based on the original, entitled the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In 
2019, the Canadian government had been in talks with other countries in the Pacific Rim 
to widen the coalition throughout southeast Asia to add these countries.236 President 
Trump lost to former Vice President Joe Biden in the 2020 election in the United States. 
Facing pressure from left-wing movements from economic justice, Biden has distanced 
himself from President Obama’s pro-free trade stance.237 He may or may not rejoin the 
TPP, but the remaining countries might welcome the U.S. back to the TPP. If political 
conditions in the U.S. allow for that reentry the U.S., Biden could re-enter in 2021.  
The dominant debate over the TPP during the 2016 election cycle was largely about 
wages and jobs – a public dialog that reflected post-recession resurgence of nationalist 
arguments over protecting the American worker. Political pressure to oppose the TPP 
was so great from labor interests and populist coalitions that 2016 Democratic candidate 
Hillary Clinton changed course and opposed the deal, after she supported it as Secretary 
of State under Obama (and supported NAFTA in hindsight–a major initiative of her 
husband’s administration). As a Senator from New York, in fact, the only trade 
agreement she voted against was the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
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(CAFTA).238 But, as analysts have pointed out, the purpose of the TPP was not to remove 
tariffs and other nationalist protections. Much of that work had already been done 
through the WTO and bilateral treaties. In fact, the TPP (and other recent trade 
agreements) are coming at a time when most tariffs have already been eliminated. The 
TPP and other recent trade agreements are driven by the goal of the United States Trade 
Representative to protect intellectual property – to use trade agreements as leverage the 
economic power of the United States to enforce conformity in patent and copyright 
law.239 As the economist Paul Krugman argues “these days, 'trade agreements’ are mainly 
about other things. What they're really about, in particular, is property rights – things like 
the ability to enforce patents on drugs and copyrights on movies.”240  
Delving deeper, one central goal of the intellectual property chapter of the TPP was, 
in fact, the extension of IP rights to the internet. The IP chapter of the TPP would have 
done what the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) failed to do–to effectively 
– tie internet policy to free trade and embed western commercial values into the law and 
regulation of the internet. The work of extending IP rights globally in the analog domain 
had already been done in through the World Trade Organization. But the work that 
remained was to impose strict controls and legal mechanisms for policing the internet to 
protect intellectual property. This coupling of free trade with internet policy had begun in 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that faltered in the E.U. in 2012, due 
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to public outcry and lobbying by internet platforms. This history of ACTA, and the 
beginning of the linking of digital copyright and free trade has been covered by Monica 
Horten,241 who highlights the lobbying influence of the International Intellectual Property 
Association and its chief counsel Eric Smith. In 2005, Smith testified to the U.S. 
Judiciary Committee to say that the U.S. should use free trade leverage to “raise the level 
of statutory protection to encompass new technological challenges, like the Internet.”242 
Analyzing the Text of the TPP’s Safe Harbors Provisions  
The purpose of this section is to provide a clause-by-clause analysis of the TPP 
intermediary liability provisions. The TPP, as it is currently written, creates a model for 
policy diffusion that reforms §512 of the DCMA in the opposite direction of the 
Canadian model – broadening protections for rightsholders and leaving the user with 
impossibly high barriers to protest unlawful takedowns.243  
Defining Intermediaries  
 Article 18.82 of the chapter on Intellectual Property of the TPP outlines the 
procedures that all parties – users, intermediaries, rightsholders, and the courts – must 
take to shield intermediaries from the threat of legal action. The article is preceded by 
article 18.81 that seeks to clarify the definition of an intermediary for the TPP parties. 
The experts who drafted the IP chapter clearly saw the importance of this definition to 
possible legal challenges and previous statute. In Canada, for example, court opinions 
and rulings of the Copyright Board relating to takedowns, safe harbors, and liability have 
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relied on definitions that designated intermediaries as legally distinct from publishers in 
the analog environment, in that they can be understood as passive and neutral conduits 
between senders and receivers. In the intermediary liability provisions of the E.U. 
Commerce Directive (2000), the text outlines two ways that ISPs act as mere conduits: 
passive transmission and providing internet access.244 In Canada, the courts and the 
Copyright Board have further defined the difference between passive transmission and 
digital communication.245 Intermediaries are protected due the passive nature of 
transmission where the content in question is neither communicated by the intermediary 
nor authorized by the intermediary. In other words, the intermediary does not perform a 
communicative act that could be deemed unlawful, it merely passive transmits unlawful 
material. The TPP addresses the conceptual issue in article 18.81,  
Internet service provider means:  
(a) a provider of online services for the transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing undertaking the function 
in Article 18.82.2(a) (article 18.81) (b) a provider of online services 
undertaking the functions in Article 18.82.2(c) or Article 18.82.2(d)246 
The text of this article is specific and intentional in what it excludes–
communication–and what it includes within definition of a neutral conduit. According to 
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the TPP, an ISP can be eligible for the benefits of safe harbors when it is transmitting 
between sender and receiver without modifying, when it merely provides the connections 
that allow for the transmission– when it is storing for technical reasons as part of the 
transmission process, modifying the content for technical reasons only (i.e., digital 
compression), or storing digital files at the request of the user. In this definition, 
protection is granted to the dominant business models for platform intermediaries: 
streaming, social media, cloud storage services and cloud platforms, and broadband 
internet access. Exposure to liability is possible when the intermediary acts as if it is the 
sender or the user – active and knowing engagement in the communication, publishing, 
or storing of a copyrighted work. The breakdown of the paragraphs within this article 
seems to address multiple types of intermediaries and their specific markets. The text 
groups internet access providers and social platforms into paragraph (a), cloud service 
providers and search engines into paragraph (b), and specifically mentions services that 
engage in automatic server-side caching into a separate sub-paragraph under paragraph 
(b). This sub-paragraph begins “For greater certainty, Internet Service Provider includes a 
provider of the services listed above that engages in caching carried out through an 
automated process.”247 This appears to be a reference to cloud computing platforms such 
as Amazon Web Services (AWS) that use artificial intelligence to temporarily store 
content, or cache data that its clients pull up most frequently. In the process of caching, 
the AI tools can modify the content for technical purposes, to be able to speed up the 
transmission of that frequently used data. With this provision, all the services provided by 
a leading cloud platform like AWS would be included in this definition of an 
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intermediary, and thus shielded from copyright liability, as long as it follows the 
following notice and takedown procedures as outlined in article 18.82 i.e., it responds 
effectively to a valid takedown notice. 
This definitional article (18.81) is a shortened and updated version of what 
appears within the first few paragraphs of § 512 of the DMCA. § 512 begins with the 
similar, but more verbose definitional introduction that include the prerequisites and 
conditions that are designed to distinguish valid intermediaries from pirate sites that 
select the content to transmit. The DMCA doesn’t breakdown groups of different types of 
intermediaries but does clearly distinguish the communicative act from what is termed 
“transmitting, routing, or providing connections.”248 In so doing, the DMCA provides 
more detailed conditions that must be followed to by ISP than the TPP. ISPs cannot 
modify content beyond what is necessary to technically transmit what material the user 
has requested. To be classified as transitory transmission, someone other than the ISP 
must initiate the transmission. The transmission may be automatic, as long as the ISP 
does not select the material and the ISP cannot select the recipients of the transmitted 
content. Similar to the TPP, the DMCA protects ISPs from liability of infringing works 
that as stored in cache databases, § 512 clarifies that this cache databases cannot be 
accessible to others beyond the intended user/audience.  
Conceptually both the TPP and the DMCA clarify that protection from liability 
cannot be granted if the ISP selects, requests, or initiates the specific content to be 
transmitted. Protection is allowed only if the material in question was selected or chosen 
by the user, or through an automated process. In both the TPP and DMCA, these 
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definitional paragraphs transfer the liability for transmission to the user or to automation. 
It is the user that requests, the user that chooses, the user that specifies where content will 
be sent, the user that modifies the content, the user who posts, and the user that directs the 
storage of material on cloud storage service. Or the transmission is initiated, chosen, or 
undertaken by an automated process. These definitional questions are important to 
address in terms of the commercial values that are embedded in the text. The articles and 
the definitions are designed to protect the rights of the intermediary to profit from user 
activity, user data and advertising. But the TPP, and to a lesser extent the DMCA, 
exposes users to liability by defining who is at fault when infringing content is 
transmitted. Article 18.81 of the TPP explicitly defines what an intermediary must be, 
and how they must act to be eligible for safe harbor, but in so doing implicitly defines the 
role and exposure of the user to liability. And, despite the fact that engineers design the 
AI tools that are implemented to the supposed benefit of the user, these automated 
caching activities are not considered actual knowledge or the same as a manual request or 
communication of content. The roots of this protection are found in the DMCA, but the 
TPP goes further to leave the user with even less ability to counter a takedown request. 
The Preamble 
After article 18.81 on ISP definitions, Article 18.82, “Legal Remedies and Safe 
Harbours” begins with a preamble in paragraph one that defines the purpose of safe 
harbors. The text is clear who the law – and the enforcement mechanism it provides – are 
designed to protect:  
The Parties recognize the importance of facilitating the continued development of 
legitimate online services operating as intermediaries and, in a manner consistent 
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with Article 41 of the TRIPS Agreement, providing enforcement procedures that 
permit effective action by right holders against copyright infringement covered 
under this Chapter that occurs in the online environment. Accordingly, each Party 
shall ensure that legal remedies are available for right holders to address such 
copyright infringement and shall establish or maintain appropriate safe harbors in 
respect of online services that are Internet Service Providers.249  
 The benefits to the consumer are not mentioned, nor are the protections of the 
rights of the user, or the importance of digital networks to a functioning democracy. The 
drafters make the values here explicit – to protect the commercial interests of 
intermediaries and to protect the property of rightsholders. The baseline obligation is 
provided by Article 41 of the TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) 
agreement under the WTO. Article 41 of TRIPS which requires member states to ensure 
the availability of enforcement mechanisms that are effective, expeditious, and easily 
accessible by rights holders. The central caveat of the enforcement requirements is 
outlined as the avoidance of “the creation of barriers to legitimate trade” and to “provide 
for safeguards against their abuse.”250 But, TRIPS is not the only international agreement 
that puts into place a multilateral agreement on digital copyright enforcement. The World 
Intellectual Property Organization’s copyright treaties are notably absent from this 
preamble. As discussed previously, the WIPO treaties, the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (1996), preceded 
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the DMCA and were the result of debate between northern and global south countries 
over the enforcement of copyright in the digital environment. Intermediary liability was 
addressed in the WCT and the WPPT, but the results of this process left much more 
flexibility in implementation than was desired by the U.S. The IP enforcement measures 
in TRIPS – the result of coupling of free trade and copyright – did not mention protection 
in the digital environment.  
 Sub paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article 18.82 calls for the promotion of self-
regulation: “Parties shall provide legal incentives for Internet Service Providers to 
cooperate with copyright owners to deter the unauthorized storage and transmission of 
copyrighted materials.”251 A footnote widens the interpretation of legal incentives, 
“Parties understand that implementation of the obligations in paragraph 1(a) on ‘legal 
incentives’ may take different forms.”252 Legal analysts have highlighted the complexity 
of this task, given the multiple areas of law that may conflict with the privatization of 
policing.253 The requirement – to create state facilitated non-binding private agreements – 
involves government in multiple levels of secrecy in a process that lacks any assurances 
of transparency. The trade agreement is negotiated without public input and the 
regulation that results requires no public input when it implemented locally. Such non-
binding agreements either assume that the intermediaries’ interests are the same as the 
users’ or do not consider the user’s rights or interests.254 Despite these concerns, non-
binding private agreements are currently in use across a number of areas of protection, 
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including counterfeiting and copyright.255 Voluntary non-binding agreements align with 
commercial interests and reflect commercial values in a variety of ways. Most notably, 
they are flexible and can be renegotiated as market and technological conditions change. 
But they offer no assurances of protection from liability. Such agreements can be seen as 
defensive maneuvers on the part of intermediaries, who would prefer binding statutory 
provisions to protect them from liability.256  
Control, Initiate or Direct 
Subparagraph (b) mandates statutory protection via the ratification and 
implementation of local laws that define intermediaries as passive intermediaries whose 
activities shall be protected. Parties are required to create limitations through national 
laws that preclude “monetary relief against Internet Service Providers for copyright 
infringements that they do not control, initiate, or direct, and that take place through 
systems or networks controlled or operated by them.257 This paragraph is a marked 
change from the DMCA § 512 paragraph (a) sub-paragraph (1) that protects the 
intermediary only in cases where someone else, such a user, initiates or directs the 
transmission.258 § 512 does not address the issue of control in this condition of protection. 
In the DCMA, the notion of control of infringement is included as one of the possible 
rights and abilities of the ISP itself, not the user. In sub-paragraph (c)(1)(B) § 512 
provides relief from monetary damages and injunctions in cases where the ISP “does not 
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in 
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which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”259 This is the 
only mention of the ISPs or the user’s ability to control an infringing transmission within 
§ 512 of the DMCA. As written, Article 18.22 of the TPP protects intermediaries against 
situations where an intermediary would not have control over an infringing transmission 
that occurs on a network controlled or operated by them. It appears that the DMCA does 
not provide such a protection. 
Notice Requirements 
Paragraph 3 of Article 18.82 provides the essential components at the center of 
any notice and takedown regime, the requirements for a notice. But, unlike other national 
standards in place in Chile, Canada, or the United States (under the DMCA) the TPP 
stimulates that parties shall adopt their own qualifying conditions that must be followed 
by the intermediary to receive protection. In other words, paragraph 3(a) provides that 
intermediaries must  
expeditiously remove or disable access to material residing on their networks or 
systems upon obtaining actual knowledge of the copyright infringement or 
becoming aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringement is 
apparent, such as through receiving a notice.260 
The text does not require takedown notices but does outline what those notices must 
contain in a footnote, if a party decides to implement a notice-based system. The 
footnotes to paragraph (3)(a) text stipulate a notice, 
 as may be set out under a Party’s law, must contain information that: 
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(a) is reasonably sufficient to enable the Internet Service Provider to identify the 
work, performance or phonogram claimed to be infringed, the alleged infringing 
material, and the online location of the alleged infringement; and 
(b) has a sufficient indicia of reliability with respect to the authority of the person 
sending the notice.261 
Here, in the central components of the TPPs notice and takedown provisions, we can see 
the stark differences between the specific notice requirements of the DMCA and the 
openness of the TPP to multiple interpretations to the manner in which actual knowledge 
of infringement in reached.  
The DMCA requires very specific information to be included in a notice (for it to 
be considered a valid notification and to constitute actual knowledge). The requirements 
include an electronic signature of the authorized rightsholder (or the rightsholder’s 
agent), the name (or names) or the actual copyrighted work, the link to the infringing 
material, contact information for the notice sender, a statement that the “complaining 
party has a good faith belief”262 that the material in question is actually infringing, and a 
statement that the notice is accurate, and the sender is indeed authorized by the 
rightsholder to send the notice. In contrast, Article 18.82 of the TPP allows countries to 
define their own mechanism for realizing actual knowledge, but it provides that if a 
country chooses to implement a notice requirement, the notices need to contain only a 
few minimal lines of information that allow the intermediary to identify the copyrighted 
work and to locate the allegedly infringing material. Finally, the remaining safeguard 
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against abuse refers only to the notice sender and requires “sufficient indicia of reliability 
with respect to the authority of the person sending the notice.”263 The requirements for 
counter-notices are even less specific: 
If a system for counter-notices is provided under a Party’s law, and if material 
has been removed or access has been disabled in accordance with paragraph 3, 
that Party shall require that the Internet Service Provider restores the material 
subject to a counter-notice, unless the person giving the original notice seeks 
judicial relief within a reasonable period of time.264 
As discussed above, under this optional framework for counter-notices, users are 
likely left with little protection from fraudulent notices, abusive takedowns, or a mistake 
due to a technical error. If an automated system were to make a mistake, it may be that 
neither the intermediary nor the rightsholder would face legal liability for that wrongful 
takedown. If so, this would leave them with little incentive to check the validity of 
infringement claims.265  
Government Review 
One issue in the political debate between commercial values and the public 
interest is the role the state should play (and the level of state involvement) in what is 
essentially a semi-privatized extra-judicial system. The global debate over the role that 
the courts should take – whether takedowns should be pre-approved by a judge – is an 
unsettled line, with international coalitions forming on both sides. The TPP does address 
this question and I will address that issue of judicial review in a later section. Another 
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option for state review, which was instituted by the French government under HADOPI 
law (2009) for intermediary liability is to establish a distinct government agency that 
reviews notices from rightsholders for their validity. HADOPI was overturned by the 
French national assembly in 2016, when officials voted to end the system by 2022,266 due 
the political controversy of it graduated response mechanism. But it is important to 
consider in relation to the options that parties have for being in compliance with the TPP.  
In the case of HADOPI, the basis of the notice relates to file-sharing on peer-to-
peer networks, not posts to user-generated platforms. However, conceptually, the 
regulatory solution can be applied to either uploaded content or content that is shared on 
peer-to-peer network. The key to the French law is the coupling of a new independent 
government agency with a three-strikes graduated response mechanism that eventually 
obligates the ISP to terminate internet access to repeat offenders. The role of the 
government agency is to review takedown notices sent by rightsholders for their validity 
in order to prevent abusive, fraudulent, or erroneous notices from reaching the 
intermediary. Laws and regulations targeting repeat offenders have been the subject of 
political controversies on the international and national levels given their power to 
mandate that ISPs deny access to be eligible for liability protection. But, in France, 
rightsholders can target individual users for sharing copyrighted works, the HADOPI 
agency acts as an intermediary between the rightsholder and the ISP. The verification role 
has created transparency regarding how many notices are actually forwarded to users 
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(and acted upon) and it has been shown to limit the number of cases that are referred to 
judicial review.267  
Article 18.82 outlines one option for TPP member states to establish a HADOPI-
like commission, albeit one that is comprised of stakeholders – rightsholders and 
intermediaries. As outlined in the TPP, such a commission could be, “established with 
government involvement” to verify the “validity of each notice” before forwarding the 
notice to the “relevant Internet Service Provider.”268 Member states can decide how this 
commission will be formed, who will be on it, and what is meant by government 
involvement. The drafters are explicit about ensuring that any such commission should 
avoid slowing down the process of taking down. They write that, if there is a review 
process, it should include “timely procedures” that are carried out “without undue 
delay.”269 The text does not include a requirement that the public be represented in the 
oversight organization. Further, there is no mention of transparency. If a separate agency 
is established, it must include representation from rightsholders and intermediaries and it 
must act quickly to verify each notice. In practice, the level of state involvement could 
vary across jurisdictions and be dependent on the how much interest particular state 
officials have in notice verification.270  
In this optional condition that the TPP provides, corporate actors have incentive to 
give resources to an agency that can be flexible and adaptive to changes in market 
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players, technology, and the tools and techniques of piracy. There are no guarantees that 
the agency would maintain any independence from corporate interests. The text indicates 
that the verifying organization should be a “stakeholder organization” that is merely 
established by government. Further, the text only includes two parties in that range of 
stakeholders – rightsholders and intermediaries.  
This provision is also notable given that there is no consideration of a verifying 
organization in the DMCA. § 512 outlines only one defined role for government, outside 
of the courts. All intermediaries must establish a “designated agent” as a condition of 
protection from liability. That designated agent must be listed with the Copyright Office 
to receive the notice. The ISP must pay a fee to support the maintenance of this database 
of contact information for each duly designated receiver of takedown notices. The TPP 
includes no mention of a designated agent requirement, thus leaving that up to ISP to 
establish and publish clearly on their own. The TPP seems to assume that intermediaries 
will make this clear because it is in their best interest to do, if they are to maintain 
protections from liability.  
Such “stakeholder organizations” as outlined in Article 18.82 could be considered 
to be in the “DMCA-plus” category.271 These types of arrangements have been made 
within U.S. jurisdiction and may, in the eyes of corporate actors, serve as a substitute for 
the DMCA, but provide different types of protections and engage different practices and 
mechanisms. For example, the five largest intermediaries and a group of major 
rightsholders created a privatized version of the graduated response that HADOPI had 
established in France. Efforts to create a three-strikes system failed in the FCC, so these 
 
271 Urban, Karaganis, and Schofield, supra note 4 at 55. 
 128 
corporate actors created a non-binding memorandum of understanding to build such an 
agreement on their own. Intermediaries agreed not to terminate accounts – the most 
controversial component of three strikes provisions – but provided an agreed upon 
pathway to litigation. The privately managed and developed pact solved an important 
problem for intermediaries, notably it slowed the flood of millions of takedown notices 
they were receiving. It did not stop them all together but reduced the number of notices 
that were being sent by rightsholders, that were members of the participating industry 
trade groups in the U.S. – the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).272  
Within this list of obligations that a country may apply to rightsholders and 
intermediaries, the text also outlines what the duties are of this verifying stakeholder 
organization. If a party chooses to create such a government-brokered arrangement 
between stakeholders this commission must also confirm that “the notice is not the result 
of mistake or misidentification, before forwarding the verified notice to the relevant 
Internet Service Provider.”273 This language, “mistake or misrepresentation” is taken 
directly from the DMCA, but the DMCA places this burden on to the user and this 
determination of whether there is “mistake or misrepresentation” is made after the 
takedown has occurred.274 Under the DMCA, the identified user, if they believe they 
would like to dispute a takedown, can submit a counter-notice have that material 
reinstated. Once that counter-notice is received, the intermediary has 14 days to reinstate 
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it.275 This procedure under the DMCA allows for immediate takedowns without review 
by judge or any verifying organization but institutes the counter-notice as a method for a 
contesting a takedown. To make this content stay down after the counter notice is 
received (plus 14 days) the rightsholder must initiate a court order against that targeted 
user.276 Under the TPP, one of the main duties of a “stakeholder organization” would be 
make a determination of validity before the notice is sent. But, as stated in the text, the 
stakeholder organization is optional. If a party chooses to implement one, it must take on 
that role. The stakeholder organization guidelines here are quite vague and states would 
have wide latitude in who exactly is making those determinations, how they would be 
processed, and what criteria would be applied to determine accuracy. When coupled with 
the limited requirements for what a notice must contain, it appears that much of the notice 
sending, notice processing, and notice receiving processes would be decided by national 
law and determined by the level of state interest in brokering a valid process for 
verification. It appears that the DCMA does not include a mandate that intermediaries 
verify the validity of a notice, nor does § 512 outline any type of verification process.  
Timeline for Take-downs 
In regard to the speed with which an intermediary must act to “remove or disable 
access” to material listed in a notice, article 18.82 states that ISPs must, upon receipt of a 
notice, remove the material in question “expeditiously” and “promptly.”277 Article 18.82 
does not use the term takedown and the DMCA only uses it once, but instead both texts 
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speed in the DMCA is expeditious, while in the TPP, the required speed is both 
expeditious and prompt. Neither text provides a set period time for removal nor disabling 
access. But, in practice DCMA takedowns often do occur within the first 24 hours after 
the receipt of a notice. Practices do vary widely, and legal analysts have addressed the 
need to move even faster to disable access to pirate sites that stream live sports, for 
example.278 
Judicial Review 
When we consider the TPP through the lens of privatization of process, few 
concepts are more relevant than how the agreement treats the judicial review of 
takedowns. In some jurisdictions, such as Chile and Argentina, governments have agreed 
with the United States in that intermediaries must have a clear process for limiting their 
liability from copyright infringement and must cooperate with a notice and takedown 
regime as a precondition for safe harbors. But they have diverged from the U.S. law in 
regard to judicial review. In Chile, for example, ISPs must petition the court for 
preliminary injunction and the judge must review that preliminary injunction request 
before the material in question is removed or disabled. ISPs are not required to remove or 
disable the material in question until the preliminary injunction is granted.279 
Judicial review prevents the bulk removal of posts via automation and at the same 
time retains the power of the state to protect its interests and the integrity of its legal 
system, if it so chooses to. For example, government could enforce expression rights and 
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prevent abusive or fraudulent claims of infringement. Judicial review is comparably slow 
and costly to ISPs and could potentially be a burden to the courts. In Brazil, rightsholders 
were strongly opposed to judicial review and were successful in removing copyright from 
the Marco Civil, Brazil’s constitution of internet rights. The Marco Civil provides for 
judicial review in other types of content removal.280  
In regard to the government review of notices as precondition for limited liability, 
the TPP states,  
The Parties understand that a Party that has yet to implement the obligations in 
paragraphs 3 and 4 will do so in a manner that is both effective and consistent 
with that Party’s existing constitutional provisions. To that end, a Party may 
establish an appropriate role for the government that does not impair the 
timeliness of the process provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 and does not entail 
advance government review of each individual notice.281 
This provision, in addition to the establishment of stakeholder organizations that 
may review notices and the second that prevents governmental review, define the TPP’s 
approach to government involvement in enforcement. Government may facilitate and 
broker the formation of organizations that are made up of corporate actors to verify 
notices against pre-established measures of accuracy. But, due to the requirement that 
notices must be processed expeditiously and promptly, government may not play that 
role. Under this interpretation, parties could not establish an independent panel made up 
of government officials, such as in the case of HADOPI in France, nor could a TPP 
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member state involve the courts in judicial review of takedowns and preliminary 
injunctions.  
Actors, Arguments, Discourses 
 The purpose of the following sections is to assess the ways in which the internet 
policy aspects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have been addressed, debated, and 
represented in the U.S. Congress during the recent history of the TPP negotiations. This 
exploratory research seeks to summarize and describe the available transcripts and 
appendices that are included in the congressional record related to a specific area of 
internet copyright enforcement law found in the TPP, intermediary liability.  
Popular resistance movements have derided intermediary liability as a backdoor 
to state censorship. However, entertainment and information companies, largely based in 
the U.S. have pushed for the geographic expansion of intermediary liability as the 
preferred mechanism of copyright enforcement on the internet. As such, the TPP 
represents an advancement beyond the rules included in § 512 of the DMCA and a 
geographical advancement to the largest trade bloc in the world, governed under the U.S. 
model of copyright enforcement. Here, I attempt an accounting of what is available in the 
public record in regard to the public contests over the future of multilateral internet policy 
in regard to the TPP in the U.S.  
What follows is a summary of the key arguments and discourses of these hearing 
transcripts. I provide a partial accounting of how the TPP’s articles on notice-and-
takedown were negotiated, who was contributed to their development, what arguments 
were used justify policy positions and what discourses were deployed by policymakers, 
 133 
lobbyists, and the Obama administration. First, by way of background, it is important to 
understand the timeline of the TPP and the nature and history of U.S. involvement.  
The idea for a comprehensive trade agreement for the Pacific region began as 
early 1990’s as informal conversations during Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
summits. Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and the United States discussed the 
proposal at these meetings throughout the late 1990’s. Australia and the United States 
exited these talks in 2003, but Singapore, New Zealand, and Chile met formally between 
2003 to 2005. Together, these three countries formed the Pacific-Three Closer Economic 
Partnership (P3 CEP) and began to negotiate regularly to outline a vision and develop a 
negotiating text. In 2005, Brunei was invited to negotiations and formally joined the 
partnership in 2006. The resulting coalition of four countries, dubbed the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP), or P-4 developed an agreement with 20 
chapters, including a critical ascension clause that created a simple pathway for new 
member states to join.282 
 In 2008, President Bush announced plans to enter into negotiations with these P-4 
countries and Australia, Peru, and Vietnam soon followed in December of that same year. 
After a period of consultation with his trade representatives, President Obama took until 
November 2009 to announce his plans to keep the U.S. at the negotiating table.283 In 
November 2009, at a stop in Tokyo, President Obama outlined a broad vision for 
engagement in the Pacific region that included the TPP, but also branched out into 
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comprehensive support for treaties on human rights and climate change. In concluding 
his remarks, he outlined the importance of U.S.’s partnership with Japan,  
These are steps that the United States will take to improve prosperity, security, 
and human dignity in the Asia Pacific. We will do so through our close friendship 
with Japan -- which will always be a centerpiece of our efforts in the region. … 
None of this will come easy, nor without setback or struggle. But at this moment 
of renewal – in this land of miracles – history tells us it is possible. This is 
America's agenda. This is the purpose of our partnership with Japan, and with the 
nations and peoples of this region. 
And there must be no doubt: As America's first Pacific President, I promise you 
that this Pacific nation will strengthen and sustain our leadership in this vitally 
important part of the world.284 
The president flew to Singapore that same day to meet with APEC nations. The 
next morning, his trade representative, Ron Kirk announced at the APEC meeting, the 
U.S.’s intention to enter official TPP talks.285 Here, as early as 2009, President Obama 
envisioned the TPP as a vital aspect of a broad geopolitical agenda in the Asia. The 
agenda would lead to his investment in nation-wide campaign to promote the ratification 
of the TPP by the U.S Congress in 2014 and 2015. But first the U.S. led negotiations in 
the first round of talks in Melbourne in 2010 and convened parties ten more times over 
two years until the end of 2011 in Honolulu.286 At that time, Canada and Mexico began 
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the process of joining talks and became official members in 2012. Japan would join in 
2013. Over 25 rounds of negotiations and ministerial meetings were held in total and the 
final talks were completed in Atlanta, GA in September of 2015.   
The TPP’s IP Chapter in Congress 
 From 2011 to 2016, The U.S. Congress held thirteen hearings where issues of 
intellectual property law were discussed in the context of the TPP. In January of 2016, 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) also held a three-day hearing that 
included testimony regarding the TPP’s impact on all sectors of the U.S. economy – 
including technology and entertainment. Despite the significance of the text’s 
intermediary liability provisions, there was little debate on the topic in over 40 hours of 
testimony over the course of that five-year period. But a small number of representatives 
from technology industry associations, copyright holder associations, and non-
governmental organizations did present arguments for and against safe harbors in the 
TPP. A small group of lawmakers and government officials also spoke to the topic.  
On the question of the TPPs safe harbors provision, stakeholders and lawmakers 
were split three ways. Some argued that the TPP’s version of copyright safe harbors was 
consistent with U.S. law. Some argued that the TPP text might not be consistent to § 512 
of the DMCA and therefore, was a potential threat to users’ rights. And a third group 
argued that the TPP’s version of safe harbors included too many exceptions and too much 
flexibility, i.e., other countries could implement safe harbors in ways that could be a 
threat to U.S. business interests. Informed dialog on the implications of the TPP was 
difficult because the U.S. Trade Representative allowed only limited access to the 
negotiating text, even for members of Congress. Technology industry lobbyists did 
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testify, but Congress did not invite experts in internet law and did not offer opportunities 
for public comment. The TPP internet law related provisions were presented in broad 
strokes. Rather than detailed arguments about the costs and benefits of particular 
paragraphs of the IP chapter; lawmakers, trade officials, and technology industry 
representatives deployed five discourses to signify their support for the TPP’s safe 
harbors provisions. Stakeholders and government officials alike framed the TPP as a 21st 
century agreement and a boost to the U.S. digital economy, and technology job creator. 
Some claimed that § 512 of the DMCA created the internet economy in the U.S. Many 
stakeholders argued therefore, that it made logical sense to export a similar rulebook 
through free trade agreements. Finally, some testified that the TPP represented a chance 
for the U.S. to set the rules of the road of the internet economy before China did so. In 
other words, the TPP’s internet rules – including copyright safe harbors – mattered to the 
geopolitical position of the U.S. vis a vis it’s power to control digital networks and 
foreign investment in internet ventures internationally. These five discourses – rules of 
the road, digital economy, jobs, created the internet, and 21st century agreement – 
characterized the arguments from a variety of industry stakeholders, lawmakers, and 
government officials throughout the five years of hearings that addressed the TPP’s IP 
chapter. Stakeholders and government officials alike framed the TPP’s safe harbors 
provisions as part of a package of the TPP’s reforms that would address the needs of the 
technology industry and the platform economy. 
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 When the issue of copyright safe harbors and the TPP was directly addressed in 
these hearings, stakeholders had differing opinions on the consistency between the TPP 
and the DMCA. The U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Michael Froman, and two 
industry associations – the Copyright Alliance and Internet Association287 – all argued in 
support of the TPP’s safe harbors provisions and claimed they were consistent with U.S. 
law (see figure 6.1).  
Figure 6.1. Stakeholder & Government Arguments on the Consistency of TPPs 
Intermediary Liability Provision with U.S. Law (Section 512 of the DMCA). 
 
287 Members of the Internet Association include Airbnb, Amazon, Coinbase, DoorDash, Dropbox, eBay, 
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Worldwide, Netflix, Pandora, PayPal, Pinterest, Practice Fusion, Rackspace, reddit, Salesforce.com, 
Snapchat, Spotify, SurveyMonkey, Ten-X, TransferWise, TripAdvisor, Turo, Twitter, Uber Technologies, 
Inc., Yahoo!, Yelp, Zenefits, and Zynga. 
The TPP intermediary liability provisions are consistent with U.S. Law 
 U.S. Government Officials  
o Michael Froman (U.S. Trade Representative) 
 Technology Industry Associations  
o Internet Association 
 Technology Think Tanks 
o Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF)  
 Rightsholder Associations 
o The Copyright Alliance 
 
The TPP intermediary liability provisions may not be consistent with U.S. Law 
 NGOs 
o Knowledge Ecology International  
o Public Knowledge 
 U.S. Senators and Congressional Representatives 
o Rep. Zoe Lofgren (California) 
o Sen. Ron Wyden (Oregon) 
 
The TPP intermediary liability provisions are too ambiguous and include too many 
exceptions  
 
  Rightsholder Associations 
o Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) 
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Ambassador Froman argued in a 2015 hearing on the TPP,  
So, what we are pursuing in TPP is based on the approach that has been crafted 
here under U.S. law, including around issues like ISP liability…this is the first 
trade agreement in history that we will put forward that allows for exceptions and 
limitations to copyright consistent with U.S. practice. So, our approach has been 
very much consistent with that approach.288 
The exceptions and limitations that he cites here are the fair use protections that 
are found in the DMCA – and he claims the TPP is consistent with fair use. Michael 
Beckerman of the Internet Association argued that fair use protections work for the 
platform economy and they should be included in the TPP.  
…what we have sought…is to have the same balanced copyright policy that we 
have here in the United States, with fair use exceptions limitations. That is the 
U.S. balance that I think works very, very well here for creators. We think that 
should be part of trade deals around the world…289 
The Copyright Alliance – who represents individual artists and publishers, as well 
as larger organizations – submitted a statement to the International Trade Commission 
(ITC) in 2016, which did not take issue with the TPP’s version of copyright safe harbors. 
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Their CEO, Keith Kupferschmid wrote simply, “Significantly, the standards established 
in the TPP reflect current U.S. laws and regulations.”290 
Two lawmakers and two non-governmental organizations challenged the TPP’s 
safe harbor provisions on users’ rights grounds. Little testimony or questioning included 
a detailed critique of the text. Most comments regarding a critique of the TPP’s approach 
on fair use grounds alluded to inconsistencies with the DMCA – and argued that the TPP 
may not be as protective of users’ rights as the DMCA. For example, in 2011, Krista Cox 
of Knowledge Ecology International submitted comments for the record to the 
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee. She wrote, “The 
proposals are even more inappropriate when they would introduce backdoor changes into 
our own laws or block current legislative reform efforts…we believe that the USTR 
inappropriately pushes norms that are inconsistent with current U.S. law.”291 In a 2012 
hearing, Rep. Zoe Lofgren of California questioned Teresa Stanek Rea, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Deputy Director of the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office about fair use. She asks, “I didn't find the exceptions and 
safeguard, like fair use, that we enjoy in this country. So, the concern...is whether, under 
the treaty, people would have the same freedom as they would in the United States vis-a-
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vis copyright.”292 In 2015, Senator Ron Wyden or Oregon questioned Ambassador 
Froman on similar grounds. He said,  
I just think that millions of Internet users want it clear and they want it 
straightforward that nothing is going to be done to undermine an open Internet. 
And particularly they want to buttress the victories that have been won here and 
look to over-seas opportunities for the same kind of policies.293 
The advocacy group Public Knowledge submitted a written statement to a 2016 
hearing that was entitled, “Expanding U.S. Digital Trade and Eliminating Barriers to U.S. 
Digital Exports.” Four legal experts wrote on behalf of Public Knowledge. This appears 
to be the only mention of the TPP’s source text in regard to copyright in all thirteen 
hearings that addressed the TPP and intellectual property. The legal experts wrote,    
While the TPP requires that signatories “shall provide” extensive intellectual 
property rights and enforcement mechanisms, it requires that signatories “shall 
endeavor to achieve” appropriate limitations and exceptions. Going forward, U.S. 
trade policy should ensure that trade agreements mandate parties to achieve 
balance in their intellectual property system through the provision of adequate 
limitations and exceptions.294 
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 Public Knowledge and Knowledge Ecology International, as well as Rep. Lofgren 
and Sen. Wyden wanted some assurances that TPP’s text would be explicit about fair use, 
as way of precluding national versions of safe harbors that didn’t allow for user 
safeguards against mistakes, fraud, and abuse.  
 In a 2016 hearing at the ITC, Stephen Ezell Vice President, Global Innovation 
Policy at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) in Washington 
testified to the contrasting position i.e., the non-binding nature of the TPP’s approach to 
fair use rightly allows for national variation. He argued the opposite position to Public 
Knowledge on this point. He testified,  
The TPP…reflects the different legal systems and approaches that each member 
takes with regard to the issue of fair use. A prescriptive requirement for explicit 
fair use provisions probably would not have been a good approach given the 
differences of different countries. Overall, we think it's a flexible framework that 
accommodates different approaches and it is going to lead to great levels of 
digital and content and creative innovation throughout the Trans-Atlantic 
Partnership region.295 
 In 2016, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) wrote a letter for 
the record to the ITC for their hearing on the economic impact of the TPP. The MPAA 
appeared to make an outlier argument that did not fit well into the range of debate 
regarding consistency with the DMCA. The MPAA wrote, “…MPAA is disappointed 
with several elements in the text, notably the ISP liability provision. MPAA also notes 
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that the TPP takes a different drafting approach to exceptions though this should not 
implicate the actual effect of the provision.”296 The MPAA’s position is that the TPP does 
not go far enough to protect copyright in the digital environment because the open 
language permits variation in national implementation – which would potentially harm 
copyright enforcement in foreign markets.  
Representatives of technology industry associations, The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, and a few members of Congress argued in support of including copyright 
safe harbors in the TPP – as part of suite rules that covered other relevant areas as well 
(see figure 6.2). 
These stakeholders repeated three central arguments to make their case for 
copyright safe harbors in the TPP: TPP is a necessary update to the WTO for the digital 
age, TPP (and free trade agreements in general) should include intermediary liability 
rules, and the lack of intermediary liability protections in other countries amounted to a 
non-tariff barrier to trade for U.S. companies.  
Stakeholders and lawmakers argued that U.S.-led free trade agreements needed to 
include copyright safe harbors because TRIPS was out-of-date and the TPP could support  
trade in digital goods – an area where the U.S. had a competitive advantage. Ed Black of 
the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) testified in 2010, 
“…the U.S. Government should move to close gaps in the existing WTO framework to 
ensure all GATS disciplines apply to trade over the Internet.”297 Grant Aldonas, the 
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international investment expert and economics professor, also highlighted the difference 
between digital and industrial goods. He said, “The real problem is that the WTO rules, 
such as they are, are largely confined to trade in industrial goods. They don't reach many 
of the things that are a competitive advantage.”298 Rep. Reichert of Washington argued 
that Congress’s intent is to update trade law to account for significance of the platform 
economy to U.S. interests. He said, “Many of the problems our digital exporters now face 
arose after our existing trade agreements were negotiated years ago. And that is why 
Congress set forth important new and expanded principal negotiating objectives relevant 
to digital trade in goods and services…”299 And, Stephen Ezell, CEO of the ITIF testified 
to the ITC that current WTO rules were a threat to U.S. interests because China and other 
countries are able to intervene to slow down trade in digital goods – in ways that would 
be prohibited for physical goods. He said,  
I think U.S. property sensitive sectors will benefit from a host of measures…that 
provide new legal protection and enforcement mechanisms for digital trade. Very 
important that these countries agree that digital and content has equal protection 





298 UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES AGAINST THE U.S.: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT, 
PROPERTY EXPROPRIATION, AND OTHER BARRIERS. HEARING OF THE H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
112TH CONG., 52 (2012). 
299 EXPANDING U.S. DIGITAL TRADE AND ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO U.S. DIGITAL EXPORTS: HEARING 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 114TH CONG., supra note 290 
at 4 (Opening remarks of Rep. David G. Reichert, Chairman). 
300 TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: LIKELY IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC 
INDUSTRY SECTORS: HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
TRANSCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS VOL. III:, 1031 (2016). 
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Figure 6.2. Stakeholder & Government Arguments on Why the TPP Should Include a 
Notice-and-Takedown Provision Similar to Section 512 of DMCA. 
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Witnesses representing technology industry associations also appealed to 
lawmakers’ desires to reduce trade barriers for U.S. companies. They argued that the TPP 
was an opportunity to reduce barriers that were not directly tied to tariffs. He argued that 
U.S. trading partners either lacked intermediary liability laws all together or they 
enforced strict liability for content that their governments wanted to control. The latter 
situation – where foreign governments were holding U.S. platforms liable under their 
national laws – that was of particular importance to the U.S. technology lobby. Ed Black 
of CCIA argued, “…from the perspective of advancing U.S. global economic 
opportunities, unreasonable liability rules are functionally no different than traditional 
market barriers.”301 Mike Sax, of the Association for Competitive Technology (ACT) and 
a software business owner testified that compliance with conflicting and overlapping 
intermediary liability regulations forced his business to invest heavily in avoiding 
liability. To him this was “prohibitive and almost takes away some of the advantages and 
the opportunities that cloud computing can present to us.”302 In a 2016 hearing, Michael 
Beckerman of the Internet Association repeated this point five times throughout his 
testimony and prepared statement to the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and 
Means Committee. He wrote, “Inadequate intermediary liability laws make it impossible 
for e-commerce platforms to operate and serve as trade-enabling marketplaces.”303 49 
Beckerman also wrote, “…many countries lack flexible copyright rules such as fair use – 
 
301 INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY. HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, CUSTOMS, AND GLOBAL COMPETIVENESS OF THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 111TH 
CONGRESS., supra note 298 at 38. 
302 Id. at 10. (Testimony of Mike Sax, Board President, Association of Competitive Technology). 
303 EXPANDING U.S. DIGITAL TRADE AND ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO U.S. DIGITAL EXPORTS: HEARING 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 114TH CONG., supra note 290 
at 49 (Testimony of Michael Beckerman, President & CEO Internet Association). 
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which creates significant barriers to entry for U.S. companies that are hoping to do 
business in those markets.”304  
 A small group of internet industry lobbyists and a handful of general business 
groups also argued in support of the TPP’s copyright safe harbors provisions on the 
grounds that the U.S. trade agenda was the appropriate place for pursue U.S. interest in 
the area of internet policy. As such, the U.S. should include safe harbors in trade 
agreements, along with a suite of laws that support U.S.-based internet platforms. They 
made their case by arguing the new digital trade rules in the TPP would benefit more than 
just technology companies – there was in fact a larger economy of U.S. businesses that 
sell goods and services through internet platforms. It was therefore, in the interest of the 
U.S. government to use trade leverage to export the same suite of internet regulations that 
worked at home. To them, the TPP’s safe harbors provisions represented a vital new 
effort for the U.S. Trade Representative. Ed Black of CCIA testified on this point in 
2015. He said, “…we believe it is…appropriate, for the U.S. Government as we try to 
persuade others in the world to have strong copyrights, that they also reflect the 
boundaries and limitations that have proved so important to the ability of…Internet 
companies to flourish.”305 In 2016, Michael Beckerman of the Internet Association also 
testified that the TPP copyright rules were important shift in the U.S.’s trade agenda. He 
said, “Historically, pro-Internet policies have been absent from trade agreements...we feel 
that the TPP does acknowledge the benefits of...safe harbors to protect the basic 
 
304 Id. at 47. (Testimony of Michael Beckerman, President & CEO Internet Association). 
305 INTERNATIONAL DATA FLOWS: PROMOTING DIGITAL TRADE IN THE 21ST CENTURY. HEARING BEFORE 
THE COURTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNET OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114TH 
CONGRESS., 99 (2015), https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=104145 (last 
visited Nov 5, 2019). 
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functionality of the Internet.”306 Robert Atkinson, President of the technology think tank, 
ITIF echoed this argument in the same hearing in 2016. He said, “I would agree with Mr. 
Beckerman that trade agreements should include some kind of provisions like § 230 for 
intermediate liability protection.”307 Atkinson cited § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA), which covers defamation and other types of illegal content, but the 
thread of his argument is the same. All the technology industry lobbyists that commented 
on the TPP argued in support of this new effort on the part of the USTR – to include 
copyright safe harbors in the trade agenda now and into the future. In addition to the tech 
lobby, Ambassador Alan Wolff, chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council 
(NFTC)308 testified to the ITC in 2016 in favor of safe harbors in the TPP. He submitted a 
policy platform to the ITC for the digital economy entitled, “Encouraging Economic 
Growth in the Digital Age: A Policy Checklist for the Digital Economy.” Its first point 
(of ten) reads, “Ensure open global flows of information while regulating appropriately 
for the public good…maintain appropriate protections for Internet intermediaries.”309 The 
NFTC’s platform doesn’t specify the details of how these protections should function, 
only that they should part of a broad U.S. agenda to use trade agreements to influence 
internet regulation globally.  
 
306 EXPANDING U.S. DIGITAL TRADE AND ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO U.S. DIGITAL EXPORTS: HEARING 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 114TH CONG., supra note 290 
at 39 (Statement of Michael Beckerman, President & CEO, Internet Association). 
307 Id. at 79. 
308 The NTFC is a U.S.-based business association that lobbies on behalf of its membership for favorable 
trade policies. Its members include Fortune-500 companies from many sectors of the economy.   
309 TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: LIKELY IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC 
INDUSTRY SECTORS: HEARING BEFORE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, RECORD OF 
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS, DAY 1., 69 (2016) (Statement of Amb. Alan Wm. Wolff on behalf of the National 
Foreign Trade Council). 
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 These three core arguments in favor of the TPP’s safe harbors provisions – it’s a 
needed update to TRIPS, it reduces barriers to digital trade, and it is an essential part of a 
new trade digital trade agenda – are found throughout the public record of Congressional 
hearings on the TPP and in transcripts of the three-day hearing at the ITC. As regulatory 
arguments, they were included with little debate and there were few opposing views on 
these lines of argument in the public record. There was, however, debate on these points 
outside of congress310 but it appears that these conversations were absent from the 
hearings on the TPP. There were two NGOs, one senator, and one congressional 
representative who did argue that the TPP’s copyright safe harbors text may not be 
consistent with U.S. law (see above). But the record doesn’t include direct debates (back 
and forth discussions between witnesses and members of Congress) on these three central 
arguments.  
Discourse: A 21st Century Agreement 
 The U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman testified in three hearings 
regarding the TPP. Throughout his testimony, Ambassador Froman framed the TPP as a 
21st century agreement or a high standard agreement (see figure 6.3).  
 
310 Grant Gross, Tech firms oppose fast-tracking of Trans-Pacific Partnership, NETWORK WORLD (2014), 
https://www.networkworld.com/article/2176323/tech-firms-oppose-fast-tracking-of-trans-pacific-
partnership.html (last visited Oct 22, 2020). 
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Figure 6.3. Stakeholder & Government Discourse: 21st Century Agreement 
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tended to relate to the interests of their industry. Stakeholders and government officials 
alike spoke in general terms about these suite of policies – connecting them to e-
commerce, intellectual property, and innovation – rarely connecting the broader idea to 
detailed discussions of specific rules. 
 In January of 2015, Ambassador Froman read a prepared statement about the TPP 
before answering questions. He said, “…we have made important progress…in 
addressing a number of 21st century issues such as intellectual property, digital trade, 
competition with state-owned enterprises, and labor and environmental protections.”311 In 
2014, he referred to his own framing of the 21st century and argued that this was the 
USTRs agenda in negotiations. He said, “…when we talk about updating our trade 
agreements for the 21st century and bringing new issues like the emergence of the digital 
economy into those trade agreements, this is precisely what we are focused on.”312 And, 
at that same hearing in 2014, he connects the idea of a 21st century agreement with 
copyright safe harbors. He wrote,  
We are also seeking to establish in TPP, for the first time in any U.S. trade 
agreement, a balance in partners' copyright systems by means of limitations or 
exceptions…and to support strong and balanced Internet service provider liability 
and ‘safe harbor’ provisions that benefit 21st-century e-commerce and internet 
businesses.313  
 
311 PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 2015 TRADE POLICY AGENDA: HEARING BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 
114TH CONG., supra note 289 at 7 (Testimony of Amb. Michael Froman, United States Trade 
Representative). 
312 PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TRADE POLICY AGENDA WITH U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL FROMAN: 
HEARING BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 113TH CONG., 59 (2014). 
313 Id. at 143. (Questions for the Record from Rep. Tom Reed). 
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Discourse: The Digital Economy 
Stakeholders and lawmakers also repeatedly referred to the TPPs intellectual 
property rules as a key component of the digital economy – a necessary group of laws to 
promote e-commerce, the growth of platforms, and all the other sectors of the analog 
economy that rely on those platforms (see figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4. Stakeholder & Government Discourse: The Digital Economy 
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and consumers. Lawmakers and tech industry stakeholders invoked the image of a global 
grand marketplace – populated by small businesses and facilitated by U.S.-based internet 
platforms – to argue in favor of TPP and its digital trade rules. Michael Beckerman, CEO 
of the Internet Association opened his prepared remarks to congress in 2016 by calling on 
lawmakers to support his corporate members. He said,  
Internet platforms are the global engine of the innovation economy. The Internet 
sector represents an estimated 6 percent of U.S. GDP in 2014, totaling nearly $1 
trillion and nearly 3 million American jobs. In addition to the economic 
contribution to the Internet industry, our member companies are transforming the 
way we do business at home and abroad by lowering barriers to entry and 
providing unprecedented growth opportunities for American businesses, large and 
small, and entrepreneurs.314   
Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon invoked the small rural business owners in his home state. 
In 2015, he argued,  
Three decades ago, an entrepreneur with big dreams in a place like Mt. Vernon, 
Oregon –a small town of 500 didn't have the Internet as a means to access global 
consumers. Today, that entrepreneur does. And that access could be direct or 
through Internet platforms, which could include eBay, Amazon, and Etsy.315 
 Michael Froman, the U.S. Trade Representative called on lawmakers to imagine 
Esty, the platform of global home businesses. He testified in 2015,  
 
314 EXPANDING U.S. DIGITAL TRADE AND ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO U.S. DIGITAL EXPORTS: HEARING 
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 114TH CONG., supra note 290 
at 38 (statement of Michael Beckerman, President and CEO of the Internet Association). 
315 PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 2015 TRADE POLICY AGENDA: HEARING BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 
114TH CONG., supra note 289 at 85 (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden). 
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And when [sellers] engage through Etsy with the 95 percent of the customers of 
the world who live outside our country, they are using telecommunications 
services, software services, electronic payment services, express delivery services. 
Those are all issues that we are addressing in TPP, making sure that those services 
stay open, that our providers can continue to provide them and expand their 
access in these markets, to make it possible for small and medium-sized 
businesses all over the country to engage in global commerce.316 
Discourses: Jobs, Rules of the Road, and Safe Harbors 
Stakeholders and lawmakers used three other secondary discourses to argue in 
favor of the TPPs digital trade rules. First, they made a geopolitical case that the U.S. 
should be the one to set the rules of the road for the digital economy before other 
countries do (see figure 6.5). In this context, China was the competitor that they cited 
most. Second, they invoked the origin story of big tech in the U.S. and tied that early 
development to the legal infrastructure of safe harbors – both § 512 of the DMCA and § 
230 of the Communications Decency Act. Here, the legal shield of safe harbors was the 
protection that created the internet economy in the U.S. (see figure 6.6). Third, 
stakeholders invoked the American worker to make the claim that internet rules that 
protected the digital marketplace would create more U.S. jobs (see figure 6.7). 
 
316 U.S. TRADE POLICY AGENDA: HEARING BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON WAYS ON MEANS, 114TH CONG., 44 
(2015). 
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Figure 6.5. Stakeholder & Government Discourse: Intermediary Liability Laws Created 
the Internet Economy in the U.S  
Figure 6.6. Stakeholder & Government Discourse: Rules of the Road 
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Debates in Context  
On December 14th, 2011, the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and 
Means Committee held a hearing entitled “Trans-Pacific Partnership.” Invited panelists 
included Ambassador Demetrious Marantis (the deputy U.S. Trade Representative), 
Devry Boughner (of Cargill and the U.S. Business Coalition for TPP), Angela Hofmann 
(of Wal-Mart), and Michael Wessel (of the Wessell Group).  
The record also included a number of important public submissions from Ed 
Black of the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA), Krista Cox of 
Knowledge Ecology International (KEI), and a coalition of medical professionals. The 
first two documents in this appendix provide the detailed opinions of two opposing 
positions on the TPP’s copyright policies. Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability is 
mentioned in terms of the importance of safe harbors to protect innovation. Ed Black’s 
submitted comments focus on the importance of copyright laws to protect innovation and 
Krista Cox’s comments focus on the lack of transparency and the negative implications 
of the TPP for consumer rights and protections - a primary advocacy focus of Knowledge 
Ecology International. However, the oral testimony neglects the question of copyright for 
digital cultural products and instead focuses on protections for the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industries and vague mentions of the digital economy. The bulk of the questioning in 
regard to intellectual property is in regard to pharmaceutical brands, protecting drug 
patents and ‘biologics’ in the international market. Committee members framed these 
questions in terms of protecting American jobs in those areas. Mentions of digital trade, 
internet freedom, e-commerce, and cultural products appear to be limited to the first two 
attached submissions. 
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Six months later, on June 27th, 2012, the Subcommittee on the Intellectual 
Property, Competition, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
entitled “International IP Enforcement: Protecting Patents, Trade Secrets and Market 
Access”. According to the record, the hearing consisted of three opening statements from 
committee members and one prepared statement from Teresa Stanek Rea, the Deputy 
Secretary of Commerce and Intellectual Property and Deputy Director of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) at the U.S. Commerce Department. She 
gave oral testimony, included a prepared statement for the record, and answered 
questions from the committee. These opening statements and oral testimony focused on 
the enforcement of U.S. patent law internationally and the role of the patent office and 
trade agreements in that enforcement. Discussion was primarily limited to technology and 
pharmaceutical patents and the threats that U.S. patents face in the global market. 
Committee members pressed Ms. Rea on how the U.S. patent office will be push the TPP 
member states to follow U.S. patent law in regard to drug patents and data protection for 
biologics. Ms. Rea made repeated comments reiterating the patent office’s commitment 
to pushing for the strongest protections possible with the TPP. Her prepared statement 
summarizes her assurances to the committee,  
We (USPTO) continue to provide expert technical advice on the full range of 
substantive IP protection and enforcement issues to the USTR in connection with 
on-going trade negotiations. The USPTO plays an active role in the on-going 
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Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and the implementation and monitoring 
for compliance of other bilateral and free trade agreements.317 
Two lines of questioning in the record are particularly relevant to the public 
concerns of previous agreements and the inequities inherent in the process of U.S.-led IP 
governance. Ms. Rea’s answers are instructive for gaining clarity on the U.S.’ perspective 
on the connection between IP law and development, and the U.S. approach to free trade 
negotiations. The record reveals that Melvin Watt, a representative from North Carolina 
asked an open-ended question about the challenges that the USPTO faces in free trade 
negotiations. Ms. Rea responded, “Culturally, a lot of countries come from a different 
perspective from what we do. They have different legal systems.”318 She continues to 
discuss the IP training institute that the USPTO operates for judges in various countries to 
“bring them up to speed”319 on the U.S.-style patent system. On a subsequent line of 
questioning Ms. Rea is pressed on the lack of transparency in the TPP negotiations by 
California representative Zoe Lofgren. Ms. Rea’s answer neither explains nor defends 
transparency. She pledges to get back to the committee. This line of questioning was 
particularly relevant to controversy over internet policy. Rep. Lofgren compared the TPP 
process to the negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the first 
and only time this comparison was made to the committee in this hearing. This is notable, 
given the clear policy similarities between the two agreements, especially in regard to 
internet and intellectual property policy.   
 
317 INTERNATIONAL IP ENFORCEMENT: PROTECTING PATENTS, TRADE SECRETS AND MARKET ACCESS: 
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNET OF THE 
H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., supra note 293 at 13. 
318 Id. at 18. 
319 Id. at 18. 
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 Three weeks later, on July 19th, 2012, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
held a hearing entitled “Unfair Trading Practices Against the U.S.: Intellectual Property 
Rights Infringement, Property Expropriation, and Other Barriers.” The Chairman of the 
Committee Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Republican of Florida, framed the conversation at 
the outset in terms of rule breaking states i.e., other governments tolerating and 
encouraging the theft of intellectual property to support their domestic industries. She 
mentions cultural products in this context from the outset, “China is the most egregious 
example, where the U.S. Trade Representative estimates that 99 percent of all music 
downloads from the internet is done so illegally.”320 She continues on to cite 
Hollywood’s estimates of losses due to global piracy and she returns to the well-worn 
image of pirated DVDs being sold on the streets of Beijing for pennies. The Chairman’s 
position here represents the agenda of the government/Hollywood nexus in the U.S.: 
countries such as China and Venezuela are undermining American growth by promoting 
piracy on purpose. The answer here is presented as larger and more comprehensive trade 
agreements that set global rules on IP trade and punish countries for non-compliance 
through sanctions.  
In this case, Hollywood’s influence is felt directly and its agenda vis a vis the lack 
of IP protection in China frames the entire discussion and the bulk of the oral testimony. 
While the TPP was not the main focus of this hearing, the agreement receives repeated 
mention as a perceived counterweight to China and its active indifference to U.S. 
intellectual property law. Geopolitical concerns frame the discussion and the TPP is 
 
320 UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES AGAINST THE U.S.: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT, 
PROPERTY EXPROPRIATION, AND OTHER BARRIERS. HEARING OF THE H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
112TH CONG., supra note 299 at 2. 
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positioned as a geopolitical opportunity, with hardly any direct opposition to this view. 
One invited witness, Grant Aldonas of Split Rock International makes one comment321 
regarding Vietnam towards the end of the open questioning period that is particularly 
relevant in terms of understanding connection between financial investment and IP law. 
Aldonas sees the inclusion of Vietnam into the TPP trade bloc as a counterweight to 
China because American investors will be more likely to invest in Vietnam, if regulatory 
frameworks are in place. To summarize his testimony, he links IP legal structures to a 
rule of law foundation that technology investors need as a prerequisite for investment. 
According to Aldonas, when this happens in Vietnam, they will outcompete China for 
investment dollars from the west and China will be forced to shift its stance on IP. TPP, 
with its strict regulatory framework for IP in the digital environment is positioned as a 
strategy to shift financial investment away from China and towards markets that protect 
U.S.-based cultural exports.322 To follow this argument, the adoption of internet policy 
influences brick and mortar development projects, because a country with U.S.-style 
internet policy is perceived to be more accessible and secure.  
Nearly two years later, on April 3rd, 2014, the House Ways and Means 
Committee held a hearing entitled “President Obama’s Trade Policy Agenda with U.S. 
 
321 “We have an opportunity with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and it is going to be a challenge for 
Members of Congress because we are going to be negotiating with Vietnam. But I will say, the single most 
important reaction that I have seen out of the Chinese Government is when Intel decided to put a plant in 
Vietnam rather than in China. And to the extent we can use the TPP process to encourage Vietnam with its 
historic relationship with China to make choices that China has yet to make, and they do start to out 
compete the Chinese for capital because the reality is Vietnam has become the new south coast of China. 
The go west policy of the Chinese Government hasn't worked. The more you see of that the more 
responsive they have to become because they have to deal with the economic reality of trying to continue to 
attract that investment flow. And that will come to an end if there is a better option” (Unfair Trading 
Practices Against the U.S., 2012, p. 69)”  
322 UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES AGAINST THE U.S.: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT, 
PROPERTY EXPROPRIATION, AND OTHER BARRIERS. HEARING OF THE H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
112TH CONG., supra note 299 at 69. 
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Trade Representative Michael Froman”. The record of the hearing consists of 60 pages of 
testimony from the featured witness, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and 40 
pages of submissions for the record from various lobbying groups. The last addition is an 
attachment entitled “Questions for the Record: Representative David Reichart”. These 
twelve pages appear to be written testimony in the form of questions and answers to 
USTR Froman from various members of the committee. There are a number of 
exchanges in this attachment in regard to internet policy that were not included in the oral 
testimony of this hearing.  
In one section of the “Questions for the Record” appendix, Representative Tom 
Reed of the Finger Lakes region of New York questions USTR Froman on the TPP’s 
balance between users’ rights and copyright enforcement. Rep. Reed asks,  
I have heard concerns expressed that the intellectual property provisions of U.S. 
trade agreements only reflect part of U.S. law -- strong protection and 
enforcement...Can you describe for me how USTR will be approaching IP within 
TPP and TTIP to reflect the full balance of U.S. law regarding the internet?323 
USTR Froman proceeds to then provide a two-paragraph accounting of the U.S. 
trade agenda in regard to copyright and internet policy that includes reference to the 
unique mix of copyright enforcement mechanisms, data flow measures, criminal 
penalties, cyber theft safeguards, ISP liability statutes, and data localization requirements. 
The policies in these areas are included in TPP. Froman includes ISP liability in his 
laundry list of goals for the TPP. He writes, “We are also seeking to establish in TPP...to 
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support strong and balanced internet service provider liability and ‘safe harbor’ 
provisions that benefit 21st-century e-commerce and internet businesses.”324 The USTR’s 
testimony here is notable for a number of reasons. First, this is one of the very few 
mentions of ISP liability and safe harbors in the transcripts of hearing testimony. 
Secondly, while he thoroughly describes the U.S. free trade agenda vis a vis copyright, 
but he does so without once directly mentioning Hollywood, films, music, or piracy. This 
omission is significant given how much these policies are designed to protect such 
copyrighted works and how explicit the USTR has been in the past in regard to the 
importance of free trade policies to Hollywood and the music industry. 
Five months later on September 18th, 2014, the Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing 
entitled, “U.S. Copyright Office.” The single invited witness was the director of the U.S. 
Copyright Office, Maria A. Pallante. According to the record, there were three opening 
statements from members of the committee and nine submissions added to the appendix 
from industry groups and other members of Congress. The final submission in the 
appendix was submitted by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). 
The oral testimony and questioning from committee members focused on what 
the Copyright Office will need to do modernize its operations for digital enforcement. 
Free Trade was mentioned once in the oral testimony in the context of the duties of the 
Copyright Office. In this portion of the testimony, Pallante explains to the committee all 
the different types of work that is being done by the Office’s lawyers and how much 
more staff they need. In her list of responsibilities, she includes the TPP, “We do 
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everything. Regulations alone could keep that number of lawyers constantly engaged, and 
that doesn’t count getting on a plane and going to Vietnam to help the USTR negotiate a 
Pacific Rim agreement.”325 
While the MPAA avoided entirely any mention of free trade in their submitted 
comments, the Songwriter’s Guild submitted a statement lobbying for more resources for 
the Copyright Office. In this statement, the Guild quotes previous testimony from the 
Copyright Office about the multiple duties the office must perform, including assisting in 
free trade negotiations. In quoting the Copyright Office’s previous testimony, the Guild 
writes, “the Copyright Office participates in important U.S. negotiations relating to 
intellectual property, for example, treaties and free trade agreements, at both the bilateral 
and multilateral levels.326 The Guild explains that U.S. Copyright law is going through a 
major period of review to upgrade the law for the digital age and the global marketplace, 
while at the same time the U.S. economy is more and more dependent on the copyright 
industries for GDP growth and job growth. The Guild writes, “The Copyright Office 
must be provided with the support that it needs to protect this crucial cultural economic 
segment of the American landscape.”327  
Furthermore, the Authors Guild implies that technology moves faster than 
Congress and therefore Congress is ill equipped to legislate on copyright. Therefore, the 
most viable option is the privatization of regulation. They write,  
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It may not be practical for Congress to legislate effectively for the long term on 
technology specific matters, such as safe harbors for online service providers…as 
soon as technology-related laws are adopted, technology changes...The Copyright 
Office could play an important role in interpreting the law and creating 
guidelines.328 
The specific mention of ISP liability in regard to the interests of authors is 
significant. The Copyright Office plays a key role in the everyday practice of notice and 
takedown and ISP liability as codified in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. To be 
eligible for safe harbors, an ISP must register with the Copyright Office and the Office 
maintains that database. The Authors Guild prepared statement appears to advocate for 
broadening the powers of the Copyright Office in regard to ISP liability, especially in 
regard to updating the law to reflect technological changes. However, it is unclear what 
this would mean. 
Four months later, on January 27th, 2015 Congress hosted two hearings that 
addressed the president’s free trade agenda. Both hearings included testimony related to 
copyright policies in the digital environment and the TPP. According to the record, The 
House Ways and Means committee hosted a hearing entitled, “Rep. Paul D. Ryan Holds a 
Hearing on the U.S. Trade Policy.” The hearing included one invited witness, USTR 
Michael Froman. Froman entertained questions from the committee in regard to the TPP 
and TTIP, as well other agreements. The balance of the questioning related to specific 
trade agenda that related to each member’s district. In addition, there were a number of 
challenging questions from committee members about transparency and having access to 
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the texts. Internet policy was addressed in terms of data localization requirements and 
global ecommerce. The artisan platform Etsy.com was specifically mentioned in this 
context. Copyright was addressed only at one moment. Rep. Loretta Sanchez from 
Orange County California pressed USTR Froman on enforcement, “The difficulty that we 
-- that I’ve had in prior trade agreements is the issue of enforcement because you can 
have an agreement but if there’s no enforcement of that or weak enforcement of that, you 
know, it’s not worth the paper that it is written on.”329 In his response, USTR Froman 
connects the cultural industries, U.S. job growth, copyright enforcement, and ISP 
liability: 
So, in TPP, for example, we are promoting strong copyright rules, strong 
enforcement mechanisms, whether it is on camcording or the illegal downloading 
of copyrighted material from satellites or from cable. We are trying to find the 
right balance, consistent with U.S. law, with regard to ISP liability, and the 
relation to that to copyright enforcement. And, of course, all of those obligations, 
under TPP, will be both higher than TRIPS from the WTO, and fully enforceable, 
under the TPP dispute settlement mechanism.330 
USTR Froman’s language is important to recognize in regard to ISP liability. His choice 
to describe the USTR’s goals in terms of finding the “right balance”, “consistent with 
U.S. law” is notable given the later resistance from civil society groups in regard to the 
TPP’s restrictive and market-led version of notice and take-down.  
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 The Senate Finance Committee also held a hearing on this same day entitled 
“President Obama’s 2015 Trade Policy Agenda.” USTR Froman was again the only 
invited witness. Sen. Wyden of Oregon pressed Froman on internet freedom and users’ 
rights. In his questioning, the Senator connects an open internet, political freedom, and 
the impact of ISP liability. The exchange addresses the topic, but Senator Wyden 
abruptly pivots, rather than delving into substantive debate. Senator Wyden begins the 
exchange: 
Ambassador, I want to talk with you for a couple of minutes about the importance 
of a free and open internet. It is obviously critically important to our economy, but 
it is also a platform...for the free exchange of ideas...so what I would like to hear 
briefly is how you are going to make sure that nothing in these agreements will 
undermine an open internet?331 
In turn, Ambassador Froman then recognizes the contentious nature of recent internet 
policy debates in the U.S. and the resistance from other TPP member states, without 
directly mentioning speech rights or the specifics of the debate:    
We view the TPP as an opportunity to bring into the digital economy fundamental 
principles from the “real” or the physical economy, including the importance of 
the free flow of information and data across borders and maintaining a free and 
open internet. So, what we are pursuing in TPP is based on the approach that has 
been crafted here under U.S. law, including around issues like ISP liability, or 
around technology protection measures, or around copyright, making sure there 
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are strong copyright laws. But at the same time, this is the first trade agreement in 
history that we will put forward that allows for exceptions and limitations to 
copyright consistent with U.S. practice. So, our approach has been very much 
consistent with that approach.332 
Senator Wyden responds,  
I just think that millions of Internet users want it clear and they want it 
straightforward that nothing is going to be done to undermine an open internet. 
And particularly they want to buttress the victories that have been won here and 
look to overseas opportunities for the same kind of policies.333 
Discussion 
Once adopted, the TPP could affect billons of users in TPP countries but there is 
little evidence that their interests were given serious consideration in international 
negotiations and the debates within the U.S. Congress. The time for testimony was in 
fact, dominated by technology industry associations and little time was offered to the 
copyright industries or digital rights NGOs. Internet platforms were represented by 
CCIA, ITIF, and the Internet Association and all argued in favor of exporting copyright 
safe harbors through the TPP. But spokespeople for these groups did have some 
disagreement over the details of TPP’s version of safe harbors. This coalition of 
technology interests were supported by general business associations, including the 
National Foreign Trade Council and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who also argued in 
favor of safe harbors. Rightsholders were represented by three groups: The Copyright 
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Alliance, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), and the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA). Of these groups, only the IIPA was invited to testify in 
person in front of Congress. The MPAA and the Copyright Alliance submitted statements 
for the record for two hearings. These rightsholder groups often disagreed with the 
technology industries but had less of an opportunity to express those views in the front of 
Congress or at the ITC. There was very little evidence in the record of the extended and 
contentious political battle between the platforms and rightsholders that took place during 
the debates surrounding Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2012.  
If adopted by all member states, the TPP’s copyright provisions could further 
privatize the policing of copyright online in many jurisdictions. There would be few 
requirements to create roles for government in the enforcement of digital copyright, 
unless states chose to involve courts or other regulatory bodies. Member states would 
have the option of removing most of the user protections that are found in § 512 of the 
DMCA. There would be few requirements for the content of takedown notices and 
removed content could stay-down indefinitely, unless states implemented their own user 
safeguards. Members could create a system of counter-notices, only if their governments 
chose to do so. If member states chose to implement the bare minimum of standards in 
the TPP, rightsholders and platforms would be able establish more efficient automated 
systems that lessoned the small amount of friction that exist in the DMCA-based process. 
Platforms would not be required to check for the validity of a notice and rightsholders 
could write notices in a way that best suited their preferences for efficiency.  
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The narrative(s) of the TPP’s copyright safe harbors provisions in these hearings 
was shaped primarily by the office of the USTR and the technology industry groups. The 
broad coalition who argued in favor of the TPP’s version of safe harbors deployed two 
core discourses to shape the public narrative about these policies: 21st century agreement 
and the digital economy. These stakeholders, along with the USTR, supported these 
discourses with a number of related arguments: the TPP is consistent with U.S. law, 
TRIPS must be updated for the digital age, and the lack of notice-and-takedown systems 
in TPP countries is a non-tariff barrier to trade. I argue that these three arguments can 
help us understand what the USTR and tech industry lobbyists may mean when they 
claim that the TPP is a 21st century agreement or that the TPP is the needed legal 
framework for the digital economy. First, a U.S.-led global internet economy could be 
created in the image of TRIPS i.e., trading partners would agree to a rule book that most 
favored U.S. interests and the interests of U.S.-based corporations. Second, trade rules 
that dictate internet regulation should be modeled after U.S. law – because, as the 
argument could go, U.S. law works best for the stakeholders that create U.S. jobs and 
grow the U.S. economy. Third, U.S. technology companies and their investors need to a 
favorable legal environment to expand and compete overseas.  
During the timeline of TPP negotiations U.S.-based platforms including Google, 
Facebook, Apple, and Amazon grew to such a size that they eliminated or purchased 
nearly all domestic competitors.334 As a result, they amassed unrivaled political power 
domestically. Since the passage of the DMCA and Communications Decency Act, they 
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have also benefitted from a favorable legal environment at home via these well-protected 
immunity laws.335 In fact, it could be argued that large Chinese technology firms are their 
only viable international competition.336 As such, the TPP would begin the process of 
establishing favorable legal norms for U.S. allies and trading partners, so that these U.S. 
firms could more easily grow into Asia. The risk of liability would be minimized, along 
with the expense of adapted to differing legal systems.  
The discourses deployed by U.S. tech firms in their congressional testimony – the 
21st century agreement and the digital economy – largely hid this agenda from the public 
dialog. These two discourses in fact described what could be considered a universal and 
mundane set of interests – making the law more up to date and supporting small internet 
entrepreneurs. But in truth, there is little that is mundane or universal about the TPP’s 
copyright rules. They would in fact, benefit a very narrow set of interests and regulate the 
possibilities for billions of users in TPP countries. The interests and legal rights of those 
users – to free expression and due process – were largely absent from the Congressional 
record and therefore, left out of the public discourse surrounding the TPP’s internet rules.         
Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored what exists in the public record of U.S. Congressional 
hearings in regard to the TPP and intermediary liability law. I also provide a detailed 
legal analysis of the TPP’s safe harbor provision vis-á-vis users rights and the automation 
of enforcement. The documents assessed were all produced as transcripts of 
congressional hearings held over a five-year time frame, 2010 to 2016. The text of these 
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transcripts included oral testimony of invited witnesses, statements from members of 
congress, prepared statements from stakeholders submitted for the record, and various 
appendices. From 500+ pages of oral testimony and appendices, there appears to be only 
a handful of references to policies that are based on copyright provisions that currently 
define U.S. law, under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. However, it was still 
possible to account for the actors, arguments, and discourses related to the policymaking 
process of the TPP and safe harbors. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of these debates for users’ rights and the political economy of internet policy 

















THE CANADIAN MODEL FOR STATE INTERVENTION IN DIGITAL 
COPYRIGHT 
Introduction 
Using the Canadian policymaking process as a case study, the purpose of this 
chapter is to describe in detail the policymaking process that led up to the final adoption 
of Canada’s unique mechanism for governing copyright takedowns, notice-and-notice. 
As one section of the Copyright Modernization Act (2012), I will describe how the law 
governs copyright takedowns, outline how the policy was created and account for the 
various conflicts over rights that were expressed during the policymaking process. Given 
the competing interests of the Canadian government, such as fostering the digital 
economy, protecting domestic cultural industries, and adhering to democratic norms, I 
will describe and situate the discourses and arguments that are contained in the text of 
these documents, while connecting these responses to the various actors and coalitions 
involved. The actors, discourses, and arguments that are unique to the Canadian case are 
highlighted and connected to these geopolitical dynamics. 
Notice-and-Notice 
“We would have to fill a whole floor with individuals in order to process them all. 
We haven’t automated that system as we wait to see what copyright legislation 
will bring our way.”337 
 
337 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons., LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON BILL C-32: MARCH 22, 2011, 
BILL C-32, AN ACT TO AMEND THE COPYRIGHT ACT, EVIDENCE OF PROCEEDINGS. NUM. 19, 3RD SESSION, 
40TH PARLIAMENT, 4 (2011), http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-3/CC32/meeting-
19/evidence (last visited Oct 1, 2018). 
 172 
From 2000 to 2010, the Canadian Parliament had been considering a series of 
reforms that would address changes in technology and bring Canada into compliance 
with international treaties. The proposed changes were linked by parliament under the 
umbrella legislation, the Copyright Modernization Act.338 Among other things, the 
Copyright Modernization Act standardizes enforcement on digital networks. In so doing, 
it adopted, as state policy, a voluntary and privatized agreement that had already been 
created between rightsholders and ISPs called notice-and-notice.  
Semantically juxtaposed to the U.S. standard of notice-and-takedown, notice-and-
notice involves no immediate taking down and a takedown is not required for the hosting 
platform to be shielded from liability. First, a copyright holder notices that a user has 
shared a song or a movie that they own the rights to. They then send a takedown request 
to the internet company that provides the hardware and software that enabled that 
sharing. Rather than removing the song, the internet host forwards that request to the 
responsible user. The notice that the user receives is similar to a cease-and-desist letter in 
that it includes threats of legal action.339 While the notice-and-notice system seemed 
straightforward in the early 2000s, practices varied across actors, and by 2010, ISPs were 
claiming they couldn’t process the volume of notices that were arriving from 
rightsholders in a timely fashion.340 In the 2001, The Canadian Association of Internet 
Service Providers proposed that the government abandon plans to adopt the U.S. system 
of notice-and-takedown. And, in turn, advocated that notice-and-notice be used as the 
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framework to establish a clear set of rules to apply to all parties – standardized 
requirements for the content of a copyright notice and a timeline for notice forwarding.341  
In the quote above, chief council for Bell Canada, implies that the ‘system’ in 
question, the Canadian digital copyright enforcement mechanism, notice-and-notice, had 
been managed manually, and the cluttered floors at the offices of Canadian ISPs, Bell, 
Telus, and Rogers have been full of paper of notices. Here, there is an implicit complaint 
about the cost and burden of the system itself and a direct request to government to 
expediate the legislative process, to provide the rules that automation requires.  
The Canadian Modernization Act provides this clarity. First it defines what a 
copyright notice must contain: the identifying information for the claimant (the 
rightsholder), the name or title of the work in question, the claimant’s interest in the 
copyrighted material, the URL of the infringing post or link, and the timestamp for the 
recording of the copyright violation. In addition, to ensure the benefits of safe harbors, 
the statute requires that platform is obligated to forward the notice on to the user quickly, 
or “as soon as feasible”.342 This set of requirements creates both the guidelines for a 
shared practice amongst all rightsholders and intermediaries and it also provides the 
details that all parties need to create automated systems for notice sending and 
forwarding.   
In addition, the law provides ISPs with only one data retention requirement. After 
receiving the notice, ISPs must keep the user’s identifying information for sixth months. 
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Unless the rightsholder decides to sue the user, the ISP is not obligated to release it to 
anyone or keep the user’s data for a longer period of time. Finally, if a user fails to 
remove the copyrighted content from a hosting platform or fails to stop downloading 
pirated material, they can be fined, but no more than $10,000.343 Even if the accused user 
does not remove the copyrighted content, the ISP is still shielded from liability. These 
three defining elements of notice-and-notice: the notice requirements, the data retention 
rules and the limits on statutory damages, represent the legal infrastructure that puts into 
force the intent of notice-and-notice – to incentivize the user’s own action to remove 
allegedly copyrighted material that they have posted.  
Notice-and-notice provides two key protections for the user that are not in place 
in other jurisdictions. First, there is more protection of due process, as users are 
incentivized to self-enforce. Second, the user’s identity is protected by the platform or the 
ISP. The platform is not required to release that personal information until there is legal 
action. In theory, this user self-enforcement shields the internet platform from legal 
liability in regard to both copyrights and free expression rights.  
Case Law and Statutory History 
The Canadian Constitution protects freedom of expression as a fundamental 
freedom, as it is a foundation for individual liberty and a functioning democracy. A 
number of laws have protected freedom of expression in Canada, but in the Constitution 
Act of 1982, the Canadian government put into force the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms which implements constitutional protection for freedom of expression, freedom 
of the press and freedom of “other means of communication” as fundamental 
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freedoms.344 The Charter of Rights and Freedoms took over a decade to complete and 
was the product of extensive public involvement and social advocacy. Much of this 
advocacy centered on how The Charter handles limitations.345 Ultimately, the final text 
ensures that limits on rights must be “prescribed by law”. The limitation clause 
acknowledged that freedom of expression is not absolute. The charter specified how these 
limits are permitted and thereby more clearly defined how power to limit speech can be 
exercised over the majority in a democratic system.346 
The second related and influential backdrop to Canada’s approach to digital 
copyright is the data privacy regulation, the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), passed in 1999.347 The statute stands out against 
the U.S.’s approach to privacy, in its user-focused policy intent. PIPEDA promotes the 
personal control of one’s own data and requires platforms to obtain permission from the 
user before they disclose personal information to a third party or use personal data for 
another purpose than originally agreed to. It is the emphasis on personal control that 
appears to be unique to Canada.348 However, the intent of policy, to protect the user’s 
privacy from state and corporate misuse, also shares much in common with the E.U. 
Privacy Directive. In this way, PIPEDA has some bearing on the Copyright 
Modernization Act’s handling of intermediary liability, in that it codifies a uniquely 
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Canadian approach that protects user data from being passed between firms without 
consent. Rather than the U.S. model of privacy as individual liberty or the European 
model that sees privacy as dignity, the Canadian model defines privacy as the bundle of 
rights that allow the user control over use and transfer. Levin & Nicholson emphasize the 
importance of domestic influences and public pressure to protect personal privacy and the 
right to control personal information.349 PIPEDA establishes this framework for all future 
laws that affect what can be shared, to whom, and for what purpose and the right to 
remain anonymous.  
Thirdly, the need for intermediary liability statute in Canada is also connected to 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in the case of the Society of Composers, Authors 
and Music Publishers (SOCAN) v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers (CAIP), 
known commonly as the Tariff 22 decision.350 Tariff 22 is seen to be the leading case on 
digital copyright and ISP liability in Canada351 and has been key to defining the rights 
and responsibilities of ISPs when it comes to illegal content of all kinds on their 
networks. Essentially, the court upheld an earlier decision by the Canadian Copyright 
Board that defined ISPs as passive intermediaries by confirming the Copyright Board’s 
decision that providing the means for communication is not the same as communication 
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itself.352 Both decisions, of the Board and the court, upheld the common carrier exception 
clause of the Copyright Act that exempted ISPs from liability by defining them as only 
conduits of information, not publishers, as would be the case in traditional media. Tariff 
22 refers to the specific Tariff number that was proposed by SOCAN in 1996. SOCAN 
proposed tariff would collect royalties on the digital transmission of musical works to be 
paid by the internet service providers and telecommunication companies that provide the 
means of that transmission. The Copyright Board ruled against SOCAN in 1999 and 
SOCAN appealed to the Supreme Court. And the court ruled on the case in 2004. In its 
opinion, the court laid the groundwork for a system that designates the notice as the legal 
document that ascribes liability, and in so doing placed the burden of monitoring hosted 
content on the rightsholder. Judge J Binnie wrote in the decision, “copyright liability may 
well attach if the activities of the Internet Service Provider cease to be content neutral, 
e.g., if it has notice that a content provider has posted infringing material on its system 
and fails to take remedial action.” Here the court went further than the copyright board in 
defining knowledge of infringement. The Copyright Board ruled that “Even knowledge 
by an ISP that its facilities may be employed for infringing purposes does not make the 
ISP liable for authorizing the infringement.”353  But, judge Binnie’s concluded that an 
ISPs lack of action (takedown or filtering) after a notice is received can create liability. 
Actual knowledge is defined as a received copyright notice and ISPs are released from a 
duty to monitor on their networks, even though they may know that illegal activity is 
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taking place across their software, services, and cables. The court’s decision in Tariff 22 
can be interpreted as a legal foundation for expansion of operations for both 
telecommunications and platforms intermediaries, as maintains the court’s view that 
technologies that merely provide the means of communication are content neutral. Along 
with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the PIPEDA it creates the institutional 
foundations of notice-and-notice and Canada’s approach to the building a foundational 
set of property laws that foster capital investment in digital economies. 
It appears that notice-and-notice complies with existing case law, the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and existing privacy statute, and functions as a form of 
enforcement. It defines what a notice has to say, includes clear instructions for when it 
must be forwarded and provides a mechanism for protecting the identifying information 
of the accused user. It absolves ISPs from any obligation to monitor and police traffic on 
its own networks for copyrighted content. That responsibility is placed squarely on the 
rightsholders – in many cases, large entertainment companies and artist organizations, 
such as SOCAN. Additionally, it absolves the ISP from the responsibility for taking 
down, or filtering the infringing content, by placing that responsibility on the user. The 
threat of fines incentivizes the user to take action on removal of the content that they 
themselves posted. The hosting ISP neither has to monitor for copyrighted content, nor 
take it down when it is identified via notice. In so doing, it makes hosting platforms and 
search engines liable and puts the burden of actual knowledge of infringement back onto 
the platform. In the spirit of SOCAN’s proposed Tariff 22, it asks platforms to transfer 
some of the revenue they make from facilitating the distribution of copyrighting to the 
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owners of those copyrights or pay for the removal of that content from their networks.354 
When held up against this new possible direction being proposed in the E.U., we can see 
the significance of the Canadian model, in regard to users’ rights.  
Figure 7.1: The Timeline of the Copyright Modernization Act 
1997  Canada Signs World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Internet Treaties 
1999  The Copyright Board releases its ruling on the Tariff 22 case, 
common carrier clause of copyright act applies to internet 
intermediaries. 
June 2001 Government launches Section 92 review process, releases three 
consultation papers, 700 Canadians submit public comments on 
the proposed reforms 
March 2002  Government holds a series of in-person public consultations on 
copyright reform.  
October 2002 Government releases its Section 92 report with recommendation 
to adopt DMCA-style notice and takedown system 
March 2004  Government releases Status Report on Copyright Reform, 
reversing course to propose two versions of notice-and-notice. 
June 2004 Canadian Supreme Court upholds the Copyright Board’s 
decision in Tariff 22 case, upholds common carrier clause of the 
copyright act, introduces notification as basis for liability 
June 2005 Minister of Canadian Heritage introduces Bill C-60, An Act to 
Amend the Copyright Act. Notice-and-notice is included. Dies 
on order paper in November due to new elections.  
January 2006 The Department of Industry commissions a study on the 
economic impact of the notice-and-notice regime. Surveys all 
major ISPs in Canada. 
June 2008  Minister of Industry introduces Bill C-61, An Act to Amend the 
Copyright Act. Notice-and-notice included with no changes. 
Bills dies in September when new elections are called. 
June 2010 Bill C-32, Copyright Modernization Act is introduced to the 
House of Commons.  
Nov. 2010 Legislative Committee on Bill C-32 begins to hear testimony 
March 2011  Legislative Committee on Bill C-32 ends on its 20th meeting 
September 2011 Bill C-11, Copyright Modernization Act is Introduced 
February 2012  Legislative Committee on Bill C-11 begins to hear testimony 
March 2012 Legislative Committee on Bill C-32 ends on its 11th meeting 
June 2012 Bill C-11 achieves royal assent 
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Notice-and-Notice’s Legislative Timeline 
The digital copyright reform process in Canada took over twelve years, took four 
rounds of legislation and was completed in the 2012 with the passage of the Copyright 
Modernization Act (see figure 7.1). In contrast to previous political moments, the 
Canadian public took great interest in the debates and domestic pressure was applied 
from a growing number of stakeholders from across diverse sectors of Canadian social 
and economic spheres.355  
The WIPO internet treaties were completed in 1997 and the United States passed 
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998. Activist resistance influenced 
parliament through a series of public consultations and hearings held by the departments 
of Industry and Heritage that took place from 2001 and 2002.356 At the beginning of this 
process the government wanted a U.S. style approach similar to notice-and-takedown. 
Public interest to this proposal had reached levels that were surprising to the government 
and the small groups of experts that had been working on copyright for decades. In 2002 
and 2003 ISPs, small internet providers, lawyers, and bloggers formed a political 
coalition to advocate for users and consumers rights. These groups fought against notice-
and-takedown and moved to replace it with notice-and-notice, which was already being 
used on a voluntary basis by ISPs and rightsholders. In 2004, then, the departments of 
 
355 Michael Geist, The Canadian Copyright Story: How Canada Improbably Became the World Leader on 
Users’ Rights in Copyright Law, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 169–205 
(Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017). 
356 HAGGART, supra note 41 at 172; Sara Bannerman, Canadian Copyright: History, Change, and 
Potential, 36 CAN. J. COMMUN. (2011), http://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/2321 (last 
visited Dec 5, 2017). 
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industry and heritage jointly released a new report declaring the government’s support for 
notice-and-notice, reversing its earlier position.357 Haggart (2014) explains this change in 
terms of two domestic influences, the institutional power of the largest telecom 
companies in Canada (Telus, Rogers, and Bell) combined with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in the Tariff 22 case (as discussed above). Efforts to legislate notice-and-notice 
began in 2004 with Bill C-60 and it carried through, virtually unchanged through three 
more rounds of legislation, including C-61 (2008), C-32 (2010), and C-11 (2012).358 
Geist on the other hand, attributes this policy shift to the growing influence of a 
coalition of groups, led by users’ rights advocates who were opposed the government’s 
position and advocated for a notice-and-notice regime.359 The proposal of this coalition, 
to codify notice-and-notice was bolstered by the fact that it had already been in place, 
supported by a privatized agreement between the music and film industry in Canada and 
traditional internet service providers that began in 2001, soon after the Copyright Board’s 
decision on Tariff 22 case.360 The Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers 
(CAIP), the Canadian Cable Television Association (CCTA), and the Canadian 
Recording Industry Association (CRIA) agreed to follow a process whereby the “CRIA 
notifies the ISPs in writing about an alleged infringement of copyright by a customer of 
the relevant ISP; upon which the ISP notifies its customer in writing and also sends a 
written confirmation to the CRIA that the notification has happened.”361 The mechanism 
 
357 HAGGART, supra note 41 at 174. 
358 Id. at 174. 
359 Geist, supra note 356. 
360 HAGGART, supra note 41 at 174. 
361 Judit Bayer, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Third Party Content, 1 VIC. UNIV. WELLINGT. 
WORK. PAP. SER. 1–110, 58 (2008). 
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was initially designed to combat both illegal downloading via peer-to-peer networks and 
the illegal posting of copyrighted material and links to public bulletin boards.362 No 
official contract appears to exist for the original private agreement, submissions by the 
Canadian Association of Internet Providers (CAIP) to the 2001 copyright review process 
reveal the details of the non-binding agreement. According to CAIP, the industry practice 
involved notice writing and notice forwarding. The rules for compliance were not set and 
the specific requirements for a notice were not standardized. But, in practice, it operated 
in a way that seem to function effectively.363  
The first appearance of notice-and-notice in a bill in the House of Commons came 
in 2004 in the copyright reform Bill C-60. In 2003, CAIP submitted a report to House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage to advocate for national copyright 
reforms and a specific provision for notice-and-notice. The report made specific 
recommendation for the how notices should be written and how the process should 
function.364 But a patronage scandal involving Prime Minister Paul Martin in November 
of 2005 resulted in a vote of no confidence, the dissolution of parliament and new 
elections. All in-process legislation was tabled.365 The draft of C-60 did include the 
model language for notice-and-notice that would influence future attempts to codify 
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digital copyright in Canada. The basic mechanism was there – when an ISP receives a 
takedown notice, it forwards it directly to the end user and the ISP could not release the 
personal identity of the user for six months.366 Fines are levied on the ISP for failure to 
forward the notice and for releasing the identity of the end-user before the end of the six-
month wait period. The fines for releasing the user’s identity ($10,000) are twice the 
amount for failing to forward the notice. C-60 goes further to protect the ISP, by 
explicitly defining actual knowledge of infringement as “actual knowledge of a decision 
of a court of competent jurisdiction to the effect that the other person who has stored a 
work or other subject-matter, or a reproduction of it, infringes copyright by so storing it 
or by the way in which the thing so stored is used.”367 
Digital Copyright Debated: C-11 and C-32 
 Notice-and-notice lasted, in this form, through three more attempts at copyright 
reform that eventually ended with the royal assent of C-11, the Copyright Modernization 
Act in 2012. The legislative timeline lasted eight years from the first reading of C-60 in 
2004 to the final passage of C-11 in 2012. Bills C-60 (2005), C-61 (2008), C-32 (2011), 
and C-11 (2012). All contained the original framework of notice-and-notice, included in 
C-60, but with minor adjustments. The first two rounds of legislation, C-60 and C-61 
never advanced beyond the first reading in the House of Commons. But, bills C-32 and 
C-11 were studied through extensive hearings, each with its own special legislative 
committee. The legislative committee for C-32 met 20 times during the winter of 2010 
and 2011 and the committee for C-11 met 11 times during February and March of 2012. 
 
366 Canada. An Act to amend the Copyright Act (S.C., 2005, c. C-60), s. 40.1 (1) 
367 Id. s. 31.1(5) and Bayer, supra note 44 at 58. 
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Between the two committees, MPs heard from over 200 witnesses. The testimony, 
discussions, and submitted statements in these special parliamentary committees reveals 
the details of the central debates that characterize the implementation of Canada’s 
domestic digital policy.  
During this period, the international infrastructure of copyright takedowns was 
being built to facilitate automation and the bulk removal of illegal content. 
Internationally, notices and takedowns were increasing exponentially, given the 
development of artificial intelligence (AI) tools that allowed for bulk removal and notice 
sending and the reliance by U.S. rightsholders on the notice-and-takedown regulation. At 
the same time, Canada’s digital policy was being influenced by two free trade 
agreements, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (with the U.S. and 11 other countries in the 
Pacific Rim) and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (led by the U.S. and Canada) 
that each included extensive regulation of intellectual property. This new international 
effort, especially in the case of ACTA, had been met with an unprecedented level of 
citizen backlash – a digital rights movement that had the backing of major U.S. 
intermediaries.368  
There were three groups of stakeholders who had some concern with intermediary 
liability: strict copyright advocates who were seeking to implement a system similar to 
the United States’ system of notice-and-takedown, those seeking a middle-ground 
between the two that would place more responsibility on the intermediary and a third 
group comprised of technology companies, and advocates who supported notice-and-
notice. Each of the groups of stakeholders had different sets of arguments regarding the 
 
368 See Parks, supra note 53. 
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level of responsibility intermediaries should assume, why intermediaries should take on 
more (or less) responsibility for the copyright infringement on their networks, how those 
responsibilities should be enforced, the role that the state should play in digital 
regulation, and the importance of intermediary liability to Canada’s status as a global 
trading partner.  
Two government agencies also testified and presented views on intermediary liability 
that were not always consistent with the MPs positions: The Department of Innovation, 
Science, and Economic Development (ISED) and the Department of Canadian Heritage. 
According to published transcripts, the first meeting of the legislative committee that 
hosted witnesses heard from both the Minister of Industry and the Minister of Heritage 
and Official Languages. Their published testimony points to the attitude of the Harper 
government in regard to intermediary liability. Much like the uniquely Canadian 
approach to privacy,369 the interests of consumers are placed on equal consideration with 
the interests of copyright owners–both artists and entertainment companies.  
Anti-notice-and-notice advocacy came from performers, broadcasters, songwriters, 
filmmakers, creative industry associations, and artists, as well as their allies in Parliament 
who argued that intermediaries were benefitting from cultural content, but not paying for 
the benefits they received. During the legislative committee research on the Copyright 
Modernization Act, Pablo Rodriguez, a liberal MP from Quebec, questioned the Minister 
of Industry, a cabinet member under the conservative Harper administration. MP 
Rodriguez asks,    
 
369 See Levin and Nicholson, supra note 349. 
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In your opinion, do Internet service providers have certain responsibilities? When I 
talked to them, they always say that they are just the “tube” carrying the information, 
when in my opinion, they are much more than that. They play a fundamental role, and 
they have certain responsibilities. In your opinion, at what point do their 
responsibilities come into play?370  
The minister of industry, Tony Clement responds by emphasizing the importance of the 
consumer’s needs, “…if you add more duties and responsibilities for internet service 
providers, you run the risk of their not providing as robust a service to consumers as 
consumers want in this country.”371 The Minister of Heritage, James Moore adds to 
Clement’s testimony and signals the unity within the Harper cabinet on notice-and-notice,  
Service providers also have a responsibility to participate and must participate in the 
“notice and notice” regime that is part of this legislation as well, to help engage in the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. This is an obligation that this legislation 
imposes on them to join with us, with all Canadians, in stepping up and confronting 
those who are doing the infringing.372 
These two arguments together, that notice-and-takedown would hurt consumers and ISPs 
are already doing enough to combat piracy, ultimately carried through the remaining two 
years in the legislative process and The Copyright Modernization achieved Royal Assent 
in 2012 with notice-and-notice intact. The strength of united Harper government 
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appeared to win out over intense opposition from creative industry associations, large 
rights holding corporations, and their allies in Parliament.  
Who were the actors who sought to influence parliament on notice-and-notice, 
what arguments, rationales, and discourses did they use to justify their positions and what 
were the responses that characterized the debate? Here, I account for the coalitions that 
together sought to align Canada more closely to the United States and those that 
advocated for the uniquely Canadian solution of notice-and-notice. 
Actors and Arguments 
Two distinct groups of actors emerged from the debates on C-32: those pushing 
for the adoption of the U.S. model of notice-and-takedown, where ISPs were required to 
remove targeted content immediately, and those that argued in support of the current 
Canadian standard, notice-and-notice (see figure 7.2). The notice-and-takedown group 
was made up of a disparate collection of artists’ organizations, software companies, 
entertainment companies, businesses associations, and lawyers, all closely aligned in 
their advocacy for stricter copyright protections. But, given the importance of copyright 
to cultural policy in Canada, a key constituency in this group of anti-notice-and-notice 
advocates are identified as Canadian artists, creators, and the cultural community. The 
testimony and submitted briefs that advocated for notice-and-takedown are important to 
examine, given what they can tell us about how the U.S. standard of notice-and-takedown 
is understood and framed by Canadian copyright industries and how the privatization of 
regulation has been debated in this national context. The openness of the process and the 
transparency of the legislative record sits as an example of one public debate over the 
validity and efficacy of U.S. law.  
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 Telecommunication and Platform Intermediaries, appearing under 
the Business Coalition for a Balanced Copyright: 
o Telus 
o Rogers  
o Bell 
o Yahoo!  
o Google Inc. 
o Tucows 
o Canadian Association of Internet Providers 
o Shaw Communications  
 Lawyers and Advocates 
o Michael Geist, University of Ottawa  
o Russel McOrmond  
o Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic  
 Government Authorities and Agencies 
o The Department of Industry 
o The Minister of Canadian Heritage and Culture 
Anti-Notice-and-Notice 
 Canadian Media Production Association 
 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada 
 The Creator’s Copyright Coalition 
 Union des Artists 
 Canadian Recording Industry Association 
 Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association 
 IATSE 
 Business Software Alliance 
 Artisti 
 Olé 
 Société québécoise de gestion collective des droits de 
reproduction (COPIBEC) 
Middle Ground 
 Entertainment Software Association of Canada 
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The pro notice-and-takedown group argued that nothing short of notice-and-
takedown was viable. To them notice-and-notice was not just ineffective, but a fake 
policy that offered only the mirage of protection. Comments focused on the simplicity of 
notices that foreclosed any potential for real enforcement. In effect, rightsholders argued 
that notice-and-notice is a government subsidy for intermediaries to profit from piracy. 
And, therefore, it is immoral for intermediaries to get away with such little obligation. 
The solution would include an immediate takedown requirement, as this is the best tool 
for protecting revenues on open networks.  
In her testimony, one of Canada’s most famous recording artists, Loreena 
McKennitt and founder of the recording label Quinlan Road Limited questions the 
morality of the Tariff 22 decision that codified intermediaries as mere conduits.  
I believe the ISPs and the website owners should most certainly play a significant 
role in the management of that content that passes through their hands and be 
accountable for that...after all, it is these companies who are making their profits 
off the eyeballs that are driven to their site to access illegal content.373 
In alignment with McKennit, Olé, Canada’s largest full-service music publishers 
argued in their brief to the C-32 committee, “[C-32] provides no viable tools to allow 
creators and rightsholders to be fairly compensated…notice-and-notice…absolv[es] ISPs 
from any real responsibility.”374 In turn, Reynolds Mastin, counsel for the Canadian 
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Media Production Coalition argued, “We think it's important that there be an equitable 
process, but we also believe that a notice and notice regime does not provide the deterrent 
that we need for serial infringers.”375 Few comments in this group recognized the 
potential externalities of immediate takedowns. And most framed their arguments on the 
benefits of quick enforcement. The Union des artistes, Artisti, of Quebec, argued that 
immediate takedown would limit losses from piracy, but omits any discussion regarding 
the implications of the means of enforcement, 
The creation of such a requirement [notice-and-takedown] would have the benefit 
of giving rights holders real ways to stop infringements and do so quickly. Indeed, 
in many cases, early intervention, rather than a simple notice system whose 
effectiveness depends on the willingness of the copyright infringer, could severely 
limit the economic damage caused to the rights holder whose creation is found 
illegally on the Internet.376 
Implicit to these arguments are differing positions on the rights of users to due 
process verus the faith in the rightsholders’ allegation of infringement. Rightsholders here 
argue for a system that places that trust in the submitter of the notice – the artist 
themselves, the association, or publishing company that owns the copyright. In a 
privatized system, such as notice-and-takedown these for-profit entities are the arbiters of 
legality. Their decisions must consider free expression rights, moral rights of the author, 
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and fair dealing (fair use in the U.S.). Members of parliament from both major parties 
questioned the legality of this proposal in the Canadian context. In a hearing on bill C-32, 
Conservative MP Mike Lake (Edmonton) pressed this point,  
In [notice-and-takedown] there's no proof of infringement; you just ask for it to be 
taken down, and it has to be taken down regardless of whether there's 
infringement or not…. We do live in a country where due process is important…. 
You can't live in a world where we automatically take things down. It doesn't 
work that way.377 
MP Lake as well as other MPs addressed this relationship between consumers’ rights, 
free expression, and due process throughout questioning. Questions revolved around the 
relativity of justice in the digital environment. MPs and the pro notice-and-notice 
coalition argued that it is not just to automatically remove content without proof of 
infringement. However, rightsholders argued that, given the level of mass infringement, 
due process cannot be expected. Fundamental to their argument was trust in the 
rightsholder’s judgement. Helene Messier of Société Québécoise de Gestion Collective 
des Droits de Reproduction (COPIBEC) argued on this point, 
Do you really believe that creators and copyright owners have so much time on 
their hands that they will spend it sending out unnecessary notices? In my 
opinion, if they take the trouble to report a possible infringement, it's because they 
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have serious suspicions… People do not just get up one morning and decide to 
send out dozens of notices for no reason.378 
MPs also questioned rightsholders on users’ rights to contest a takedown. Geoff Regan, 
liberal MP from Halifax also pressed rightsholders on this issue,  
One of the worries I have is that you have a small player who is a user or 
whatever and who has put up something that is allegedly infringing…. someone 
claims it's infringing. If you have notice to take down, the ISP has to take it 
down…rather than the person who's put it up having the chance to defend 
himself.379  
 Key to the rightsholders’ arguments are the practical and infrastructural 
differences between the analog and the digital environment. Rightsholders argued that the 
volume of infringement made due process unrealistic. While MPs Lake and Regan 
questioned the legal justification for limiting due process in the digital environment. In 
questioning, Robert D’Eith of the Canadian Independent Music Association, argued what 
a number of cultural industry representatives were unwilling or unable to say.  
We believe that there should be some due process. What we don't believe is that 
it's practical to expect it. There are literally millions of infringements every day 
on the Internet—millions. Are we going to have to start millions of lawsuits 
because of the notice-and-notice provision?380  
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Advocates for Notice-and-Notice 
 The pro notice-and-notice group included user’s rights advocates, lawyers, 
Canadian ISPs, and members of the Harper cabinet. This coalition appeared share a 
common set of arguments on notice-and-notice, but clearly had a different set of positions 
in regard to digital policy. Despite their institutional differences, their arguments were 
closely aligned around this central point – notice-and-notice is an effective deterrent and 
notice-and-takedown would be too intrusive. Once and end-user receives a notice that 
includes a threat of fines, they themselves will remove their post from the hosting 
platform and stop posting copyrighted content. Underlying this argument are a number of 
broader viewpoints that relate to both existing case law and previous statute. First, the pro 
notice-and-notice group argued that the user should have the right to leave their content 
live and intermediaries should not have the requirement to takedown content immediately 
i.e., there should be a version of due process built into the law. Second, a court should be 
the ultimate arbiter of legality, not a private individual artist or an institutional 
rightsholder. Third, the user has a right to informational privacy and the rightsholder 
should not have access to their identity, until a court releases their identifying 
information. Fourth, intermediaries are already doing their part and there is no need to 
require them to do more. Notice-and-notice does require them to take responsibility, as 
they must invest resources in compliance. Finally, a number of witnesses were also 
aligned in their disapproval of the U.S. model on both privacy and free expression 
grounds, but also in terms of its intrusiveness of the end-user.  
 
16 (2012), http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-1/CC11/meeting-5/evidence (last visited 
Oct 1, 2018). 
 194 
 Professor Michael Geist, of the University of Ottawa and Canada’s leading expert 
on digital copyright and users’ rights argued that notice-and-takedown lacked the privacy 
protections that are required by Canadian law. And he went further justify his position 
based, in part, on the experience of notice-and-takedown in the United States. He places 
the Canadian standard in direct opposition to the U.S. model, in terms of users’ rights.  
I think the approach that the bill takes on notice and notice is one through which 
there is responsibility on the part of the ISP…. what it does is look at the 
experience in other jurisdictions and try to strike the appropriate balance so that 
there are remedies for rights holders and appropriate privacy and other protections 
for users.381 
Professor Geist’s testimony focused on the implications for the users’ rights, 
while the technologist Russel Mc Ormond, directly addressed the question of 
privatization of enforcement and the morality of intermediaries as decision makers. This 
is one of the few references in the C-32 hearings on this point. McOrmond’s position is in 
direct contrast to Ms. Messier’s in terms of who should be given the authority to judging 
infringement. In support of notice-and-notice, he argued,  
…intermediaries should not be in the position of judging whether or not 
something is a copyright violation. It's not a simple yes or no. Most Canadians, 
most ISPs, are not lawyers, and nor do all lawyers agree on what is and is not an 
infringement.382 
 
381 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons., Legislative Committee on Bill C-32: December 1, 2010, Bill 
C-32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, Evidence of Proceedings. Num. 5, 3rd Session, 40th Parliament. 
6 (2010), http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/40-3/CC32/meeting-5/evidence (last visited Oct 
1, 2018). 
382 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons., Legislative Committee on Bill C-32: March 8, 2011, Bill C-
32, An Act to amend the Copyright Act, Evidence of Proceedings. Num. 17, 3rd Session, 40th Parliament. 6 
 195 
Telecommunication Industry Coalitions 
 During the 19th committee hearing on C-32, the representatives and lawyers for 
the Canadian ISPs, TELUS, Bell, Rogers, and Shaw Communications all testified in 
favor of notice-and-notice. Their testimony includes a number of arguments regarding the 
appropriate role of the state and of corporate authority in terms of policing digital 
networks. There arguments mirrored those of user advocates who raised questions of 
privacy and freedom of expression. However, they emphasized the power and 
effectiveness of notice-and-notice and used their own data as evidence of efficacy. In 
alignment with the Minister of Industry, they cited the consumer’s interest in paying for 
services without the threat of a service denial or a takedown.383  
Craig McTaggart of TELUS argued that ISPs should not be working on behalf of 
rightsholders, “TELUS…encourages Parliament to arm rightsholders with effective tools 
to directly pursue those actively enable it [piracy]…”384 But, he went further to invoke a 
specific Canadian legal foundation for notice-and-notice. In addressing privatization, he 
asserts the role of the courts and the specifically Canadian resistance to the privatization 
of legal authority. He argued, “ISPs cannot be put in a position of having to decide 
whether content should be taken down…Under Canadian legal values, only a court can 
determine whether a law has been broken.”385 Pam Dinsmore of Rogers, citing Rogers’ 
own data of notices and user activity claims, “the notice and notice routine is effective at 
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discouraging those people who are alleged to have infringed—only alleged to have 
infringed—from infringing again. We think it does put the fear of God into them and it is 
effective in doing that.”386 Ms. Dinsmore was questioned further by Sherbrooke MP 
Serge Cardin on why notice-and-takedown is undue interference on customers’ activities. 
She responds, “The courts have to determine, with the information put forward by the 
rights holder, whether that alleged infringer actually is infringing…we are not in a 
position to make that decision.387 
Over one year later, during the testimony on bill C-11, Jean Brazeau of Shaw 
Communications invoked the rights and needs of the consumer to critique the 
intrusiveness of the U.S. approach. In regard to notice-and-notice, he argues,  
We certainly think that notice and notice is a far less intrusive means to ensure 
that the government achieves its policy objective…. The response by the 
customers to those measures would be significantly negative. I think the measure 
is somewhat too draconian.”388  
Ultimately it is this argument that most addressed the interest of the Harper government. 
This theme, of the consumer’s rights is echoed in the testimony of the Minister of 
Heritage and Culture and the Minister of Industry at the very opening of the legislative 
committee on bill C-32.389  
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ISPs, member of the Harper cabinet, and representatives from platform 
intermediaries argued that any move to adopt the U.S.-model of notice-and-takedown 
would conflict with the possibilities and options for customers. This framing, of users as 
customers, connected rights – the right to due process and free expression – to the needs 
of paying clients, clients that were fueling the growth of Canada’s digital economy. 
Representatives of telecommunication and platform companies went further to argue that 
privatized enforcement has the potential to restrict innovation by limiting the construction 
of certain business models for hosted content. But testimony also reveals that these 
intermediaries had a particular aversion to the requirement that they monitor and police 
their own networks. These activities could not only prove to be expensive and potentially 
expose them to litigation, it appeared that the integrity of their brands were at stake. 
Innovation, customers’ needs and therefore, the brand story of internet providers and 
platform companies are in conflict with extra-judicial takedowns, limiting access, and 
threatening users. These interests led to broad coalition of users’ rights groups and 
powerful corporate actors that advocated against immediate takedowns and objected to 
government policies that required self-enforcement on the part of platforms, as 
requirement of safe harbors. Much like the Anti-SOPA coalitions in the United States in 
2012 and the ACTA protests in the E.U., platform intermediaries joined with user 
advocates to argue in favor of a solution that limited the rightsholders ability to automate 
the limitations on access and more adequately protected users’ rights.  
Representatives from Canadian ISPs and content intermediaries were nearly 
united on these points. In testimony to the C-11 committee, Jacob Glick, counsel for 
Google Canada equates a takedown with an injunction and raises the question of 
 198 
rightsholder power. Glick reframes a takedown notice as “lawyer’s letter” that gives the 
rightsholder the power of an injunction with a mere letter. Key to argument is the 
question of the contextual circumstances of the legal action. An injunction in the analog 
context, according to Glick requires judicial action. Glick argues that there is no legal 
difference in the analog and the digital context, i.e., an allegation of infringement 
shouldn’t be enough for an injunction in either context. He argues,  
You get the power of an injunction, which under law in normal circumstances is 
an exceptional legal remedy. So, you get the power of an injunction on an 
allegation in the lawyer's letter. That has proven to be problematic on a number of 
occasions…that provides a lot of opportunity for mischief and stifling of free 
expression.”390 
Therefore, to Glick notice-and-notice is not only a sufficient remedy for 
rightsholders it is more protective freedom of expression and limits the potential for 
overreach and abuse. Throughout the testimony, this point was held up as the cornerstone 
of the uniquely Canadian approach.  
The Digital Economy Discourse 
From what can be seen, MPs from different parties favored compliance with the 
WIPO treaties, liability protection for intermediaries, and protections for cultural works 
(as has been the case in a number of jurisdictions), however the record also reveals the 
stated goal of avoiding the United States’ policy program through an independent and 
nationally relevant digital policy. Lines of questioning and arguments made by MPs and 
 
390 Canada. Parliament. House of Commons., Legislative Committee on Bill C-11: March 1, 2012, Bill C-
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cabinet officials include references to a Canadian solution that stood up in the midst of 
international pressure. And, despite that pressure, Canadian officials, in collaboration 
with internet service providers, created their own version of an intermediary liability law, 
as they asserted the government’s right to sovereignty in the area of copyright. In a 
speech to the House of Commons in October of 2011, The Minister of Heritage declared 
Canada’s independence in this area, “Canadian Internet service providers have developed 
a unique model...The bill formalizes this practice into law. We disagree with the 
American approach with regard to copyright...for very good reason.”391 
The bill’s sponsors and other officials connected the Canadian policy program 
directly with the government’s digital economy strategy. Together, they appear to say 
that the growth and development of Canada’s digital economy is predicated on set of 
digital laws that are uniquely Canadian. In the Speech from the Thone on March 3rd, 
2010, to open the 3rd session of the 40th Parliament, Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of 
Canada couples Canada’s digital economic growth with copyright reforms on a national 
level.  
To fuel the ingenuity of Canada's best and brightest and bring innovative products 
to market… [our Government] will launch a digital economy strategy to drive the 
adoption of new technology across the economy. To encourage new ideas and 
protect the rights of Canadians whose research, development and artistic 
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creativity contribute to Canada's prosperity, our Government will also strengthen 
laws governing intellectual property and copyright.392 
To Jean, Canadian consumers and technology companies are the center of the 
strategy for growing the national digital economy. The stated strategy of the state protects 
the Canadian consumer’s rights to due process and privacy while also protecting 
intermediaries from copyright liability. The end result of the Copyright Modernization 
Act is to give Canadian telecom companies and intermediaries an advantage over the 
intermediaries in other jurisdictions who face more heavy-handed enforcement 
obligations. Throughout the hearings on C-32 and C-11, Canadian officials and MPs 
repeatedly signaled their interest in providing Canadian intermediaries with that 
advantage. The state’s interest, in this case, is to provide benefits for intermediaries – 
protection of the consumer’s personal privacy and a low burden for safe harbors. They 
are released from both the actual cost of managing takedowns and the legal exposure to 
freedom of expression cases, while also overreaching into the lives and online activities 
of their customers. In this outcome, in fact, there is no incentive for them to overreach, to 
over-block to avoid liability. In the context of E.U. and U.S. statutes that do not provide 
those benefits, Canadian platform intermediaries are operating under a highly beneficial 
legal framework, while still taking responsibility and having obligations in regard to 
copyright enforcement. This one claim is asserted and is unquestioned throughout the 
government’s testimony: limiting liability fosters private investment in the internet and 
that benefits all Canadians. 
 
392 Canada. Parliament., Speech from the Throne to open the Third Session Fortieth Parliament of Canada 
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Government officials from the department of industry and the department of 
Heritage deployed the discourse of the digital economy throughout the different channels 
of testimony, including debates, speeches, and submitted briefs. The vision of the thriving 
Canadian digital economy implies that a prosperous Canadian society can built similarly 
on the levels of wealth and investment that are evident south of the border. Reminiscent 
of discourses of the cultural economy or even the innovation economy, the digital 
economy focuses our attention on what private venture capital and innovation can do for 
us, but also leaves behind or diminishes the importance of updating legal and policy 
frameworks to foster more traditional creative industries such as film, television, and 
music. These are both encompassed by the digital and also excluded from policy 
priorities in the pre-platform era. The digital economy discourse also connects to the 
Canadian government’s nationalist agenda to foster a trajectory of independently 
generated technology development as well asserting its political sovereignty to control its 
own legal structures for both intellectual property and digital rights. In the end, the digital 
economy promises nearly all needs and constituencies will be satisfied, birthing a society 
where entrepreneurs can foster growth, artists can thrive, and Canada can maintain its 
position as a middle-power status. 
The Balanced Copyright Discourse 
Advocates on both sides of the debates over the Copyright Modernization Act 
invoked the metaphor of balance to represent their positions in a positive frame. In terms 
of copyright, balance is often coupled with fairness to construct a narrative that positions 
the opposing policy position as unfair and elevates the proposed position as the solution 
to that unfairness. Balance identifies a middle ground where all stakeholders can find 
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partial satisfaction in their interests, but alas everyone had to compromise to the 
reasonable middle. Balance implies the benefit as balance itself–a good goal for a 
democratic society to achieve as it seeks to build a better democratic system. In other 
words, democracy has reached an efficacious end when a balanced process that includes 
all voices leads to a balanced outcome for those actors and the state. The United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) has invoked balance in its proposal for limitations and 
exceptions in the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but stopped short 
of requiring that national laws actually achieve that balance as a condition for their 
membership.393 The Canadian supreme court has specifically referred to the balance of 
creator’s rights and other interests–including innovation and users rights–in its opinions 
on a number of copyright cases.394 But, the Canadian court’s clarity on whose interests 
are being balanced constructs the tent under which the stakeholders sit. Without that 
clarity, balance could include only corporate interests, as in the balance between 
platforms and content producers, or could include a balance between users’ rights and 
independent producers. Copyright statutes often are the result of prolonged negotiations 
between powerful industrial coalitions. In turn, the length and intensity of these 
negotiations are the narrative substance that is presented to argue for the fairness of the 
policy solution reached, despite who was, or who was not provided a voice in the process. 
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This was the case in the hearings regarding the limitations and exemptions provisions of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.395  
We can say that the meaning of balance in terms of whose rights are being 
balanced and how the balance will be measured and defined is contingent on the 
positionality and identity of the person who is labeling a policy outcome or a policy 
process as balanced. At times the balance discourse appears to be a watered down and 
shallow descriptor deployed to justify the passage of the Act, but in other cases, the 
notion of balance is connected to the structural power of the actors whose needs are in 
play. When situated in fairness frame, the “fair balance” can reference the political power 
that each party has inherently to protect its own interests–thereby giving the notion of 
balance some political substance. Spencer Keys of the Canadian Alliance of Student 
Associations, in their testimony to the legislative committee on bill C-32 in December of 
2010 assessed balance on the imbalance of economic power in the copyright system, 
“Yes, it is a fair balance, particularly because in this country you're not generally talking 
about individuals. You're talking about licensing collectives who absolutely have the 
capability to challenge the courts on behalf of individuals.”396 Keys did not specifically 
mention notice-and-notice, as their concern was focused on fair use rules that affect 
educational applications. But their testimony serves to deconstruct the fallacy of the 
balance discourse itself, a discourse that negates power differences by reducing each 
stakeholder to an equal player in the policy field. Keys implicitly asks what balance can 
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be achieved when the stakeholders in question have the legal resources to sue for 
infringement and students (and users) are left with few options to afford representation to 
contest takedowns or cease and desist letters (in educational cases).397 
Discussion 
The state’s interest in the digital copyright policy program is based, in-part, on the 
need to create a favorable legal environment for venture capital investment to support the 
domestic growth of platform intermediaries.398 Canada’s digital economy is growing 
rapidly and highly concentrated. Digital advertising revenues grew from $3.8 billion in 
2014 to $6.7 billion in 2017 with revenues are concentrated in two major players, Google 
and Facebook.399 While mobile broadband adoption in Canada is lower than many other 
OECD countries, wired internet adoption is comparatively higher. Subscription revenues 
from wireline broadband have climbed from $1.8 billion in 2000 to $10.2 billion in 
2017400 and are concentrated in the three major Canadian providers: Rogers, Telus, and 
Bell. Throughout public testimony, representatives from these technology companies and 
the business coalitions they comprise have pointed to the legal structures that they say 
must be in place for their businesses to operate – with limited exposure to copyright 
liability in a predictable and disciplined marketplace. Without these protections and 
standardization, they argue, their businesses are strained and the legal terrain is 
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uncertain.401 And in turn, a favorable legal environment that limits liability and reduces 
the costs of compliance will lead to further tech investment.402 The adoption and 
implementation of notice-and-notice in Canada suggests that some state actors, both in 
parliament and regulatory agencies are creating broader policy programs to foster private 
investment in platform technologies. In turn, these regulators have been more responsive 
to the influence of platform technology companies (those that are based in Canada and in 
the U.S.) than to the lobbying efforts of the entertainment industries and cultural 
interests.403 
But the Canadian government has other competing interests in regard to internet 
policy – beyond its domestic platform economy. And the government has been subject to 
other coalitions of powerful and influential actors. While the state fosters investment in 
the digital economy, the film, music, and video game industries are also critical and 
growing sectors of the Canadian economy and important both to the export market and to 
Canadian heritage. For example, the music industry in Canada has gone through a 
profound transition in recent years, one that has mirrored the changes seen around the 
world in the past five years. While revenues from recorded music have declined, 
revenues from publishing, and internet distribution have grown alongside concerts and 
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performances. Total music industry revenues in Canada reached $2 billion in 2015 and 
revenues from internet and mobile delivery nearly doubled in 2016.404 
While Canada is a net importer of cultural products, copyright reform has 
historically been an important component of cultural policy.405 As such, leading 
companies within the domestic film, music, and video game industries support strong 
protections for copyright in the digital environment and have sought to limit exceptions 
and increase enforcement. And the Canadian government has historically supported the 
domestic film industries through tax incentives and direct investment, much which 
attracted Hollywood studios to produce films in Canada.406 
As in many jurisdictions, national copyright policy is also a matter of 
international agreements and the various forces of policy diffusion that are involved in 
matters that impact trading partners around the globe. As such, some MPs and 
government officials stressed the importance of maintaining Canada’s reputation as a 
trading partner with other neoliberal states and multilateral coalitions. Discourses of 
modernization, then, reflected previous waves of global legal reforms that are driven by 
the state’s interest in a positive international reputation amongst capitalist states, abiding 
by the norms407 established in multilateral free trade negotiations, internet governance, 
and copyright agreements, such as the Berne convention. Historically, the Canadian 
government has oscillated in its allegiance to the norms established international 
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agreements.408 Digital copyright laws that limit liability for internet intermediaries and 
create safe harbors laws have been included in a number of U.S.-led free trade 
agreements and have been established in multiple jurisdictions through the 
implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) internet 
treaties.409 During the debates of copyright reform, from 2010 to 2012, Canada was in 
negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and, as leaked drafts suggest, Canadian 
and United States negotiators disagreed over the proposed framework for digital 
copyright.410 However, until 2012, Canada had not implemented the WIPO treaties and, 
as the legislative record indicates, reputation in Canada’s international community is a 
key driver for policy action to protect intermediaries from liability.411 
Thirdly, maintaining consistency of democratic norms in the digital environment 
and adhering to free expression principles are also competing interests of Canadian 
officials that are driving a digital copyright policy program. The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Supreme Court opinions on digital copyright have 
provided the backdrop for the position of some state actors in the debates over the 
Copyright Modernization Act.412 Democracy can be fostered or hindered by internet 
policies that fight piracy or attempts to filter or block content of any type. Certainly, 
policies that lead to blocking or filtering content or release the identity of users can be 
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designed in ways that are counter to democratic norms, especially when they are 
implemented without public oversight. It is precisely in area of digital copyright that the 
state’s role is defined in the digital environment vis-à-vis the user’s rights, such as 
freedom of expression.413 This broad debate between freedom of expression and 
copyright has been a focus in the debates over digital copyright in Canada.  
Public debates reveal the influence of internet rights groups in this area and 
suggests the significance of dramatic public conflicts in Europe over the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and in the U.S. in over the Stop Online Piracy 
Act (SOPA).414 The Copyright Modernization Act of 2012 addresses a broad range of 
digital copyright and most have some relation to democratic norms. But notice-and-notice 
specifically relates to the user’s ability to contest a takedown and the power that 
platforms have to immediately and automatically remove hosted content. The state’s 
interest in digital democracy appears to lie here, with those actors that are calling for the 
application of free expression norms in the digital environment, rather than only the 
material interests of competing economic coalitions. In fact, Geist, in his assessment sees 
a groundswell of grassroots citizen action as the key factor that shaped the Copyright 
Modernization Act. In contrast to the debates that occurs in the late 1990's and early 
2000's when public interest and involvement in copyright issues were quite minimal, the 
negotiations leading up the Copyright Modernization Act included wide public 
consultation. This public involvement was facilitated by the government, but only 
because of the concerted advocacy calling for more openness. Mass protests regarding 
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digital rights and the exponential rise of political organizing on social media are also 
cited as evidence of increased participation of the public in digital policy. According to 
Geist, there is reason to believe that user's rights have at least matched (if not overtaken) 
the political weight of corporate actors in the entertainment and digital industries.415 
Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented an investigation of the politics of Canada’s law for 
copyright safe harbors, notice-and-notice. The chapter begins with a description of how 
notice-and-notice functions and how it compares to § 512 of the DMCA, emphasizing the 
significance of the Canadian model as a legal outlier that is vastly more protective of 
users’ rights than U.S. or E.U. law. The statutory history and the case law in Canada that 
led to the Copyright Modernization Act also was reviewed. The remaining sections 
presented an analysis of the policy-making discourses that led to notice-and-notice with 
descriptions of the actors involved, the arguments presented, and the discourses that made 
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CHAPTER VIII: 
THE POLITICS OF ARTICLE 17 IN THE E.U.: AUTOMATED FILTERING AND 
THE FUTURE OF NOTICE AND STAY-DOWN 
Introduction 
The European Union adopted Article 17 of the new Directive on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market in 2018, which requires automated filtering for user-generated 
violations of copyright,416 which sits alongside intermediary liability provisions of the 
eCommerce Directive (ECD)417 and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).418 In 
so doing, the E.U. established a new international standard for far stricter limitations on 
liability than U.S. law. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of intermediary 
liability provisions in U.S. and E.U. law, as well as the legislative discourse that has 
accompanied the adoption and modification of these laws in the E.U. The following 
research questions are addressed: What are the leading arguments for and against reform 
and how are those arguments tied to institutional interests? Who are the various actors – 
including state agencies, industry coalitions, and civil society groups – that have 
influenced the reform processes in the E.U. and the U.S.? How have the conflicts in the 
debate over safe harbors been expressed in discourses and what discourses have been 
used to support reform? To answer these questions, I analyze relevant laws in the E.U., 
recent legislative proposals, and the legislative discourse surrounding these (proposed) 
laws. 
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 Article 17 of the DSMD419 is perhaps the most legally significant reform of 
intermediary liability law in over two decades. The DMCA in the U.S. and the E.U.’s 
eCommerce Directive (ECD) established the legal standard of notice-and-takedown. As 
described above, notice-and-takedown requires rightsholders to send a notice of 
infringement each time that a user makes unlicensed copy available online. As numerous 
legal decisions have established, platforms do not have a duty to monitor all the traffic on 
their network for infringing posts. Knowledge of infringement is created on the receipt of 
a valid notice. Article 17 replaces this notice-and-takedown system with a notice-and-
stay-down system. In practice, a notice-and-stay-down system obligates a platform to 
remove all instances of unlicensed work on their network, once an original notice has 
been received that refers to a single infringement. In other words, platforms are obligated 
to monitor all user activity in order to keep unlicensed copies of a specified work off their 
networks. The rightsholder does not need to send a notice for each instance of 
infringement, just one notice of the first instance that a user has posted a particular song, 
photo, or film clip. From that point forward, the platform is obligated to prevent any 
future uploads of that work. Knowledge of all future infringements in created by that 
original notice. Platforms are therefore required, de facto, to implement automated 
filtering technologies to maintain protection from copyright liability.420   
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Argument: The E-Commerce Directive is no longer fit for purpose  
 The European Commission (EC) published two documents in 2016 after the 
completion of the Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, 
Online Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative Economy.421 
The first summarized the responses to the consultation and the second that analyzed them 
for EC lawmakers. Both the summary and the analysis were created by contractors or EC 
staff and both included data analyzed from responses that were not made publicly 
available. In regard to the initial question of the e-Commerce’s directive and its fitness 
for purpose in the current marketplace, the summary published by the EC framed the 
debate as one between rightsholders and all other stakeholders. According to the 
summary, rightsholders and argued that Article IV of the e-Commerce Directive (ECD) 
does not provide enough incentive to platforms to expeditiously remove copyrighted 
content. Many other stakeholders, including platforms and other business associations, 
argued that the ECD limited users’ rights because it did not have a sufficient requirement 
and provision for a user to contest a take-down. In these reports, the range of debate was 
often defined as copyright protection versus the protection of users' expression rights. 
There is another debate that is also evident with the responses of stakeholders to 
this question of the “fitness” of the notice and takedown provisions of the ECD. The 
submissions here reveal competing arguments over the role of the state in the platform 
economy of 2015. Stakeholders debated the proper role of self-regulation in 2015 versus 
2000. Some argued it was still best for government to take a light-touch to regulation and 
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to incentivize self-regulation. Others argued that the current platform economy was so 
different that 2000, that government should now mandate self-policing.   
§ 230 of the Communication Decency Act (CDA), § 512 of the DMCA, and e-
Commerce Directive are based on the idea that governments should incentivize self-
policing of illegal or harmful content. Under this legal philosophy, mandating self-
policing would stifle innovation and slow the speed of economic development. At the 
core of this regulatory theory is the notion that the internet economy is different. This 
idea, called internet exceptionalism, is the principle that internet technologies, in order to 
thrive, require a different communications law framework than analog communications. 
U.S. lawmakers codified this philosophy in the prologue to CDA 230. The ECD is 
founded on the same principle - the role of the state is to incentivize self-policing, not to 
require it.  
The question of “fitness” of the ECD asks respondents to assess changes in the 
marketplace over time and make a qualitative judgement - does this philosophy that 
guided a light-touch to regulation still hold in 2015? In the answer to these questions 
regarding the fitness of the ECD, many rightsholders argued that the digital economy has 
changed and the ECD is no longer fit for purpose (see figure 8.1).  
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Figure 8.1. Stakeholders Arguments on the Fitness of the e-Commerce Directive 
The ECD Has Proven Fit for Purpose  
 Industry Associations Representing Platforms: 
o The Internet Association 
o Tech-Net 
o The European eCommerce and Omni Channel Trade Association 
(EMOTA) 
o EDiMA 
o Digital Europe  
 ICT Industry Associations  
o Finnish Federation for Communications and Teleinformatics 
(FiCom) 
o Nederland ICT 
o Information Technology Industry Council (ITI) 
o EuroISPA 
 Consumer Electronics Industry Associations  
o Orgalime, The European Engineering Industries Association 
 ICT Service Providers 
o Orange (France)  
 Digital Rights NGO 
o Open Media 
 Think Tanks and Research Groups  
o OpenForum Europe 
o International Center for Law and Economics 
 Platform Companies 
o Facebook 
 Legal Experts 
o Daphne Keller, Stanford Law School 
 General Business Federations  
o BusinessEurope 
 
The ECD is No Longer Fit for Purpose 
 Rightsholder Associations 
o Independent Music Companies Association (IMPALA) 
o VG Bild-Kunst (Germany) 
o Irish Music Rights Organization (IMRO) 
o European Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers 
(GESAC)  
 Broadcast Trade Association  
o The European Association of Television and Radio Sales Houses 
(EGTA) 
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Associations 
o European Brands Association (AIM) 
o Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) 
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To this coalition of stakeholders, internet service providers that needed safe 
harbors in 2000 are (were?) so fundamentally different than the internet platforms of 
2015 that new regulation is needed protect the public, and rightsholders from harm. In 
regard to copyright, the rightsholders argued that any site that is the business of 
facilitating access to cultural content, that aggregates cultural content for users, and that 
indexes cultural products – even though that content is uploaded by a third party – should 
be now be regulated as a publisher. On the other hand, intermediaries and other 
stakeholders held that the e-commerce Directive had proven itself effective over time at 
serving the needs of both rightsholders and intermediaries and was best suited to continue 
working – in a future-proof and technologically neutral fashion. 
In their contribution to the consultation, FiCom, the Finnish Federation for 
Communications and Teleinformatics, who represents the ICT industry in Finland wrote, 
“The existing liability framework is…well established, highly functional, …and serves 
the needs of the rightsholders and the practical needs of providers of information society 
services.”422 Other technology industry groups echoed the commitment to the ECD over 
time. Orgalime, the European Engineering Industries Association, who represents 42 
trade federations representing the mechanical, electrical, electronic, metalworking & 
metal articles industries of 24 European countries, also argued e-Commerce directive is 
currently functional and question the need to re-regulate. They wrote, “as to the question 
of liability of online intermediaries, Articles 12 to 15 of the e-commerce Directive 
(2000/31/EC) already regulate liability of Internet service providers. Therefore, there is 
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no need for specific provisions for platforms.”423 The French mobile communications 
company Orange, in one of the few publicly available contributions from a corporate 
policy office, wrote “[the] current rules contained in the…e-Commerce directive still 
remain relevant.”424 The technology thinktank OpenForum Europe also saw no need for 
changes to notice and takedown framework. They wrote, “The e-commerce directive has 
proved its worth.”425 And, The Information Technology Industry Council, a tech industry 
lobbying group based in Washington DC questioned the justification for European 
Commission’s interest in reform, “the Commission provides no significant evidence that 
that such entities engage in harmful conduct that is not already addressed by existing 
regulatory frameworks.”426 Other platform companies and technology industry groups, 
such as The Internet Association, Tech-Net, The European eCommerce and Omni 
Channel Trade Association (EMOTA), EDiMA, Nederland ICT, EuroISPA, Digital 
Europe, and Facebook all echoed these arguments and all claimed that the e-Commerce 
Directive remains appropriate, has been proven effective and is well established. (see 
figure 8.1). 
A coalition of entertainment industry rightsholders, retail companies, and 
broadcasters all took the opposite stance on the question of fitness of the ECD. They 
argued that the incentive-based system framework codified in the ECD was no longer 
relevant, ill-adapted to mass piracy and not intended to regulate the current platform 







business model is enough basis for reform. They wrote, “The safe harbour provisions of 
the ECD are no longer suitable for all the different business models which have emerged 
in the last 10-15 years.”427 The Irish Right Management Organization (IMRO) focused 
also on the comparison of industrial context between 2000 and 2015, “…at the time of 
the adoption of the ECD many of the services that now claim to be under Art 14 did not 
even exist. The intention was to address purely technical services…”428 The European 
Association of Television and Radio Sales Houses (EGTA) wrote that platforms that 
dominate the digital economy in the current period behave like broadcasters, so they 
should be exposed to the same liabilities, “It is therefore no longer relevant to award 
these particular services, which provide both passive and active services, with the liability 
exemptions…”429 (see figure 8.1). And the Business Coalition to Stop Counterfeiting and 
Piracy (BASCAP), a lobbying division of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
addressed the effectiveness of e-Commerce Directive over time. They wrote, “…we have 
a seen a shortfall or absence of pro-active measures by digital intermediaries to 
effectively deal with clear cases of illegal activity…the directive has not led to industry 
 
427 In their response IMRO includes a long list of new platforms and their business models as evidence that 
new regulation is needed. They write, “Platforms’ appear in different structures and technical typologies; 
for example where individual end-users upload content (UGC or professional promotion platforms, e.g; 
You Tube, Dailymotion, Soundcloud, MySpace), individual end-users post links to cultural content or post 
their own content to share with others in a social media environment (Facebook, Hyves, Twitter, Musicyou, 
Snapchat, etc) operators of the services select, aggregate and facilitate access to existing content on other 
websites and/or platforms through hyperlinking and/or embedding (TuneIn, iHeartRadio, NL FM, 6 
Seconds, UberRadios, OnLineTV Lite, etc.), some of which raising also moral rights issues (Bmusic, in 
Spain). operators develop software and dedicated search engines to find, index, list and access content 
(dedicated to certain type of cultural content such as books, images, videos, news and/or including cultural 
content as part of a general offer, e.g. Google, Yahoo, Bing, Qwant, etc.) recently there appeared 
application based services providing the technical facility to access cultural content available from other 
end-users’ devices through links that give direct access to cultural content (e.g. periscope,etc.).” 
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agreements and standards…”430 Other artists associations and anti-counterfeiting groups 
all agreed with this assessment that the ECD is outdated i.e., stricter regulation is now 
needed (see figure 8.1). 
Argument 2: EC should require stay-down 
 The EC’s Questionnaire addressed the question of a notice and stay-down 
mechanism in multiple ways and from multiple angles. The notice and “stay-down” 
mechanism, as opposed to notice and “takedown” requires the intermediary to remove all 
instances of the copyrighted content in question, once the notice has been received. 
Under notice and stay-down, the platform’s automated system is the arbiter of illegality. 
The algorithmic controls are designed to maximize the platform’s protection from 
liability. As legal researchers have shown, the algorithmic controls make mistakes, and 
their judgements are not easily contestable.431  
Under a notice-and-stay-down system, in order to receive the benefits of safe 
harbors, platforms have an obligation to monitor all activity on their networks for any 
instances of a protected work, once they are put on notice that an unauthorized copy has 
been posted by any user. In a notice and action system, it is designed to prevent the 
“whack-a-mole” problem, whereby pirate sites quickly re-upload the same content on a 
different URL, sending the notice-sender into a supposedly indefinite chase. A “stay-
down” system naturally leads large platforms to implement pro-active monitoring – the 
most efficient, albeit expensive, way to avoid liability. YouTube’s ContentID was one of 
the first such voluntary systems and is widely cited.432 The key question at hand in these 
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debates leading up to Article 17 is whether the government should statutorily require 
platforms to implement automated filtering system such as ContentID or should 
legislation merely incentivize self-policing through voluntary agreements (but stop short 
of a mandate).  
 The Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation summarized respondent answers 
to three questions that were relevant to stakeholders’ opinions on notice and stay-down: 
1. “Do you consider that different categories of illegal content require different policy 
approaches as regards notice-and-action procedures…?”; 2. “Should action taken by 
hosting service providers remain effective over time ("take down and stay-down" 
principle)?”; 3.“Do you see a need to impose specific duties of care for certain categories 
of illegal content?” 433  These questions, among others, elicited responses from 
stakeholders that reveal their opinions on the stay-down principle and on whether the EC 
should direct states to impose a duty to monitor. The next section will address which 
groups of stakeholders wrote that the EC should require a notice and stay-down 
mechanism on platforms and which stakeholders argued against a duty to monitor. The 
arguments used on both sides of this debate are outlined.  
 According to the Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation, those opposed to a 
duty to monitor argued that a notice and stay-down system was disproportionate, raises 
barriers to entry, is not technically feasible, undermines right to freedom of expression, 
would lead to general monitoring, would limit access to public domain, be costly for 
intermediaries, and would not distinguish between fair use and illegal uses. They also 
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argued that platforms should not be the arbiters of what is illegal. According to the 
synopsis, respondents made similar arguments against imposing duties of care, as the two 
questions were obviously similar and designed to address essentially the same issue. 
Those in favor of imposing a notice and stay-down system argued that the current notice 
and takedown system is costly to notice-senders and ineffective “in addressing large-
scale online piracy as most service-providers remove only specific URL links notified in 
the takedown notice.”434 
 A coalition of artist and publisher associations and anti-counterfeiting groups 
argued that regulation should require intermediaries to monitor (see figure 8.2). In 
opposition, a coalition of intermediaries, technology industry associations, and legal 
experts argued that intermediaries should not be arbiters of illegality. Not surprisingly, 
these alliances were similar to the coalitions that argued for and against the current fitness 
of the ECD’s notice and takedown framework.  
IMPALA, The European Association of Independent Music Labels, argued for 
reforms that mandated automated policing. They wrote, “…new rules should require 
online intermediaries to remove the notified file…and prevent re-uploading of the same 
file.” Two other rightsholder groups used similar language regarding the shift from 
incentivizing to requiring. FESI, a Sports Equipment Industry group argued, “FESI is of 
the opinion that an obligation to actively monitor in order to prevent future infringements 
is not per se contrary to [the e-Commerce Directive].”435 Anther anti-counterfeiting 
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organization with broader membership, The European Brands Association (AIM) argued 
that the duty of care principle inscribed in the e-Commerce Directive should apply to 
protecting consumer brands. AIM wrote, “The duty of care principle can be defined as 
the obligation for online platforms to act with diligence by taking any 
proactive…measures in order to protect consumers.”436 The Business Coalition to Stop 
Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP), the lobbying division of the International Chamber 
of Commerce argued that the E.U. must do more to protect businesses that rely 
intellectual property, including requiring a duty to monitor. BASCAP wrote, “Platforms 
should remove duplicates and be under a positive obligation (emphasis added) to prevent 
reposting of identical content infringements.”437 UK Music, a broad coalition of music 
industry groups argued that one notice should cover all instances of the work, i.e. a 
notification of the title is all that was needed to require any illegal posting of a work on a 
platform, “It needs to be clarified that the notification of a work triggers actual 
knowledge regarding the work itself…”438 The German artist association VG Bild-Kunst 
echoed this point, “…it should be clarified that the notice-and-action procedure for 
infringement of copyright protected works is a ‘notice and stay down’ procedure.”439 
Together, this coalition of anti-counterfeiting groups argued that the government’s role 
needed to change – from incentivizing self-policing and brokering voluntary agreements, 
to requiring automated filtering. The implications are not merely minor technical reforms 
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to existing law, but a paradigmatic shift of the state’s priorities in regard to the internet 
economy. 
Figure 8.2. Stakeholders Arguments on the Requirement of Notice and Stay-Down 
 
In response to these sets of questions regarding notice-and-stay-down and duties 
of care, intermediaries and allies in the technology industries argued that intermediaries 
should not be the lone arbiters of illegality. While few mention automated tools, they 
framed their responses around the potential harms that could come from requiring 
platforms to make legal decisions on the fly, whether those decisions are automated or 
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made manually. EuroISPA, which represents over 1800 internet service providers across 
Europe responded to the idea that duties of care should broadly apply to intermediaries, 
“…the intermediary should not be in a position whereby they have to assess which 
content is unlawful.”440 Digital Europe an association representing the consumer 
electronics industries framed their argument in terms of responsibility, “intermediaries 
should not be responsible for assessing if content is illegal or not.”441 Daphne Keller, an 
expert in intermediary liability law based at Stanford University in the United States, 
argued that requiring intermediaries to make legal decisions would incentivize 
censorship. She wrote, “Meaningful legal review of removal requests may simply not be 
a priority, or affordable, for many companies.”442 Finally, Facebook also argued to the 
Commission that the legal decisions in question are more complicated than rightsholders 
claim i.e., there may be legal uses for a copyrighted work and filtering on title alone 
disregards legal uses of a copyrighted work. Facebook wrote, “a user’s upload of 
copyrighted content may be…perfectly lawful…due to fair dealing, a licensing 
arrangement, or a host of other reasons. To impose a stay down obligation on 
intermediaries would automatically eliminate consideration of all these other reasons.”443   
Argument 3: Voluntary agreements are better than more regulation 
 Voluntary filtering measures are programs – both manual and automatic – that 
intermediaries put into place to search, identify, and remove harmful and illegal content 
from their networks. The most commonly understood example of this are the efforts that 
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social platforms put into place to remove child pornography. But many other types of 
posts are filtered as well – and many enforce platform-specific policies and codes of 
content. In regard to illegal content, the key characteristic of these filtering methods is 
that they are designed to go above and beyond what the law requires. In many cases, 
platforms are shielded by immunity laws such as § 230, but they filter anyway. It was in 
fact Congress’s intent to foster such a patchwork of self-designed and self-imposed good 
Samaritan practices on the part of internet companies. The good Samaritan clause in § 
230 allows platforms to legally remain passive intermediaries, even though they police 
their own networks. In the E.U., the law is not as clear on this question.  
The Commission’s questionnaire includes two questions regarding voluntary 
agreements and pro-active measures. They ask, “(For online intermediaries): Have you 
put in place voluntary or proactive measures to remove certain categories of illegal 
content from your system? Please describe them.”444 and “Could you outline the 
considerations that have prevented you from putting in place voluntary measures?”445 
The Commission did not provide examples of what they meant by voluntary measures 
and did not address the differences between automated and manual programs.  
A number of respondents directly addressed voluntary measures in their responses 
to these questions as well as in other sections related to stay-down and to platform 
liability in general. The Commission’s summary of the submissions provides a synopsis 
of responses regarding voluntary measures. In the summary, the EC wrote, “Over half of 
the online intermediaries described voluntary measures to remove certain categories of 
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illegal content from their systems...most of these voluntary measures are targeting 
intellectual property infringements, child sexual abuse material, hate-speech, defamation, 
privacy and [fraud.]”446 The EC also summarized the key argument on the part of 
intermediaries in regard to self-filtering:  
Many intermediaries prefer that duty-of-care remains voluntary. They argue that 
they are already expected to take action when notified, which is a type of duty-of-
care, and that the Commission should foster the voluntary adoption and 
improvement of notice and action mechanisms already implemented by E.U. 
intermediaries.447  
The analysis below focuses on the arguments presented by intermediaries on that point. It 
also examines the responses of a small group of rightsholder groups that argued that the 
ECD already allows for governments to strongly encourage self-policing and that such 
filtering is not per se barred under the ECD’s framework.   
Platforms and other intermediaries cited their current voluntary measures as 
evidence that the status quo was working and that they were investing in filtering 
technologies to protect consumers – voluntarily going above and beyond the law. Their 
focus was on what was already being done, as well as efficiency and effectiveness. Some 
respondents also argued that a light touch to regulation is preferable as a general principle 
for technology policy – for efficiency, flexibility and innovation. And a small group of 
rightsholder organizations argued that the Commission should not reform the e-
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Commerce Directive but should instead use it to “strongly encourage” further voluntary 
agreements.   
The platform industry group, the Internet Association, argued that intermediaries 
were currently doing enough to prevent harm through voluntary efforts. They wrote, “The 
current legal framework is supplemented by voluntary efforts…that help stop the 
spread…of harmful content.”448 EuroISPA, which represents over 1800 internet service 
providers across Europe, agreed with this point and claimed that voluntary agreements 
actually do more to filter illegal content globally than regulation that is limited by 
jurisdictional boundaries. They wrote, “…intermediaries have developed their own 
policies, or adhered to codes of conduct, under which remedies can be provided that are 
broader than could be prescribed by law e.g., global removal of copyright infringing 
content.”449 Facebook also argued that no further regulation was needed when platforms 
were doing it themselves. They wrote, “A number of services have also voluntarily 
exceeded…obligations by creating additional tools, such as Facebook’s recently 
announced copyright matching tool.”450 Facebook also argued that agreements between 
platforms and rightsholders were more flexible because they could adapt to changing 
business models, changing technologies, and new kinds of threats. Digital Europe, an 
association representing the consumer electronics industries, argued also for efficiency of 
voluntary measures. They wrote, “We believe that [voluntary measures] are more 
efficient than any imposed obligation… As a matter of fact, many online intermediaries 
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have already put in place their own monitoring systems.”451 Tech-Net, a network of tech 
industry CEO’s also cited current efforts in their argument for the status quo. They wrote, 
“there are currently many voluntary, proactive measures adopted by intermediaries and a 
number of existing agreements between intermediaries, rights holders, and enforcement 
authorities.”452 EDiMA, a European trade association representing online platforms, cited 
specific examples of self-regulatory tools currently in place to make their case that 
platforms were effectively policing themselves. They wrote, “Some [platforms] have 
developed specific systems to further prevent the sharing of copyright infringing content, 
for example, DailyMotion’s signature, YouTube’s Content ID, and Facebook’s recently 
announced copyright matching tool.”453  The think tank, the International Center for Law 
and Economics, made the broader argument that regulation, as a rule, should be a last 
resort. They wrote, “…it is generally preferable to seek every means of encouraging 
independent pro-social behavior of these large platforms before resorting to intrusive and 
distortionary regulation.”454 
Platforms and the industry associations that represent them were joined by a 
group of rightsholder organizations, who also argued for voluntary measures and against 
re-opening the ECD. This group included the Motion Picture Association (MPA), 
International Video Federation (IVF), International Federation of Film Producers 
Association (FIAPF), and European Association of Film Agencies (EFADS). These 
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groups argued that it is not necessary to remove and replace the ECD, but the 
Commission should strongly encourage more voluntary agreements between 
rightsholders and intermediaries – through releasing some type of “interpretive 
communication” or “recommendation.” The MPA argued, “Changing the ECD is not 
required, but the Commission should step up efforts to encourage voluntary agreements 
between rights holders and legitimate platforms.”455 IVF wrote, “We believe that the 
Copyright Directive, as interpreted by the CJE.U., already embodies relevant 
principles.”456 EFADS agreed, “The Commission should explore how to implement this 
principle without opening the ECD.”457 FIAPF concurred, “Changing or reopening the E-
Commerce Directive is not required to address this situation…”458 Together these four 
European film industry groups advocated that the EC take some type of alternative 
approach, rather than a wholesale reform of the existing regulation. FIAPF argued for 
non-regulatory solutions, “…the Commission could more strongly encourage voluntary 
agreements between right holders and legitimate platforms and could codify current case 
law via recommendations and/or interpretative communications.”459 EFADS argued for 
three possible options such as, “interpretative communication, revision of the Copyright 
Directive and/or IPRED [the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive].”460 It 
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the Commission should look to relevant case law in member states, “Several E.U. MS 
have already developed such voluntary agreements, the Commission should consider 
building on this experience and relevant case law at the Member State level to promote 
model agreements (including in the follow the money strategy)”461 IVF appears to argue 
that the ECD is fit for purpose, but just needs clarification. It is therefore the job of the 
Commission to provide that clarification to member states. IVF stops short of specific 
prescription on how best the Commission should go about doing so, but they are clear 
that it should not involve reopening the directive. They wrote, “The Commission may 
wish to explore alternative means to clarify (via a recommendation, communication or 
separate legislative instrument) that sites, which are actively involved in content 
distribution, cannot avail themselves of the liability privileges.”462   
It is notable that the group of rightsholders that argued for replacing the ECD – it 
is not fit for purpose – was comprised of music industry groups and anti-counterfeiting 
groups. On the other hand, the group that argued to keep the ECD and to clarify it with 
some type of recommendation, was comprised of motion picture industry groups. At this 
point, in late 2015, there appears to split amongst rightsholder groups in the E.U., in 
regard to the direction the EC should take at this time.  
Discourse: ECD Created the Internet in Europe 
 Lawyers and technologists on both sides of the Atlantic have claimed that well-
crafted immunity laws, such as CDA § 230 literally created the internet that we have 





businesses.463 In so doing, they imagine a world without the ECD, § 230 or the DMCA – 
where the first intermediaries would never have been allowed to grow and the platforms 
of today would not exist. Without the legal shield, their ideas would be stuck before 
release – chilled and limited by the constraints of liability. This discourse invokes a three-
way relationship between the government, internet startups, and consumers. In this three-
legged stool of an open internet, government protects the startups so startups can provide 
more communication tools to users, and all parties benefit. In turn, the state protects 
freedom of expression, fosters economic development and startups continue to grow. 
And, users (all of us), reap seemingly endless benefits to our individual lives from 
digitally networked tools we use every day. Judges in numerous federal courts of the 
United States have supported this interpretation of immunity laws.464 And, a number of 
Governments have received innumerable benefits from privately developed and managed 
platform technologies and collaborate with platforms to perform state functions.465  
In their written comments to the EC, Platform companies deployed this 
construction – that the ECD created the internet in Europe (see figure 8.3) – in an attempt 
to appeal to the Commission’s interest in a certain liberal democratic notion of the 
internet. This discourse helped to promote and maintain the free flow of commerce across 
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Voluntary agreements and voluntary measures are working: 
 
 Industry Associations Representing Platforms: 
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two below) 
o International Video Federation (IVF) (identical response 
to FIAPF) 
o International Federation of Film Producers Association 
(FIAPF)  
o European Association of Film Agencies (EFADS) (unique 
response, but similar) 
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They also coupled the stated goals of the Digital Single Market initiative with the 
ECD. In so doing, they portrayed the ECD as the singular law that allowed the internet 
economy in Europe to be born and to mature. Representatives of industry associations 
that advocate for platforms and the spokespeople and in-house council for platform 
companies wrote that the ECD was the essential infrastructure for growth, an innovation 
engine, the legal foundation of economic growth in Europe – and that the law that 
undergirds all of the information society. In their construction, this law is also future 
proof and all future possibilities for all online users hinged on this one law. In other 
words, any fundamental changes to it could chill the next tech industry boom before it 
leaves the developer’s metaphorical garage. 
The Asociación de Empresas de Electrónica, Tecnologías de la Información, 
Telecomunicaciones y Contenidos Digitales (AMETIC) (an association that defends the 
interests of the Spanish digital sector) and Digital Europe, who represents Information 
Technology, telecoms and consumer electronics companies across Europe, submitted 
identical comments that implored the Commission to see the ECD as crucial to a 
functional internet in Europe. They wrote,  
The liability limitations for third party content provided by the eCommerce 
Directive have been essential to the development of online services in Europe and 
its principles have underpinned the development of the Internet in Europe as the 
Digital Single Market Communication recognizes.466 
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Orgalime, who represents the consumer electronics industry in Europe, concurred, “…its 
principles have allowed the development of [the] Internet in Europe.”467 EDiMA, a 
European trade association representing online platforms, conjured the image of the ECD 
as a timeless treasure that, once altered, could lead irreparable harm to the digital 
economy. They wrote, “The layered framework in the e-commerce Directive shows huge 
foresight and has proved enduring, providing precious legal certainty for the digital 
players in a market where such certainty has been limited.”468 Facebook used one of the 
Commission’s own studies on the impact of the ECD to claim the singularity of the law 
for intermediaries.  
…The 2007 study prepared for the Commission on the economic impact of the 
Directive notes that ‘several intermediary service providers suggested that this 
provision is the single most important one in the directive for intermediaries, 
because it so clearly provides certainty in a crucial area where there was 
uncertainty before.’ This remains true today.469 
Orange, the French telecommunications company wrote, “The exemptions for 
liability of intermediaries contained in the E-Commerce Directive are core principles for 
the functioning of the information society and for the provision of innovative 
services.”470 Two Dutch groups, Nederland ICT and Stichting Digitale Infrastructuur 







the development of a prosperous European Internet Ecosystem…”471 The Internet 
Association472 broadened the frame of safe harbors to include the United States and 
contrasted the insecure times when startups were not protected by immunity laws, to the 
confidence in the marketplace that the law provided. They positioned safe harbors as a 
progressive and liberal approach – where the state filled a wide legal gap with a policy 
ahead of its time, “In the Internet’s early days, the legal status of startups was uncertain. 
However, both the United States Congress and the EC Commission responded to this 
vacuum in an enlightened way and courts in both systems have done a good job 
interpreting these legal frameworks…” Technet, a bipartisan group of technology CEOs 
based in the United State used the principles behind immunity laws to connect the 
interests of government, business, and users. In this interpretation, immunity laws are 
vital to nearly all stakeholders who use or depend on digital technologies. Technet 
submitted, “Strong intermediary liability protections promote innovation, empower users 
and small businesses to use platforms to reach a global audience, and encourage free 
expression and the democratization of access to information.”473 
Discussion 
After four years of research and negotiations, the European Parliament approved 
Article 17 of DSMD in April of 2019. Its regulation of platform liability further 
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fragments the international picture of copyright safe harbors, as the law contrasts with the 
U.S. and Canadian models in significant ways. For example, it is far more protective to 
copyright holders than the two other models under study here. Rather than notice-and-
takedown or notice-and-notice, it requires notice-and-stay-down in all E.U. member 
states. In the end, it appears to obligate automated filtering – although it does not state 
that requirement explicitly.474  
According to Bridy, there are two sections of Article 17 that stand out as being 
most important for understanding the implication of the law and how it compares to other 
models. First, the law defines a new class of intermediaries. In the text of Article 17, this 
new category of intermediaries is labelled, “online content-sharing service provider” 
(OCSSP). The OCSSP label refers to platforms that stream and store large amounts of 
copyrighted works, specifically audiovisual files for profit, such as YouTube. In the case 
of YouTube, for example, the content is user-generated, but the OCSSP provided the 
means of the user-generated exhibition. Secondly, in addition to establishing the OCSSP, 
Article 17 includes a “best efforts” clause to define the intermediary’s responsibilities in 
a notice-and-stay-down system. To avoid liability, the OCSSP first receives and notice of 
an infringing post. Second, the platform must apply its “best efforts to prevent further 
uploads of the notified works and other subject matter for which the rightsholders have 
provided relevant and necessary information.”475 There is no specific requirement in the 
final text that requires one particular method for preventing further uploads. The text only 
refers to “suitable and effective means” and “professional diligence.”476 As Bridy argues, 
 




automated filtering methods are the only practical method of compliance with a stay-
down requirement. This de facto obligation to implement upload filters is the 
fundamental shift that Article 17 represents.477  
 This chapter examines only one phase in the negotiations in the E.U. that led up to 
the passage of Article 17. But this sample of 46 stakeholder submissions contain some of 
the core arguments and discourses that characterized the politics of platform immunity in 
the E.U. in 2015. First, it is clear that all parties were framing the reforms in question as a 
significant departure from the previous directive that regulated intermediary liability – 
the e-Commerce Directive (ECD) (2000). A broad coalition of technology and 
telecommunication groups argued for keeping the ECD and a coalition of rightsholder 
groups argued for reform. Even though this is just a sample of the stakeholder 
submissions to one consultation, we can still see evidence of the depth and breadth of the 
internet platform lobby (and it’s supporting coalition) in the E.U. (see figures 1 and 4). 
Representatives from nearly every technology sector wrote in favor of keeping the ECD 
and its notice and takedown mechanism. These representatives made informed and 
detailed regulatory arguments and deployed targeted discourses. This coalition was led by 
large platform companies that were headquartered in the U.S., such as Facebook. But the 
coalition also included thousands of start-ups, software developers, and service providers 
from within E.U. member states. For example, the group Stichting Digitale Infrastructuur 
Nederland (DINL) submitted a statement to the EC arguing in favor of keeping notice 




DINL is the voice of hundreds of online companies and represents the interests of 
leading parties in the Netherlands that provide underlying technical facilities and 
services for the digital society. The members of DINL are the DDA (Dutch 
Datacenter association), the DHPA and ISPconnect (representing the hosting and 
cloud sector), the NLNet foundation, SURFnet (the NL academic network), 
AMS-IX (the world’s largest Internet Exchange point), SIDN (the ccTld registry 
for .nl), the VVR (Dutch domain registrars association) and NL ICT - The NL IT 
sector organisation.478 
Figure 8.4. Stakeholder Discourse: The E-Commerce Directive Created the Internet in 
Europe 
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Most of the other E.U. stakeholders who wrote in favor of notice-and-takedown 
represented similar types of companies – datacenters, cloud computing companies, 
hosting companies, domain registrars, and IT companies. Most were headquartered 
within E.U. and have direct connections to the platform economy in Europe. These 
platform industry groups were supported by online advertisers, consumer electronic 
groups, digital rights advocates, think tanks, and general business groups.  
 A much smaller and narrow coalition argued against notice-and-takedown, and 
for a stay-down system. These group was led by the motion picture industry and music 
recording and publishing groups. They had support from retail brands and broadcasters. 
The balance of these groups represented E.U.-based rightsholders, publishing companies, 
and artists.        
 Each side deployed discourse to support their position to the EC and to influence 
the public narrative of safe harbors in the E.U. The technology sector claimed that the 
legal shield provided by the ECD created the internet economy in Europe. In this 
construction, they invoked a story of the law as the benevolent protector of a universal 
society benefit. The lessoning of liability leads not just to further investment in 
commerce, but it contributes to the greater public good as well. It allows small startups to 
experiment and innovate without fear of liability and the public gains. While this 
discourse appeals to a positive public opinion of internet technologies, much is hidden. 
Chapter Summary   
This chapter was an investigation into the actors, arguments, and discourses of 
Article 17 of the new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market that became 
law in the European Commission in 2018. The chapter began with a brief description of 
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the law and how it fits within the recent history of internet policymaking in the E.U. The 
primary focus of this investigation was over 40 stakeholder submissions to the Public 
Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries, and 
the Collaborative Economy that was commissioned by the European Commission in late 
2015.479 I identified two central stakeholder debates and one discursive construction that 
characterized the texts of these submissions. The central arguments and discourses of 
these debates are described, as well as how they connect to debates in other jurisdictions 
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Both internet policymaking and free trade negotiations have separately faced 
crises of legitimacy amongst mass publics that see little personal agency over the 
financial and telecommunications decisions that affect their future possibilities.480 To 
foster a sense of agency and to avoid the political consequences of a legitimacy crisis, 
Moss argues that internet policymaking must maintain and assert democratic processes 
that prioritize public involvement and a diversity of ideas and interests.481 In addition, 
this governance should be done on the foundation of a cosmopolitan rights framework. 
Moss cites Benhabib482 in arguing that a rights framework has proven effective in holding 
stakeholders and institutions accountable and can be useful for prescribing a shared 
vision of the internet that makes the connection between opportunities for democratic 
participation and the openness of the system. As Moss argues,  
...the internet has the potential to facilitate more deliberative-democratic forms of 
participation…. [Therefore,] rights relating to democratic participation - given 
their importance in procedural terms in interpreting and legitimating rights more 
generally - warrant certain priority in our thinking about how the internet should 
be governed.483  
 
480 see CHAKRAVARTTY AND SARIKAKIS, supra note 104; Moss, supra note 104. 
481 Moss, supra note 104. 
482 see Seyla Benhabib, Claiming Rights across Borders: International Human Rights and Democratic 
Sovereignty, 103 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 691–704 (2009); Seyla Benhabib, The legitimacy of human rights, 
137 DAEDALUS 94–104 (2008). 
483 Moss, supra note 104 at 391. 
 241 
We can see intermediary liability law as one shifting terrain of struggle over just 
the argument that Moss presents, as the decision point between specific competing rights 
- the right to freedom of expression as it relates to democratic participation and the right 
to private property, or intellectual property rights. In other words, the debates within, and 
the outcomes of policymaking processes that relate to copyright enforcement on the 
internet help us to see “how rights are best realized in practice” and what “balance is to 
be struck when rights conflict.”484 In turn, we can see what values are guiding internet 
policymaking, how those values are asserted in a non-transparent policymaking process, 
and how best to intervene to envision a more participatory future.  
In following pages, I outline what the findings in these three case studies reveal 
about the political economy of internet intermediary law in the current period. First, I 
argue that the corporate capture of copyright lawmaking has entered a new era 
characterized by two central characteristics: the semi-privatization of the law and the 
rapid rise in the political power of internet platforms. Second, the recent reforms of 
digital copyright enforcement are slowly limiting possibilities in online spaces and this 
process is happening in relative darkness. In other words, the regulation of automation 
and broader implications of automation are not well understood by the public or by 
governments. And third, the discourses of policymaking of intermediary liability law are 
geopolitical. In other words, the dominant discourses used by lobbyists and lawmakers 
alike portray the interests of internet platforms and the state as overlapping. While this is 
certainly not new in terms of the history of copyright policymaking, there is little 
discussion in the literature about the relationship between platform self-governance and 
 
484 Id. at 377. 
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geopolitical agendas. The chapter concludes with some theoretical implications of these 
findings, outlining the limitations of these three studies, and proposing ideas for future 
research.      
Corporate Capture and Safe Harbors 
 While there is some debate about the extent to which digital copyright rules can 
create agency and public good,485 studies of copyright policymaking have demonstrated 
that large entertainment companies have attained unethical levels of lobbying power that 
have been relatively unchallenged by democratic accountability.486 In the arena of 
copyright, examples include the WTO TRIPS agreement, ACTA, and the variety of bills 
in the U.S. Congress.487 These investigations show how the values of private property 
gained prominence and shifted policy over time to further restrictions and fewer 
limitations and exceptions – aided by the lobbying power of a small group of 
multinational entertainment and software companies.488 As changes in consumer 
electronics and digital technology evolved, discourse surrounding enforcement justified 
harsh penalties, threats, and fines with the language of the law – labelling large scale 
counterfeiters and individual users alike, as pirates. This discourse of direct infringement 
carried through to the popular narrative of digital copyright. Available copies could be 
considered and labelled as illegitimate and illegal or legitimate/legal depending on how 
 
485 See Chander and Sunder, supra note 116. 
486 HORTEN, supra note 73 at 272. 
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they were obtained and produced.489 The policy discourse of the corporate-led fights 
against direct piracy in the 1980s and 1990s was aided by high-profile raids by both 
private security and law enforcement agencies. For example, the aggressive legal 
activities of Software Business Alliance in the 1990s focused on private investigations 
and public raids. In one of the earliest domestically published cases, U.S. marshals raided 
offices in New Jersey and California and seized an estimated $9 million worth of illegal 
versions of MS-DOS. The tactic of using U.S. marshals for search and seizure operations 
continued throughout the 1990s.490 Pirates used hard infrastructure – disc replicators 
(software) camcorders and DVD replicators (cinema) – to create and distribute illegal 
copies. Related discursive constructions of this type of pre-internet piracy and direct 
infringement were used in congressional hearings well into the 2010s.491 Also, in regard 
to peer-to-peer downloading and illegal cyber lockers, direct infringement was 
discursively linked with direct investigation, prosecution, and penalty – fines, raids, and 
the involvement of law enforcement agencies.492 The crime can be considered a private 
transaction, but in cases involving direct infringement, the enforcement of the law often, 
but not always, involves one or more state agencies. The public narrative, and hence the 
policy discourse has been driven by and characterized by high profile raids and arrests 
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– to attack the infrastructure of direct infringement and pressure lawmakers to dedicate 
resources to these types of enforcement.  
 In the case of copyright safe harbors, and in the findings in this study, we can see 
the emergence of a new discourse of copyright that frames the indirect (or secondary) 
infringement of intermediaries and the policies that incentivize the self-regulation of 
those intermediaries. In terms of direct infringement and law enforcement action, 
discourses that support further copyright restrictions and the involvement of the state in 
that enforcement, rely on a public narrative of illegality and the fight against that anti-
social behavior. What we see in regard to the dominant public narrative of safe harbors 
(and indirect infringement in general) contains little of a policing/law enforcement frame. 
In these three case studies, stakeholders largely replace narratives of the state – law 
enforcement and policing – with discourses of self-regulation. As a legal framework, self-
regulation is positioned as a modern and high standard 21st century approach that 
achieves universal goals – growth in the internet economy and jobs in the technology 
sectors. Certainly, the political divisions between the copyright industries and platform 
companies remain, but debates (in these cases) relate to mechanics of self-regulation, not 
the legitimacy of self-regulation itself.     
 Three discourses support self-regulation and semi-privatization: 1. the 21st century 
agreement; 2. the digital economy, and 3. safe harbors created the internet. In the case of 
the TPP, the 21st century agreement discourse appeals to what is understood as a 
universal need: for the law to be up-to-date, modern, forward looking, serving the 
economy of the future. Second, the created the internet discourse imagines a lawless 
internet of the past and a regulated, safe, and profitable internet economy of the current 
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day. This discourse can be found in all the policymaking debates analyzed in this study: 
in the E.U., Canada, and the U.S. While, the created the internet discourse looks to the 
past successes of safe harbors, the digital economy discourse looks to the future – to 
imagine new levels of economic growth facilitated by the legal shield that the law 
provides. These narratives position internet platforms – Facebook, Google, and Amazon 
– as 21st century protagonists. Their successes are not limited to the technology sector – 
but their growth is essential to the well-being of the nation and all of our individual 
possibilities. In this construction, copyright liability is a real threat to their growth and, in 
turn a threat to the universal benefits received from platform growth – information 
access, social connection, and the gig economy. And given the norm established by § 512 
of the DMCA, the solution to the threat can only be considered in relationship to the 
standard of notice-and-takedown. Simply put, if safe harbors created the internet of the 
early 2000s, it would work for the internet of the 2020s. This discourse sidesteps the 
threats of self-regulation to user possibilities and to users’ rights to contest takedowns. 
The appeal to universal benefits erases arguments regarding the expense of compliance 
for new entrants, the lack of due process in enforcement, and the inherent lack of 
transparency in automated takedowns. I would argue that the success of these discourses 
– 21st century, digital economy, and created the internet – signal an emerging hegemony 
of privatization of regulation in the area of copyright. This new period is different from 
past eras of policymaking in two respects – the political dominance of platforms and the 
norm of privatization of media policy. 
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The Lobbying Power of Platforms  
Since the passage of the DMCA, all the multilateral and bilateral free trade 
agreements that were led by the U.S. have included some form of notice-and-takedown in 
their intellectual property chapters. But, a number of states including Brazil and Chile, as 
well as Canada, have developed and implemented some form of liability protection for 
internet intermediaries that can be seen as alternatives to the U.S. model. The processes 
involved in a state’s decision to adopt safe harbors are distinct in each case and states are 
adopting their own particular methods of liability protections that are resulting in distinct 
policy outcomes. This diverse patchwork of safe-harbor legal mechanisms represents a 
challenge to the scholarly analysis of intellectual property law adoption in regard to the 
corporate capture of copyright policymaking by the entertainment and software industry 
lobbies. 
Given the available analysis of E.U. and U.S. copyright policymaking, we would 
expect the lobbying power of the creative industries to hold influence over other 
interests.493 In the United States, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) has 
lobbied for favorable copyright law domestically for many decades, reaching various 
levels of government and a variety of state agencies to apply trade pressure to foreign 
governments to combat piracy and enforce international copyright laws. The lobbying 
activities of the MPAA have been found to correlate with election cycles and the 
legislative pushes on PIPA and SOPA in 2011. The MPAA has used the discursive power 
of industry-funded studies to argue that the creative sector takes large losses due to 
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piracy.494 The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), another industry group 
based in the U.S., publishes a special 301 watchlist every year that identifies countries 
whose domestic policy environments are potentially favorable to pirates. Also, the IIPA 
commissions research in the form of the “Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy” 
report, which presents the economic contribution of the copyright industries to GDP and 
to U.S. employment. In an analog environment–based on direct sales–the MPAA was 
able to build enough power over time to capture both domestic and U.S.-led free trade 
copyright policymaking. In the digital environment, the MPAA has involved other 
partners–such as payment processers and intermediaries–in its enforcement efforts.495  
In contrast, the Canadian case reveals that numerous creative industry 
associations were not able to sway MPs to adopt a U.S.-style approach to digital 
copyright. U.S.-trade pressure was referred to throughout the legislative hearings on the 
Copyright Modernization Act and the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership were 
ongoing during the Canadian copyright debates. In this context, Canadian lawmakers 
held on to framework that countered both E.U. and U.S. policy. This lack of conformity 
in digital policy on the international level suggests an era of platform governance that is 
led by the lobbying power of large technology firms. 
Given the outsized influence of big tech’s lobbying power during this period 
(2010 to 2016), the discourses they deploy deserve attention and further analysis. An 
account of such policy narratives contributes to our understanding of where human rights 
are situated in political dialog and how exactly corporate messaging connects to policy 
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outcomes. But what of the political economic power balance itself? What do these 
debates and these coalitions tell us about the transformation of media power in the 
platform era? In the early 2010s, political economists pointed to the lobbying dominance 
of the copyright industries.496 But scholarship seems to indicate that the platform lobby is 
overtaking both traditional internet service providers (ISPs) and the copyright 
industries.497 Winseck cites intermediary liability specifically as evidence that the 
technology lobby has overtaken the copyright lobby, in terms of the political power 
needed to influence media policy. To Winseck, it is not that social movements for 
internet freedom have created a new-found effectiveness over copyright lobbyists. The 
politics of internet policymaking could indicate that the compromises of the copyright 
industry are more likely related to the comparatively huge lobbying budgets of platforms 
such as Google and Facebook.498 To Popiel, the lobbying power of platforms is so great, 
in fact, that the public’s interest is not contested by big tech but subsumed to the point 
that big tech’s interests and the public interest are actually framed as one and the same.499 
In other words, Google’s policy goals define the greater good. Freedom of expression, 
access to information and the gig economy are merely positive aftereffects of the 
business of platforms.500  
 The findings for the three cases in this study add additional evidence to support 
this trend. In the case of the TPP, the USTR Michael Froman claimed that his office’s 
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mission was to negotiate for the priorities of the digital economy – to deliver a 21st 
century agreement to Congress and for the president. In 2014, he said, “When we talk 
about updating our trade agreements for the 21st century and bringing new issues like the 
emergence of the digital economy into those trade agreements, this is precisely what we 
are focused on.”501 Multiple members of Congress echoed the USTR. For example, 
Representative Kevin Brady of Texas said in 2011, “We must now make the most of this 
new momentum to seek 21st century solutions, to streamline trade to end non-tariff 
barriers…”502 General business associations also shared the interests of the tech lobby. In 
a written submission to the International Trade Council in 2016, Ambassador Alan Wolff 
of National Foreign Trade Council (ITC) wrote, “TPP stakes out important new ground in 
promoting an open digital economy throughout the Pacific Rim's participants. This alone 
makes the TPP a 21st Century Agreement.”503 For the technology industry, Stephen Ezell 
of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation wrote in a submission to the 
ITC, “When it comes to information technology policy, the TPP agreement generally sets 
a high bar that will maximize the opportunity for innovation worldwide.”504 Ed Black of 
the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA)505 wrote in a prepared 
statement to Congress in 2011,  
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The USTR needs to become a vocal force pushing for strong pro-Internet language in 
both bilateral and regional trade agreements. If the TPP is really going to set the gold 
standard for 21st century trade agreements, it must address the issues pertinent to the 
most dynamic element of the 21st century economy.506 
Alongside the 21st century discourse, lobbyists and lawmakers in Canada, the 
E.U., and the U.S. have made use of the digital economy discourse to portray the benefits 
of safe harbors as universal and as a key component of social progress online. Public 
statements and government documents surrounding the Canadian Government’s Digital 
Economy Strategy507 contain a number of illustrative examples of this dialog – as it 
connects with the broader interests of government. In the Speech from the Throne on 
March 3rd, 2010, Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada announced the importance 
of Canada’s digital economic growth. She said, “To fuel the ingenuity of Canada's best 
and brightest and bring innovative products to market… [our Government] will launch a 
digital economy strategy to drive the adoption of new technology across the economy.”508 
The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) submitted a policy white paper to the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) in 2016 entitled, “Encouraging Economic Growth 
in the Digital Age: A Policy Checklist for the Digital Economy.” The NTFC’s platforms 
ostensibly spoke for all its members, not just who that would be benefit directly from safe 
harbors. The tech industry association TechUK wrote the European Commission in 2015 
and argued that the platform economy and the digital economy were so intertwined as to 
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be indistinguishable. Is their submission to the EC’s public consultation, TechUK wrote, 
“So fundamental is the platform model to the functioning of the digital economy that it is 
difficult to separate out the benefits of platforms from the benefits of the digital economy 
as a whole.”509  
Despite the different legal outcomes, the policy debates of these three laws reveal 
that there was, at least at the time of these hearings, broad coalitions of stakeholders in 
each jurisdiction that used the discourse of the platform industries. General business 
associations, public policy think tanks, legal experts, telecommunications companies, 
lawmakers, and government agency heads in all three cases used the arguments and 
discourses of the platform industries to argue in favor of limiting the liability of 
intermediaries. There were in some cases differences related to the details of the legal 
text, but I argue that the presence of these discursive coalitions points to the broadly 
recognized power of the platform and technology lobby in this period.  
The Gradually Increasing Threats to Communication Rights 
 Legal analysts have described recent trends in internet policy as a slow but sure, 
disorganized set of confrontations that limit user possibilities and chip away at digital 
rights. These haphazard losses and hits to the public interest have been framed in terms of 
the gradual removal of the public domain510 and the enclosure of the internet into a set of 
private, commercially controlled spaces.511 I argue that the three laws presented in these 
three case studies aid and contribute to what Monica Horten refers to as the closing of the 
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prism through which we “view and interact with culture, knowledge, and beliefs.”512 
They do so not in a rapid radical break with what was before, but act against our rights, as 
Horten argues, in the form of a “gradual closing, a piecemeal application of the barrier 
tape.”513 Article 17 of the Digital Single Market Directive mandates the enforcement of 
stay-down as a prerequisite to legal immunity. In so doing, it makes automated content 
filtering as the de facto mechanism of the law in practice. The TPP’s copyright 
provisions, if enacted, would allow member states to simply toss out the user protections 
that are found in § 512 of the DMCA. Its vague and flexible language would create a 
patchwork of standards in TPP countries and could lead towards a stay-down approach in 
the U.S. in the coming years. The Canadian standard of notice-and-notice is certainly 
more protective of users’ rights than Article 17 or the TPP, but it still lives on the 
spectrum of semi-privatization and automation. In all three cases, there is little 
government oversight of enforcement and seeming no mandates of transparency of 
individual takedowns. In these jurisdictions, public accountability rests with those users 
who have the legal resources to fight individual takedowns and internet rights NGOs who 
apply public pressure within (and outside) internet policymaking fora. 
Theoretical Considerations 
As a theoretical lens, the critical political economy of the media approach can 
complement other frameworks of media policy analysis by foregrounding the power 
dynamics of policymaking. At times, political economists provide detailed accounts of 
market power – market share and monopolistic structures – while in other cases, 
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scholarship points to trends in soft power, such as lobbying and other forms of political 
influence.514 Recently, political economists have published a number of significant 
studies that chart the abuses of power by internet platform companies and the dominant 
corporations in the technology sectors.515 Given their explicit normative orientation, these 
studies have been able to provide evidence and analyses that help us understand the 
politics of the internet over time. In particular, political economy can examine the how 
questions of media policy change. Studies of structural power – both hard and soft power 
– do indeed compliment scholarship and critique of legal scholarship and internet 
governance. In addition, political economic research and critique can aid in tangible 
policy change. As recently as July 2020, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives questioned the CEOs of Google and Facebook on their market power.516 
In these hearings, the power of platforms was questioned by lawmakers across the 
political spectrum. The theories of the critical political economy of the media can be 
useful in guiding the moral and democratically oriented response to these events, while 
critical scholarship can also contribute to the public understanding of these types of 
changes. Indeed, political economy has maintained a focus on the historical trajectory of 
changes in the structural power in the media system and is poised to contribute to a 
moment when monopoly power is publicly questioned.  
Two theoretical frameworks, Braman’s theory of the informational state and Jin’s 
theory of platform imperialism, offer contrasting models of the nature of government 
power within the context of the exponential rise of digital platform technologies and 
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broadband connectivity. To Braman, information law and policy research in the digital 
age is guided by three central questions: How should existing laws be reformed to 
“achieve enduring social and political goals?”; What do the changes in the law actually 
mean for us?; And, third, “What is the nature of government in the deeply informatized 
world of the twenty-first century?”517 Given that the state’s ability to gather and process 
information has altered institutions of governance and information processing and access 
has changed the conditions for the exercise of power, there is now a change of state. In 
sum, the exercise of informational power has transformed the bureaucratic welfare state 
into the informational state where governments “consistently control information 
creation, processing, flows, and use to exercise power.”518 
On the other hand, Jin argues that there is not necessarily a change in the nature of the 
state, but imperialism and geopolitical contestations persist. In the platform era, the 
makeup of corporate-state power has changed, but Jin argues that the cultural imperialism 
of the post-war period has been replaced with a platform imperialism of the technology 
economy. Citing the dominance of U.S. platforms in all markets except China and Korea, 
Jin writes, “…it is not controversial to say that American dominance has been continued 
with platforms. Platforms have functioned as a new form of production and distribution 
that the U.S. dominates. Arguably, we are still living in the imperialist era.”519 To Jin, the 
era of platform imperialism is characterized by three central conditions: First, the role of 
users as commodities to be bought and sold to advertisers, but also the power of users to 
resist platform ownership and control; second, the ideology of platforms in the form of 
 
517 BRAMAN, supra note 92. 
518 Id. 
519 JIN, supra note 74 at 6. 
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symbolic hegemony over the daily activities of billions of users around the world; third, 
the expansion of U.S. power through a non-territorial form of imperialism – one that 
lacks a direct political role, but is arguably an unlimited form of ideological 
dominance.520     
Recent reform efforts in intermediary liability law seems to point to the reach of 
platform imperialism into the implementation of platform regulation internationally. In 
the case of safe harbors, the state appears to have three distinct roles: brokering self-
regulatory agreements between industry stakeholders, (in some cases) maintaining a 
registry of ISPs and platforms that receive notices, and the adjudication of disputes (in 
cases where parties have the resources to litigate a takedown). These roles have been 
codified first in the passage of § 512 of the DMCA that established the standard by which 
reforms in other countries have followed, or not followed, in the case of Canada and the 
E.U. Whether other nations have adopted the same legal mechanism, I argue that the 
degrees of change are minor in the context of platform regulation – the guiding 
framework of self-regulation has been maintained through many jurisdictions. Self-
regulation, or the semi-privatization of regulation, supports the model that Jin proposes, 
as the ideology of platform economy extends through both market power and political 
influence.    
Limitations and Further Study 
 One of the most significant limitations of this study was the lack of publicly 
available documents. In the case of the TPP, I chose to focus on U.S. Congressional 
hearings because those transcripts are available. The documents analyzed in the TPP case 
 
520 Id. at 39. 
 256 
do reveal much about actors, arguments, and discourses in the U.S. Congress – but this 
analysis is limited to one national legislative body. The trade negotiations that led to 
TPP’s final text took over ten years and included lawyers and representatives from all 
member states. However, the arguments and discourses used by representatives and 
officials of the TPP member states remain hidden. Wikileaks was able to release draft 
texts, but not meeting transcripts. When and if these transcripts and notes are ultimately 
available, they may help researchers get a better understanding of how the U.S. 
negotiators were able to bring most parties to agree with their version of notice-and-
takedown. I expect also that these negotiations would include more substantive policy 
debates and regulatory arguments regarding the details and specific clauses in the 
intellectual property chapter of the TPP. Interview might also fill this gap, adding to what 
is available in the public record and Wikileaks releases. 
In the case of the Canadian Modernization Act, the Canadian government 
published most of the hearings related to bills C-11 and C-32, although some sessions 
were held in camera or in other words, available only to the committee members and not 
to lobbyists or the general public. Also, since 2012, the Canadian Parliament has 
completed further study into the effectiveness of the Copyright Modernization Act. Due 
to time constraints, I have not analyzed these new hearings. The transcripts of these new 
hearings and the resulting report that was completed in 2019 could be rich material for 
further study on the changing political economy of internet policy in Canada.521   
 
521 See https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/INDU/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=9897131 
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In the case of Article 17 in the E.U., a larger corpus would lead to a better 
understanding of policy discourses and how the automated filtering is being debated in a 
multilateral context that is not as favorable to U.S.-based platforms. The European 
Commission (EC) has created an enormous amount of documentation – hundreds of 
hours of video, numerous studies, and qualitative surveys, as well as transcripts of 
parliamentary debates. And, the EC continues to release more material, as the 
implementation of the digital single market directive is an on-going process. This 
material is vast and would best be analyzed by a team. The set of stakeholder submissions 
that was analyzed in this study is limited by its timeframe (2015), the language of the 
submissions (English), and by what the EC made publicly available. In this 2015 
consultation alone, there were hundreds of submissions that remain unpublished. 
Therefore, any conclusions that can be drawn from this corpus reflect only this 
consultation and may not be a large enough sample to make conclusions about the 
policymaking process in the E.U. surrounding the Digital Single Market Initiative.   
Finally, this research was limited by my language abilities. Multi-lingual analysis 
of documents in multiple jurisdictions could also allow for better understandings of how 
internet policies are being debated in the global south and in areas that are resisting U.S. 
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